

ЗАПИСКИ НАЧАЛЬНИКА РАЗВЕДКИ



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Abstract

These are the memories of an interesting person, almost all his life, starting from his service in a partisan detachment during the Great Patriotic War, who served in Soviet military intelligence, one of the creators of the GRU special forces (in particular, the author of the first instruction for special forces units). Although, for obvious reasons, the author carefully censored his notes, the memoirs contain a lot of, in my opinion, interesting information - both about the guerrilla war in Belarus and military operations against Japan, and about post-war events - after the war, the author studied at the Academy of the General Staff on the same course with D. Lozoi, served in intelligence in Berlin during the Berlin crisis, after the Berlin crisis and during the reform of the Soviet special forces, he was invited by the legendary saboteur Patrakhaltsev, at that time in the GRU the head of the direction of special forces units in the GRU, to the position of his deputy, was on special missions to Cuba and Ethiopia, was a Soviet military

chief

missions

connections

Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine.

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P.A. Golitsyn

Notes of the head of intelligence

about the author



Retired Major General Golitsyn Pavel Agafonovich was born in 1922 in the village. Chernostochinsk, Prigorodny district, Sverdlovsk region. He served in the Soviet Army from October 1940 to May 1984, constantly in intelligence. Passage of service: commander of a motorcycle platoon on the Western Front, commander of a reconnaissance platoon and head of intelligence of the Chekist partisan brigade (Belarus), deputy head of intelligence of the 105th rifle division and the 9th machine gun and artillery division of the 1st Far Eastern Front, and then Primorsky Military District, head of intelligence 20 Guards Army GSVG, head of intelligence of the Baltic Military District, head of the Soviet military communications mission under the Commander of the British Army of the Rhine (FRG). Three times, intermittently, he served in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - head of direction, head of department, deputy head of a research institute. Member of the Great Patriotic War from its first day, led the reconnaissance of the Chekist partisan brigade, whose sabotage and reconnaissance groups derailed 265 military echelons, destroyed 11 thousand Nazis. As part of the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, he participated in battles against the Japanese invaders. In the post-war period, he took an active part in organizing reconnaissance of the NATO troops and, in particular, the West Berlin garrison, the SGA troops. As part of Marshal's group

The Soviet Union Petrov VI took part in the development of plans and directly in the fighting in Ethiopia. Member of the CPSU since April 1944, admitted to the party by the Shklovsky underground district committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. Awarded with government awards: 8 orders (October Revolution, Red Banner, Patriotic War 1st class - twice, Red Star - three times, For service to the Motherland III class), 14 medals (including - "Partisan of the Patriotic War" I class., "For the victory over Germany", "For the victory over Japan"). Participant of the Victory parades - in Moscow in June 1945 and Vladivostok in October 1945.

Chapter 1. The first days of the war

At the beginning of October 1940, after a ten-day railway crossing in warm wagons, a team of young conscripts from the Urals arrived in the town of Suprasl, at that time in the Bialystok region, to the 4th motorcycle regiment. The regiment was quartered on the

territory of the former monastery, which occupied a significant area. In the center of the monastery stood an impressive church, adapted by the command of the regiment for a sports hall. Along the perimeter of the territory, enclosed by a meter-thick brick fence, there were brick buildings with monks' cells, converted into barracks. In the newly built wooden park premises there were motorcycles with sidecars AM-600 of the Taganrog plant, armored vehicles, wheeled transport vehicles.

The 4th Motorcycle Regiment was formed a year ago on the basis of one of the cavalry regiments, so among the Red Army soldiers and senior commanders, cavalry vocabulary was constantly present in everyday conversations, memories of serving in the cavalry and not a very friendly attitude to the new materiel - motorcycles and armored vehicles. The regiment was commanded by a representative, tall, fit,

with strict features, an old Russian officer (as the commanders said) Colonel Sobakin, who wore four rectangles (sleepers) on his buttonholes.

Our team, which arrived from the Urals, included about 40 people from the Visimsky district, including 4 from the same class of the Chernostochinsky secondary school: Viktor Bushin is my best childhood friend, Andrey Malinin is the son of my cousin, Fedor Shishov and me.

After spending the night in the "church-sports hall", we underwent a health check, washed ourselves in a bathhouse and put on a military uniform for the first time. We laughed, not recognizing each other in our new attire. To our great chagrin, instead of boots, we were given boots with windings. But we knew that there was an accelerated deployment in the West of ne

military units and formations, and it was clear that in the reserve of army the rear of the boots was not enough.

All of us, classmates from Chernostochintsy, were included in one team of young Red Army soldiers of the 2nd company of the 1st motorcycle battalion, commanded by Captain Kardanov.

After we were given carbines and equipment (duffel bags, bowlers, flasks, accessories for cleaning and lubricating weapons), classes began, the main disciplines of which were drill, physical and fire training, familiarity with the device and capabilities of a motorcycle, and the study of regulations.

The old-timers of the Red Army treated us young people very kindly, helped with advice and provided assistance in the service. Gun pyramids and

boxes of ammunition were in the corridors, at the exit from the sleeping quarters. The meaning of this placement was that when rising on alarm, the Red Army, wearing uniforms, when leaving the premises, received weapons and ammunition and followed in an organized manner to the place of construction. There were no rooms for storing weapons at that time.

After about a week of study, the foreman of the company Kovbasnya called Viktor Bushin and me, critically examined our appearance, gave half an hour to eliminate shortcomings and, by order of the company commander, took us to the battalion commander, Captain Kardanov. At the entrance to his office, we reported to him in a loud voice - we introduced ourselves. After carefully examining us and smiling very kindly, he invited us to sit down. We were tense to the limit, and, for the first time being face to face with such a big boss, we continued to stand. Then he announced to us that the command of the battalion had chosen you to be sent to study in Tashkent, at the school for the training of navigators for the Red Army Air Force. Admission to the school is voluntary, we have an order for two places. We were given a day to think and report on the decision.

My friend Victor immediately, without hesitation, answered for both: "We agree." But the captain, smiling again, said: "Think about it and come to me tomorrow." We turned around like a military man and left the office, near which the foreman of the company was waiting for us. We reported to him about the conversation with the battalion commander. Victor right away

pounced on me: "What to think about, this is what we need, this is our old dream." I didn't have such a dream. There was no particular desire to become a military man, although at that time it was very prestigious to become an officer. But Victor is different. From childhood, he was fond of aviation, led the OSOAVIAKHIM circle "Young Aircraft Builder" at school, made models of rubber-traction aircraft, organized aircraft modeling competitions in the village, built and launched kites on twine, read a lot about pilots. His favorite hero was Valery Chkalov. We slept side by side on the second floor. The night was sleepless for both of us. Victor persuaded

me to agree to enroll in an aviation school. I didn't agree. The next day we reported to the battalion commander about Victor's consent and my refusal. It was hard for me to report the refusal, but, as I understood, the battalion commander reacted to this with

understanding.

Instead of me and Viktor, a Red Army soldier Glukhov went to take exams, who did not pass the medical examination in Tashkent and returned to the regiment, and Viktor entered the school, completed the course on an accelerated program. At the beginning of the war, he made several sorties. Parting with Victor

was difficult. We both felt like we would never see each other again. In parting, Victor gave me his Photocor camera, and I handed him a pocket watch in a cast-iron case, which my mother bought me before being drafted into the army. At the end of 1942, Victor died - he did not return from a combat mission, as indicated in the funeral message of his mother. For me it was a great loss, because we were close friends with him.

Soon, all Red Army soldiers with a complete secondary and higher education (there were not so many of them) were gathered into a training company, called courses for the training of lieutenants.

In addition to newspaper materials and conversations of the command staff, we had no other information, but everyone understood that war was coming. They did not speak out loud, but everyone understood that the agreement with Hitler, concluded by the Soviet government in 1939, was only some delay in the start of hostilities.

The coursework was organized. The school days were extremely busy. Military regulations were strictly observed,

daily routine, discipline was maintained. Requirements from junior commanders and officers to cadets were tough. Most of the time we spent in the field - we studied the tactics of the actions of motorcycle units, were engaged in fire, physical and drill training. More often than other full-time units, we fired from a carbine, pistol, machine gun, and learned to drive motorcycles. They also taught us the basics of topography - mainly map reading and orientation to

terrain.

Mortars appeared in service with the newly formed motorcycle regiments. There were two mortar crews on our courses. I also got into one of them as the second number of the calculation. The rather simple device of a 50-mm company mortar, the methods of choosing and equipping a position, the rules for firing from them, we learned quite well. The first number of the calculation was one Ural engineer, whose duties included carrying the mortar, choosing a position, deploying the mortar for firing, aiming at the target and launching the mines.

My duties as the second number included carrying two trays with mines, supplying mines to the first number when firing, replacing the first crew number if necessary. When studying at the

courses, we recalled the secondary school, the organization OSOAVIAKHIM. It received some practical skills that were useful in the army. Defense circles worked at the school: a young aircraft builder, GSO (ready for sanitary defense), PVO (ready for chemical defense), BGTO (be ready for work and defense), Voroshilov shooter. The autumn of 1940, the first half of 1941, were spent in intense study at the courses: field

tactical exercises, exercises and firing, topography, primary methods of conducting reconnaissance by observation, actions on foot and motorcycle patrols, mapping enemy reconnaissance objects, taking coordinates, brief oral reports to the commander about the results of reconnaissance, classes on the study of the material part of weapons, motorcycles, practical driving and shooting - this was the main list of topics for combat training. In rare free moments, we communicated with each other, exchanged news received from home in letters. How could they support each other morally, since study and service were stressful.

Officially, we were told that after two years of training in the courses, we should be discharged from the army to the reserve with the assignment of the rank of "lieutenant". At the end of April 1941, a small group of cadets from our company left for the newly formed regiment. In the first days of May, I and two other cadets were introduced to the captain who arrived in the regiment, after a brief acquaintance with whom we were seconded to a new duty station. In the morning we got off the train, walked 10 kilometers and ended up in the town of Podbelye, 70 km south of Bialystok. Later we saw two more commanders. One of them, Captain Gromov, was the commander of the newly formed motorcycle regiment, the other, senior political instructor Dolgov, was the regiment's commissar, and the third, who brought us back from the courses, was the regiment's chief of staff.

The regiment commander, Captain Gromov, took us to the edge of the forest, lined us up and announced that a new military unit would be formed here in a few days. We realized that this would be a new motorcycle regiment.

One day senior political instructor Dolgov invited me and offered me the post of secretary of the Komsomol organization of the regiment. Apparently, my personal data suited him, or maybe there was no one to choose from, which is why he offered this elective post to me. Soon a Komsomol meeting took place, where I was elected to the regiment's Komsomol bureau. Soon the regiment's

deputy commander for the technical part arrived. Zampotech gathered several people with driving skills and set the task of driving motorcycles to the regiment, arriving by rail at the Gaynovka station, located about 30 km from the regiment's deployment site. I was appointed as the head of this team, and intensive work began for us on driving motorcycles. We were taken by truck to Gainovka, where at the unloading sites we removed the factory grease from the motorcycles, refueled them if necessary, and drove them to the regiment under our own power. Usually we made 2 trips a day, and thus delivered 15-20 motorcycles to the regiment daily. Quite intensively, other equipment came to us: armored cars, trucks, repair flights, but other military personnel were engaged in them. Echelons arrived from

recruits, officers who graduated from military schools arrived. The personnel were housed in dugouts, for the construction of which a pine forest was used, cut down near the location of the regiment. Equipment was stored in the open air on areas fenced with barbed wire.

Unlike the previous regiment, where I studied at the courses of lieutenants, there was no battalion level here. The newly formed regiment organizationally consisted of several motorcycle companies, an armored car company, an artillery battery, and combat and logistics support units.

I and another cadet were appointed commanders of motorcycle platoons, although we did not yet have officer ranks. Ordinary Red Army soldiers and sergeants addressed us: "Comrade cadet" or "Comrade platoon commander." I ended up in the second company, the commander of which was Senior Lieutenant Tverdokhlebov, who had just arrived from another unit. He must have been 30-35 years old. About 3-4 days before the start of the war, a young lieutenant, who had arrived from the school, was appointed commander of the second platoon. The duties of the commander of the third platoon were performed by the assistant platoon commander, foreman sergeant. We were engaged in the study of regulations, drill, fire, physical, tactical training, driving, but most of the time was spent on construction work.

The regiment commander, Captain Gromov, periodically organized general formations resembling a drill review. Apparently, he wanted to see for himself what he had at a certain moment. The units were built on a small parade ground adjacent to the forest. After the command "quietly" Gromov came out of the grove, received a report and bypassed the system. Several times in mid-June 1941, the regiment commander personally organized and conducted marches with the withdrawal of military equipment, weapons, and rear supplies. This usually began with an alert, followed by the exit of the regiment's units to the assembly area and a 10–15-kilometer march. Thus, the command of the regiment sought to carry out combat coordination of the unit in a short time. Approximately a week before the start of the war, the subunits of our unit were given ammunition, some of which was placed in motorcycles, and the rest were loaded onto vehicles. In units and in general in the regiment were strengthened

internal and guard services. Tension was felt in everything. On June 22, 1941, at about 5–6 o'clock in the morning, our regiment was alerted and, in an organized manner, as it was during training, went to the concentration area in a pine forest, located 7–10 km from the permanent deployment site. The subunits occupied the areas allotted to them, the commanders organized observation, and along the road leading from the place of deployment to the area of concentration of the regiment, motor vehicles of the rear stretched. Everyone thought it was another training session, but even before the official announcement of the start of the war, everyone saw a German aircraft with black crosses in the air, probably a reconnaissance aircraft, making circles over the place of concentration of our regiment. The heart of a warrior trembled.

At about 10 o'clock on June 22, the company commander Tverdokhlebov announced the beginning of the war. There were no constructions. A meeting of platoon commanders was held, at which Tverdokhlebov set tasks for the protection and defense of the occupied area and

camouflage. We did not know that early in the morning of June 22, 1941, the German ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, read to Molotov the text of Hitler's memorandum declaring war on the Soviet Union, and that at 12:22 on June Molotov spoke on the radio with an appeal to the Soviet people.

We also did not know that the troops of the Belarusian Military District, including our motorcycle regiment being formed, were at the forefront of the upcoming military battles, that troops of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were concentrated for strikes against the troops stationed in the Bialystok ledge. , 4th and 9-4 armies of the Nazis, whose task was to cut the troops of the Red Army, surround them and destroy them in the area between Bialystok and Minsk and develop an offensive against Smolensk and Moscow.

This is what actually happened. As a result of the sudden transition of the Germans to the offensive, the massive use of forces and means in the main directions, the enemy managed in the very first hours of hostilities to disrupt the front of the turnover of our troops, create a threat of encirclement of groupings, and disorganize command and control. From the very beginning of the war,

the German army was able to seize the strategic initiative, cut through our troops with strike groups, and inflict heavy losses on them in manpower and equipment. Especially

our aviation found itself in a difficult situation, which, without having time to disperse, lost most of the combat aircraft at the airfields. In the middle of the day

on June 22, the commissar of the regiment, senior political instructor-Dolgov, arrived to us, invited the company commander Tverdokhlebov and me to his place. He instructed us to take the military oath from the young Red Army men, who were in the majority in the company and regiment. Within a short time, this work was done, and the texts of the oath with the signatures of the soldiers were returned to the company commander. On June 22, we observed several times German reconnaissance aircraft and bomber formations flying east to bombard and returning to their airfields.

At about 06-17 on June 23 we took our places on motorcycles and moved in a column behind the command of the regiment. After a short drive north along a country road, the column turned west. The wounded were evacuated in open cars and horse-drawn carts. The sight of a large number of wounded and the withdrawal of troops had a depressing effect on us. The regiment moved along the

highway in an organized manner, at low speed, the retreating units gave way to us. Turning off the highway onto a country road and reaching the forest, we got off our motorcycles, went on foot to the edge of the forest, and at about 11 p.m. on June 23, turned into a chain and began to advance across an open field towards the small town of Bransk, already occupied by the Germans. My platoon was advancing on the right flank of the company, adjacent to the highway going east from Bransk. When the

regiment approached Bransk, the Germans opened heavy fire. The chain lay down and returned fire from small arms on the outskirts of the city. To my left, a platoon was advancing, commanded by a young lieutenant who had arrived in the regiment from the school before the start of the war. After the first salvo of the Germans, the lieutenant shouted loudly: "Oh, wounded, wounded." I crawled up to him, bandaged his chest wound with the help of two soldiers from his platoon, and ordered the soldiers to carry him to the rear of the chain and hand him over to the orderlies. After the dressing, the lieutenant calmed down. More wounded appeared, they were also evacuated to the rear. Neither we nor the Germans moved. This went on for several hours. As dawn broke, the fire

a group of Germans consisting of 5 people appeared on the highway on bicycles, moving in our direction. Letting them close, we opened fire. We killed 4 Germans, and one wounded

were taken prisoner.

The captured German was brought to our rear. By this time, without any command, the chain of the regiment began to retreat in scattered groups, and the Germans again opened heavy fire on the retreating soldiers.

Near the edge of the forest stood the major and watched the battlefield through binoculars. I approached him with three soldiers from my platoon and reported on the captured German. The major wrote down my last name, thanked me and asked me to report to my commander about the transfer of the captured German.

Materials from the history of the Belarusian Military District characterize the situation on the Bialystok ledge of the Western Front at that time as follows.

Chapter 2

The Bialystok ledge was covered by the troops of the 10th Army, the strongest in composition and equipment (commander - Major General Golubev K.D.). The breakthrough

of the enemy strike groupings on the right and left wings of the front in the area of Grodno and Brest put the 10th Army, which was in the so-called Bialystok ledge, in a very difficult position. By the end of June 22, scattered

parts of the divisions were fighting 15-20 kilometers from the border. In an effort to prevent the coverage of the army from the south, Major General Golubev deployed the 13th mechanized corps of Major General Akhlyustin P.P. on the Nurets River. (which included our motorcycle regiment., - author's note).

Attacked by large German forces, the formations of the

corps, which had almost no military equipment, courageously accepted the battle and inflicted considerable damage on the enemy, while the motorcycle

regiment.

The town of Bransk, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich this unit was defending, passed from hand to hand twice ... But the superiority of the enemy was too great, stubbornly clinging to each line, the divisions of the corps were forced to retreat.

After the command "on cars" the regiment began to move along the same road, only in the opposite direction. After 20–30 kilometers, we made a stop near the main road, filled the cars with gasoline, and replenished the ammunition load. The platoon was armed with carbines, and only I had the only PPD assault rifle in the platoon.

On a clearing, which was covered on all sides by forest, a regiment was lined up on foot. The regiment commander, Captain Gromov, announced that a deserter had been caught. Before the formation of the regiment, a soldier from a neighboring company was withdrawn in dirty, rumpled uniforms, which we all wore after the battle. Tousled hair on his head, without a cap, an earthy complexion, glazed dead eyes expressed complete detachment from life. What he was thinking, or whether he was thinking at all, was hard to determine. An officer, probably from counterintelligence or a tribunal, in a loud voice read out the verdict and the soldier

shot. They immediately dug a grave and buried the executed. There was one less soldier in the regiment. The system stood motionless, shocked by the unexpectedness of what had happened. Every soldier who was present at the execution left an unpleasant aftertaste. And there, in the nameless forest, there remained not the grave of a warrior, but a nameless hillock, overgrown with

weeds. After the execution, there were rumors that the so-called deserter had been stopped by someone 10–15 km from the regiment's location. After a night battle, chaos and confusion on the roads, each of us could be in his position. The demonstration execution was clearly inhumane. The regiment commander, apparently, had the goal immediately, from the first day of the war, to emphasize the special demands on discipline in wartime conditions. But the effect of this execution was the opposite, since none of those standing in the ranks believed in the justice of the announced

verdict. Retreating with daily battles from Bransk to Zelva, about 200 km, the regiment carried the front. Usually at night we retreated, using motorcycles and airborne vehicles for movement, by morning we took up defensive positions, fought the advancing Germans, who constantly outnumbered us in fire and strike force, held our line and retreated again. One evening, before sunset, the regiment, after another battle, made a retreat on motorcycles in the direction of Volkovysk and went out onto an open section of the road. At first, a "frame" hung over us - a German reconnaissance aircraft, and then, apparently, on its tip, three fighters flew in. With complete impunity, they shot us with machine guns, making several passes along the road. Losses after this raid were large both in personnel and in equipment. German bombers dropped bombs on us without hindrance, and when we occupied the defense, artillery and mortars fired heavily.

When approaching Volkovysk, one third of the personnel and equipment probably remained in the regiment. People were exhausted by daily battles without sleep and rest, they ate mainly biscuits from the "NZ", food trucks somewhere lagged behind, there was a problem with fuel. Only a few officers remained in the regiment. The combat capability of the regiment was limited. But we must pay tribute to the commander of the regiment, Captain Gromov. We saw him every day, heard his commands

and were certainly grateful to him for it. During the next offensive of the Germans west of Volkovysk, after a strong fire raid and the German infantry went on the attack, our defense was broken through, a stampede began. We left motorcycles with drivers in the village that we were defending. Having run up to the place where our cars were parked, I saw that my motorcycle was not there, someone, probably, had left on it. In the yard, next to the shed, there was only one motorcycle, all the others had already been stolen. Simultaneously with me, my company commander Senior Lieutenant Tverdokhlebov and one of the officers of the neighboring company ran up to this single motorcycle. They took their places: one in the wheelchair and the other behind the driver, there was no place for me. The driver stepped on the gas and the motorcycle with the commanders set off. I met Tverdokhlebov's gaze, which I will remember for the rest of my life. He didn't say anything to me, but his eyes said: "You see that there is no more room, and the chain of Germans is nearby." The motorcycle sped off, and I never saw my company commander again. Jumping around the corner of the house, I opened fire from a machine gun on the Germans running in my direction. They lay down. Seeing that a village man was sitting in a hole behind the house and holding a young digger on a long rope, I snatched the rope from him, jumped on my horse, and rushed across the field to the edge of the forest.

Shots were heard from behind, bullets were whistling nearby, but I managed to hide in the forest. Having galloped 10 kilometers to the east on a

horse, I saw the motorcycles of our regiment on the side of the road, but my crew was no longer in this group. The last defensive line, occupied by the remnants of our regiment and other scattered units, were the hills east of Volkovysk. Two columns of our retreating troops converged on Volkovysk: one from the direction of Bransk, Svisloch, along which our regiment retreated, and the other, probably aspen, from Bialystok, along which the main grouping of our troops of the so-called Bialystok salient retreated. From Volkovysk to Zelva, Slonim and Baranovichi, already uncontrollable, scattered, but numerous remnants of infantry, motorized, artillery and other units were

moving. They were easy prey for enemy aircraft and artillery. Rumors spread among the retreating troops about German paratroopers in disguise

"Surround, Germans, saboteurs, paratroopers," especially at night, caused panic. As a result, the troops were mixed up, equipment was rushed, random shooting was opened. We now know that the Germans really threw sabotage and reconnaissance groups into the rear of the retreating troops, which successfully carried out the tasks assigned to them in the conditions of a poorly organized withdrawal of Soviet troops. So, the remnants of the regiment took up defense on the

heights east of Volkovysk, and the task was set for me and a group of two incomplete motorcycle crews to advance west of Volkovysk and establish observation of the enemy, determine his strength, composition and time to reach Volkovysk. The group proceeded on motorcycles through the burning Volkovysk, chose a place for observation. The remnants of our foot units, single vehicles and motorcycles retreated through the city in the direction of Baranovich. We mapped out a retreat route to the regiment's defense site and carefully followed the roads leading to Volkovysk from the west. A "frame" hung constantly over the retreating columns of Soviet troops. Finally, on the road from Bialystok, at approximately 10–11 o'clock, a column appeared

German motorcyclists.

In front of the column, at a distance of 500–600 m, a patrol consisting of three single motorcyclists was moving. We opened fire on him, and then jumped on our cars and again rushed through the heavily burning city to report to the regimental command.

Before leaving the city, we were unwitting witnesses of another battle. German bomber and fighter aircraft attacked the positions occupied by our troops east of Volkovysk. Fighter planes shot the defending troops at close range, dropped bombs from a low altitude. Artillery shells exploded all over the field in the location of our troops. Our artillery fired in the city. We found ourselves between the fire of the Germans and our troops. When the next wave of German aviation flew away, we rushed at full speed to the location of our regiment, but, unfortunately, none of ours was in the same place. German artillery fire continued. The second carriage turned somewhere off the road into the forest, and ours jumped out along the road to heights much east of Volkovysk. Jumping out of the zone

artillery fire, we caught our breath and waited for the second crew. We traveled several kilometers in the opposite direction, but we could not find him. We found ourselves between our and German troops and saw how the enemy entered Volkovysk. On the approaches to Zelva, scattered groups of Red Army soldiers, small columns and single soldiers, who, like the entire retreating army, began to catch up with us, moved east. The main highway went straight through the settlement, in the center of which stood a tall church behind the square. At the entrance to the square from the bell tower of the church and its outbuildings, heavy machine-gun fire was opened. Killed soldiers fell, the rest fled to neighboring houses and other shelters. Several cars caught fire. Return fire from rifles and machine guns was opened on the bell tower and its roofs. Shooting from the church continued for some time, and then subsided, and the remnants of the troops continued to move in the direction of Slonim and Baranovichi. I spent some time looking for my driver. Among those killed on the square, he was not, probably lost among the retreating soldiers.

The reasons for the failures that befell our armed forces in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War have now been studied, analyzed by our historical science and appropriate conclusions have been drawn. I would like to share some thoughts about the tragic events of those days from the position of an ordinary soldier, through the prism of the past tense and in relation to a specific regiment in which the war found me. The decision of the political leadership and

command of the Red Army, taken in 1940 to form mechanized corps, was certainly the right one, since it fully took into account the current military-political situation in Europe and the experience of combat operations of German tank and mechanized formations in the West, as well as preparing the Nazis for war against the Soviet Union. But, looking back, analyzing the failures of our troops in the first days of the war, I come to

the conclusion that it was hardly expedient to form corps in the immediate vicinity of the state border. If they had stood east of the Berezina or Dnieper rivers, the troops might have been able to stop and detain

Germans on these lines, launch counterattacks on the advancing groupings.

A month and a half before the start of the war, the Soviet command managed to obtain a significant number of personnel, dress and arm them, put them into service and begin combat training. The regiment managed to get a certain amount of military equipment, weapons, ammunition and bring them into combat readiness.

A few days before the start of the war, the regiment was put on high alert. The morale of the personnel

was high. This, of course, was the result of a great educational, patriotic work carried out at that time in the country. It is necessary to pay tribute to the activities that were carried out in the regiment under the leadership of the senior political instructor Dolgov, the work of the newly created party and Komsomol organizations. Before the start of the war, the regiment was

not fully staffed and officers. Most of the personnel were young soldiers, many of whom did not even have time to shoot from military weapons. Not a single tactical exercise was conducted in our company. Only platoon commanders conducted several tactical exercises as part of their units. The experience of the first days of the war somewhat increased the stamina of the regiment's subunits

when fighting on the defensive, but the constant retreat and withdrawal shook the confidence of the soldiers in the ability to stop the enemy. Frequent stampede demoralized the personnel. There were talks of betrayal and betrayal of the highest commanding staff. Everyone pinned great hopes on the fact that the enemy would definitely be stopped at the old border, where fortified areas (URs) were created until 1939, but, unfortunately, this did not happen either. The lack of food had a negative effect on discipline and diligence during the hostilities. The rear of the regiment somewhere lagged behind from the very first day of the fighting, and the main food was crackers. The command of the regiment failed to find any tactics during the battles that would allow in some separate

areas to go on the offensive and force the enemy to retreat. The regiment was used in combat as infantry. For the entire short period of combat

actions, the commanders did not conduct a single analysis of the battles with us, indicating positive and negative points. We were all surprised by the strength of the enemy, the active actions of his aviation, artillery, mortars and the absence of all this on our part. For all the time of hostilities, we have never seen a Soviet aircraft in the air. Such an assessment of the actions of the regiment could be made, in no case claiming to be complete and unconditionally indisputable. Probably, there were some circumstances and reasons that did not allow the best use of the regiment in battle, but once again I will repeat that this is an assessment from the position of an ordinary participant in the events. After a

short battle in Zelva, I attached myself to a column of Red Army soldiers moving in the direction of Slonim. In front of Slonim, the column was met by commanders of various ranks and ranks, who formed platoons and companies from scattered, retreating groups of fighters, and immediately set tasks to defend the lines in front of the city in order to stop the German offensive. I ended up in one of those units. The unit was commanded by a captain. I introduced myself to him, and he ordered me with a group of fighters to defend a section north of the highway. In the air, as usual, the "rama" flew and followed our preparations. In the morning advanced German units appeared. Encountered by fire, the Germans lay down. After some time, bombers and fighters of the Nazis appeared, began to bomb and shoot our fighters. After holding out for half a day on a busy line, the defense faltered, a withdrawal and flight began through Slonim in the direction of Baranovichi. The temporary platoons and companies that had been formed dispersed, and an unorganized retreat along the highway began again. Cars were burning on both sides of the highway, the corpses of dead soldiers were lying around, heaps of scattered documents of the defeated headquarters, personal files of officers, abandoned small arms and artillery weapons. The picture was terrible. Attack groups of tank and mechanized

enemy troops, advancing from Vilnius and Brest, captured Minsk on June 28, 1941 and surrounded the main grouping of troops of the 3rd and 10th armies of the Western Front in the Lida-Baranovichi-Slonim area. Selected troops of the Western Front, the best in the Red

The armies turned out to be helpless, demoralized, surrounded by the Nazis. Tens of thousands of fighters found themselves in the encirclement cauldron.

Again and again, attempts were made to form military units to repulse the enemy, break through the German front and get out of the encirclement, but everything was unsuccessful. Being in

the midst of encircled troops, I met the senior lieutenant of the platoon commander of the neighboring company of our regiment. He offered us the option to exit the environment. During the day,

observing the actions of the Germans and listening to the shooting, we determined a section of the terrain where the enemy was either not there, or he had a weak cover. With the onset of dusk, we moved along the forest path in a southerly direction. By the morning of the next day, having traveled about 20 kilometers, we broke away from the main forces of our troops and went to the edge of the forest near some village. Suddenly, gunshots were heard. Having chosen a position, we got ready to fire, but gradually the shots stopped, and towards evening the Germans entered the village. We realized that we had left the encirclement zone, but we were already behind enemy lines. I was terribly hungry, but our meager supply of crackers ran out. His head was spinning from hunger, his legs were trembling. Between the edge of the forest and the village was a hollow through which a small stream flowed. The buildings on one side of the village were clearly visible to us. Early in the morning a man came out of the hut, and the senior lieutenant sent me to him for reconnaissance. I secretly crossed the hollow, and when the man saw me, he said quietly: "There are Germans in the village." I signaled to my commander, he also crossed the stream, and we entered the house. The man gave us milk to drink, bread, some lard, raw potatoes and matches. Thanking him, we again disappeared into the forest.

We decided to move along country roads to the East at night, not to go out on the highway, as German troops were moving along them. They hoped to reach the location of their troops in the area of the old Polish border. It was difficult with food, the only source of it was the peasants, who shared with us the last piece. Sometimes we met with the same encircled people as we were, but already dressed in civilian clothes, most of whom were walking without weapons.

Thus, part of the many thousands of the Red Army group, which was surrounded west of Minsk, was captured, and part secretly went east in the hope of reaching their troops. Some military personnel remained in the villages along the way, where, despite the mortal threat, they were sheltered by the locals.

Having passed Baranovich, we also decided to shine with military uniforms, so it was safer to go through the territory occupied by the enemy. Changed clothes from the peasants who took our uniforms. They dug up machine guns, and only with pistols and grenades moved on. In the area of Stolbtsy,

while making the next night crossing, we saw a bright fire in a clearing near the village and thought that these were village children grazing horses at night. The senior

lieutenant sent me to reconnaissance, while he himself remained at the edge of the forest. The night was very dark, and only when I got close did I see that it was the German kitchen being heated, and a German with a rifle on his shoulder was coming straight at me. He came close to me, I even examined his face - it was a young guy of my age. All fear passed, I covered the pistol grip behind my belt with my right hand. The advantage was on my side, I could shoot instantly. But he mistook me for a village boy and called out several times: "Veg, veg." I backed away towards the village and then turned towards the forest, where I left my commander. He was not on the spot, probably, having heard a shout in German, he disappeared into the forest. Deepening into the forest, I waited for dawn, but never again met with my commander.

Continuing to move east at the same pace and observing measures, precautions, maintaining distance from the main road leading to Minsk, I passed Baranovich, Minsk, Borisov, Tolochin. Ahead were already Orsha and the Dnieper, and the front was not approaching, but moving away. By October 1941, I went to the area of the villages of Vorontsevichi Lyubotyn. Bosharovo, Polyudovo, Tolochsky district, Vitebsk region. I walked 400 km through the territory occupied by the Germans, crossed almost all of Belarus from West to East. Wriggled terribly. The clothes were in complete disrepair. The boots were completely worn out. In the village of Bosharovo I refreshed myself a little. The Kovalevsky family - widow Maria Ivanovna, daughters Manya and Nadya, sewed for me from canvas

underwear and trousers, they gave me some old jacket. I took a bath, feeling the warmth of home for the first time in the entire war. How grateful I was to them. After being in the partisans and after the war, I kept in touch with this family.

In October 1941, my participation in the fighting at the front and my attempt to go to the location of my troops ended. Thus began a new, unexplored path of guerrilla warfare.

Chapter 3. Creation of a partisan brigade

In the village of Bosharovo, Tolochinsky district, Vitebsk region, as in other settlements, by the autumn of 1941, several circled people like me had gathered. I met Grigory Nikolaevich Sevostyanov, a former artillery cadet who studied at the same courses as me, as well as several sergeants and soldiers. By this time, the German administration had already appointed elders in the occupied territories, policemen appeared, burgomasters were formed in volosts and districts, the occupiers began to issue orders and instructions on the supply of food for the Nazis and the procedure for registering citizens in volost and district administrations. Accomplices of the invaders appeared. Therefore, talk about the partisan struggle was kept secret. We began to study the situation, make connections with the local population. They monitored

the activities of the German authorities and the administration imposed by the Germans. The collection and acquisition of weapons was one of the main tasks. We followed in the footsteps of the retreat of the Soviet troops and picked up abandoned weapons. We managed to find several rifles, carbines, pistols and ammunition. In the village of Sviriany, one of the collective farmers gave us a box with 10 carbines. We found a large number of mines in the forest and a 50-millimeter company mortar with a mine remaining in the barrel. A dugout was dug in the forest between the villages of

Bosharovo and Lyubotyn. The walls and ceiling were lined with poles, bunks were laid, a potbelly stove was installed and carefully disguised. We sent local residents who joined our group

for reconnaissance to Tolochin and Kokhanovo, where German and police garrisons were stationed. Upon arrival, they reported the situation.

On March 11, 1942, our small partisan detachment began fighting against the Germans.

In March 1942, Ivan Safronov and I, being in intelligence in the village of Goreliki, established contact with a partisan group

Alexander Fedorovich Simdyankin, who later became the commander of the partisan detachment, and in the area of the village of Lagovshchina we accidentally met with the scouts of the detachment of Gerasim Alekseevich Kirpich - Volodya Ryabinin and Kolya Koyanov. We agreed on the time and place of the next meeting in order to personally get acquainted with the commander of their detachment. Subsequently, Volodya Ryabinin and Kolya Koyanov and I became great friends. For the first time I met Gerasim Alekseevich Kirpich, the future

commander of the partisan brigade, in a small clearing of the Ratsevsky forest, where I was led by Volodya Ryabinin and Kolya Koyanov. Gerasim Alekseevich was his height, he looked about 30-35 years old. Smiling, he approached me, greeted me cordially, and a friendly conversation began between us. I immediately liked him for his military bearing, demeanor and conversation. He was mainly interested in where our detachment is located and operates, how many people are in it, what weapons, who is the commander, whether there are connections with

by the local population.

Returning to my detachment, I informed Sevostyanov and the rest of my comrades about my visit to Kirpich. Soon we again visited the place with Sevostyanov. Communication with the Brick detachment became permanent. Our detachment was replenished with new fighters, although we still left the local partisans in the village, it was beneficial for us in the sense that they could warn us about the exit of the Germans or policemen from the garrisons in our direction, and in addition, occasionally delivered us something - what products. We were assisted in providing food by local residents of the village of Bosharovo Maria Ivanovna, Maria and Nadezhda Kovalevsky, Ivan, Andrey and Konstantin Komissarov, Mikhail, Pavel and Peter Baranovsky, Ivan Khatkevich, Ivan and Maria Shchitnikov and others. But so far only Ignat Dedkov knew the exact location of our dugout, we completely trusted him, the communist. Later, already with us in the partisans, he showed himself to be an exceptionally brave fighter, derailing several enemy echelons, but died during one of the battles. Exits from the forest for reconnaissance, to collect weapons and conduct military operations could not go unnoticed by the local residents. They approximately already knew the place of our

basing. After consulting, we decided to move to another forest between the villages of Bosharovo and Svirana. The locals called it the Seyany forest. It was indeed seeded with mixed tree species. They equipped two dugouts in the forest, 400–500 meters apart. When digging the foundation pit, lining the walls, making the ceiling and bunks, all the earth and wood waste were carried away and buried aside. The camouflage was perfect, which allowed us to keep only one outpost, watching for the possible appearance of the enemy from the side of Bosharovo. Once, being in a dugout, we heard someone's steps, blows of an ax and crackling of dry brushwood. We realized that it was one of the locals. And then, into the open hatch of our dugout, but disguised as a Christmas tree, a teenager of 13-14 years old from the neighboring village of Bobrovinya, who was chopping brushwood to make a hedge, fell down with an ax. The boy was very frightened from the fall and our appearance. We calmed him down, strictly warned him not to tell anyone about what he saw, and let him go home.

In February-March 1942, partisan groups and detachments began to form from among the military and local residents who found themselves in the occupied territory. In the area of the villages of Ulanovo, Vyshkovo, a partisan detachment was formed under the leadership of Ivan Dmitrievich Bulanov, who later became the chief of staff of the brigade; in the region of Olkhovka, Kuvechino, Ponizovye - a group of Boris Klyuchnikov; near the village of Berezovka southeast of Shklov - the group of Baranovsky M.N. and Yakovenko N.M., in the Berezovsky forest southeast of Shklov - a detachment of Krasnyakov P.A.; in the area of the villages of Gorelki, Lagovshchina, southeast of Tolochin, a group - Simdyankin Alexander Fedorovich, who later became the commander of the 5th partisan detachment in the area southwest of Orsha - Khodorik M.K. The detachment of Gerasim Alekseevich Kirpich, which has already been mentioned, was located in the Ratsevsky forest in early,

not the villages of Ratsevo, Sloboda, Lagovshchina. All these partisan groups and detachments conducted reconnaissance in the spring of 1942, collected weapons, established contacts with the local population, replenished their ranks, gradually established contact with each other, carried out operations to defeat the volost administrations and police sta

small groups of Germans began to raid the railways to destroy the military echelons of the invaders.

The occupation regime established by the Germans, the robbery of the population, the export of raw materials, food, equipment, agricultural products the forced mobilization to Germany, introduction taxes on of young people and their export to Germany, the arbitrariness of the Nazis in relation to the local population, torture in the Gestapo dungeons of Soviet people and their executions met with active resistance residents of Belarus, contributed to the activation of the partisan movement.

The first combat operations of the partisans were disjointed, there was no unity and planning in their actions. But the first, albeit insignificant, successes inspired the partisans, instilled hope in the final victory over the invaders. In the spring of 1942, police stations and volost councils in Novo-

Brashchino, Staroselye, Chernoruchye, Bolshiye Loziny, Shklovsky district, Vorontsevichi, Tolochin district, Tuminichy, Orsha district, were destroyed, military trains were derailed in the Kopys, Kokhanovo districts, a weapons depot in Zubrevichi was destroyed, the police garrison in Dubrovka, Orsha district, was destroyed. In order to give the partisan struggle a more organized and planned character, at a meeting of the commanders of partisan detachments at the end of May 1942,

it was decided to unite the detachments and groups into the Chekist partisan brigade. Kirpich G.A., Bulanov I.D., Sedletsky F.M., Sevostyanov G.N. took part in the meeting near the village of Ulanovo. and Salafutdinov G.Sh.

G. A. Kirpich was elected commander of the brigade, F. M. Sedletsky as commissar, I. L. Bulanov as chief of staff, G. N. Sevostyanov, head of intelligence, and G. Sh. Brigade commander Kirpich G.A., career officer, lieutenant of the border troops, commander of

the operational group of the 17th Red Banner Border Detachment of the Western Border District. One of the first to fight with the Nazis on the border, retreated to the east with battles, and when to join the units of the Red

The army failed, with six fighters by the autumn of 1941 he reached the village of Shchetinki, Shklovsky district, and began organizing a partisan detachment. Brigade

commissar Sedletsky Fedor Mikhailovich, career political officer, battalion commissar, editor of the divisional newspaper. After heavy fighting near Vinnitsa, he was surrounded, by the fall of 1941 he reached the village of Staroselye, his homeland, and began to establish contacts for organizing partisan struggle. One of the first became a partisan. A man of extraordinary charm, who knew how to find a common language with people, if necessary, support and inspire them to a feat.

The chief of staff of the brigade, Ivan Dmitrievich Bulanov, a career officer, lieutenant, platoon commander, began hostilities as part of his division east of Minsk, was surrounded, after he failed to connect with the retreating units of the Red Army, in the Vyshkovo, Ulanovo district of the Shklovsky district, he began to form a partisan detachment .

Grigory Nikolaevich

Sevostyanov, head of reconnaissance of the brigade, cadet of artillery courses for the training of lieutenants. From the first days of the war, he participated in hostilities as part of an artillery regiment, was surrounded, reached the village of Bosharovo, where he began to form a partisan detachment. Grigory

Sharahudinovich Salafutdinov, head of the special department of the brigade, career officer, lieutenant of the NKVD, security officer of the border detachment. From the first days of the war, together with the border guards, he took part in the battles, was surrounded, reached the village of Rogozhanka and, together with Kirpich, began to create a partisan detachment.

During the period of unification of the detachments, the brigade headquarters did a lot of organizational work on reforming some partisan groups into detachments, creating new detachments on the basis of partisan groups, placing the available command personnel, primarily career officers, sergeants and soldiers, former police officers, party workers. Preference for appointment to command positions was given, of course, to the organizers of the first partisan groups and detachments. special selection

was conducted to a group of scouts of the brigade headquarters and reconnaissance units of

the detachments. The formed partisan brigade "Chekist" included the following divisions and groups:

- detachment of Ivanov G.S. (commissioner Scheslavskin P.I.) - 80 people;
- detachment of Simdyankin A.F. (Commissioner Bukshtynov F.I.) - 75 people;
- detachment Nikitchenko A.S. (commissioner Yakovenko M.N.) - 51 people;
- Detachment Denisov A.S. (commissioner Grishanov F.A.) - 68 people;
- detachment of Kovalev N.I. (Commissioner Danilov B.G.) - 65 people;
- detachment of Suvorov I.N. (Commissioner Mikotenko P.Ya.) - 65 people;
- detachment Klyushnikov B.N. (commissioner Massyurov N.I.) - 81 people;
- detachment of Khodorik M.K. (Commissioner Malchevsky V.F.) - 22 people;
- detachment of Krasnyakov P.A. (Commissioner Ivanov M.N.) - 75 people;
- detachment of Shamarin A.M. (Commissioner Kungurtsev I.E.) - 80 people;

— groups of Zaitsev A.I. and Kononykhina I.V. - 37 pers. Combining detachments into a brigade made it possible to plan reconnaissance and combat operations in a more organized way, maneuver forces, if necessary, concentrate to deliver strikes or act alone, cover the vast territory of the Vitebsk and Mogilev regions with partisan actions, expand the sphere of influence of partisans on the local population, and more actively carry out political work. in settlements, provide partisans with food, disrupt various activities of the German authorities.

Partisan detachment under the command of Ivanov G.S. had more powerful weapons, was a reserve and strike force of the brigade command during combat operations as part of several detachments. It was usually located near the headquarters of the brigade and carried out security and defense of the command post. It included one of the first organizers of the partisan struggle V. Chistyakov, F. Shvayuk, S. Konyashkin, S. Elkanovich, N. Dyakov and others.

The partisan detachment under the command of Simdyankin A.F., operating in the Tolochin region, was formed mainly on the basis of a partisan group. Bulaev, I. Potapov, I. Klimushkin, N. Apanasenko, I. Kurushev, B. Safronov, K. Zolotoy, M. Topivaldiev, A. Machakhovsky, who had already distinguished themselves in battles, joined its composition.

The commissar of the detachment was Bukshtynov F.I., who before the war held senior positions in the central apparatus of the country.

The detachment under the command of Nikitchenko included former partisans of the Bulanov detachment - the organizers of the partisan struggle in the Shklov region A. Vasin, P. Kornev, K. Kitov, B. Rogov, D. Prokopets, A. Denisov, L. Zinyakov, N. Akhmedzhanov, V. Astakhov, V. Aladyeva, L. Krivelskaya, Z. Platonova. Detachments of Denisov, Kovalev, Suvorov,

Krasyakov operated in the Shklovsky district, detachments of Klyushnikov and Khodorik - in Orsha. The cavalry detachment (maneuverable group) under the command of Shamarin was a mobile unit of the brigade and was intended to solve suddenly arising tasks in the course of everyday combat.

activities.

The open, relatively deserted area of operation of the brigade forced the detachments to constantly maneuver, expand their areas of activity, seek and create shelters for bases and hospitals. The detachments mainly fought in the interfluvium of the Dnieper and Druti, and hospitals and food bases were located, as a rule, in the forests west of the Druti.

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Chapter 4

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... go to the parish administration and get identity card forms (personalausweis) there. The volost administration was closed because it was a Sunday. We were shown the burgomaster's house. On a hillock next to the house, there was a horse harnessed to a light wagon. After consulting, we entered the house. A large man was sitting on a chair, in another room I noticed a boy of 12-13 years old. Without much thought, Kolya took a pistol out of his pocket and commanded: "Hands up." At that time, I checked the desk drawer, took out some papers, and opening the cabinet, I saw 2 rifles. At this time, Kolya had an accidental shot, the man fell to the floor, and the boy screamed loudly. The windows are wide open so you can hear everything outside. I grab both rifles, Kolya hardly pushes the man out into the street and puts him on the wagon. We untie the horse and rush to the forest at full speed. Shots were heard behind us, a car with the Germans followed us. But fortunately for us, she landed in a ditch and got stuck, and we hid in the forest. Soon we were in the camp of the Ratsev Forest. The man turned out to be not the burgomaster of the volost, but the headman of the neighboring village. Sevostyanov and Salafutdinov interrogated him, gave him appropriate instructions and

released him. Koyanov, a Mordvin by nationality, was one of the organizers of the partisan detachment under the command of Simdyankin, who took part in many military operations. Kolya was a good friend of mine, many times we went to reconnaissance together. He died in the summer of 1943, falling into an ambush of the enemy near the village of Yurinovo, Tolochinsky district.

The story of the enemy garrison in Zhuknevo is curious. The Germans of this garrison behaved extremely aggressively towards us. They often ambushed and destroyed single scouts and small groups of partisans. With Volodya Ryabinin and Kolya Koyanov, we went out to reconnoiter this garrison several times. Germans and policemen, totaling up to 30 people,

located on the outskirts of the village in a school surrounded by earthen walls with loopholes for firing. The area adjacent to the school was targeted from three sides. It was not advisable to destroy the enemy by raid, since we could suffer heavy losses. Let's go for the trick. Knowing that the headman of the village of Maksimkovo, neighboring Zhuknevo, was in the service of the Germans, Volodya Ryabinin, Kolya Yaskov and Kolya Koyanov were sent there, who walked around the village, pretending to be drunk. Our trick worked. The elder on horseback went to Zhuknevo and informed the Germans about the three partisans. The Germans and the police left Zhuknevo in the direction of Maksimkovo. They approached the edge of the forest, having previously examined it through binoculars. In the same place, disguised, the partisans of the 1st detachment of Ivanov and the 5th detachment of Simdyankin lay in ambush. When the Germans entered the clearing at the edge of the forest, the partisans opened fire and destroyed the enemy. Partisan scout Pavel Bulaev was killed in a shootout. The Germans remaining in the garrison opened mortar fire on the forest, and then left for Kokhanovo. So the garrison ceased to exist, and access to the Orsha-Tolochin railway

was opened for us. Volodya Ryabinin, a worker from Yaroslavl, after a short training in Moscow as a senior group, which included Viktor Chistyakov and Arkady Gershman, in October 1941 was thrown from an airplane into the German rear, in the area north of Belynichi to transfer power to the radio station, ammunition and explosives to a group of demolition men left behind enemy lines during the withdrawal of our troops. Ryabinin did not find a group of demolitionists and began to establish contacts with the local population. He met partisans Kirpich Ivanov and Salakhutdinov. Volodya and I quickly became friends, together we carried out reconnaissance missions, and in the fall of 1942 in Moscow, in the Kremlin, received the Order of the Red Banner.

On June 18, 1942, a group of scouts from the Nikitchenko detachment blew up a bridge on the Orsha-Mogilev railway, 9 km north of Shklov. The bridge was monitored for 5 days. The security and defense of the bridge were identified, the number and location of the guard. The underground worker Skvortsov, who worked in Shklov on the instructions of the partisans, reported the schedule of the changing of the guard and the password. Scouts, dressed in German uniforms, approached the bridge, silently removed

sentry, laid a mine and blew up the bridge. Railway traffic was paralyzed for several days.

Viktor Chistyakov, together with Ryabinin, was thrown behind enemy lines in the fall of 1941, and in the spring of 1942, at the direction of Ryabinin, he crossed the front and went to the location of the troops of our 4th shock army. Having reported to the chief of staff of the army the situation in the rear of the enemy, on his instructions he was again sent to the rear of the Germans to deploy guerrilla warfare. Returning from behind the front line, he met with Ryabinin, Kirpich, Ivanov and became one of the organizers of the partisan detachment. In the detachment he was a scout, took part in the preparation and conduct of a number of military operations.

The Germans sought to keep under control the Tolochin-Belynichi highway, which connected the two strategic highways Minsk-Moscow and Minsk-Mogilev. For the safety of the movement of their troops, they constantly kept garrisons in Tolochin, Drutsk, Krugly, Jumping, Teterin, Golovchin, Belynichi. The reconnaissance of the brigade, in turn, sought to keep these garrisons and the movements of the Nazis along the highway in their field of vision.

Having studied the intelligence, the command decided to defeat the garrison in Golovchin. It consisted of about 100 people. Trenches were dug around the former school, where the garrison personnel were stationed, and bunkers were built in the corners. There was an observation tower next to the building, and part of the territory adjoining the school was surrounded by barbed wire. The operation was decided to be carried out during the day with the expectation of surprise. On the morning of July 25, 1942, the partisans took up their starting positions for the attack. The enemy was stunned and failed to put up organized resistance. Small arms fire and grenades broke the resistance in the bunkers. The garrison was destroyed. Most of the Germans and policemen were destroyed, about 20 people were captured, the rest fled. The partisans lost three men killed and several wounded. All the weapons of the garrison, ammunition, food were captured. In essence, the Golovchinsk operation was a reconnaissance in combat using cavalry and motorcyclists, the key to success was precisely the calculation of surprise. This tactic was widely used by us in the future.

After some time, the garrison in Golovchin reappeared, as it was important for the enemy as a link between Tolochny and Belynichamm. On the night of September 11, 1943, the garrison was again defeated. Together with scouts Barchukov (1st detachment), Yermachenko and Buyanov (10th detachment), I was given the task of removing sentries. Under the cover of night, we crawled up to the sentry near the school and silently removed it, but another noticed us and opened fire. We ran up to the school building, threw grenades through the windows, and the partisans of the 1st, 10th and 25th detachments did the rest. In this night raid, 10 Germans and policemen were killed, 15 were taken prisoner, the rest disappeared under the cover of night. Small arms, ammunition,

food were seized. Now a museum of local lore has been opened in Golovchin, on the creation of which the former teacher Guzov Vasily Dmitrievich worked hard. The museum has a place for the history of the combat activities of the Chekist partisan brigade. In the summer of 1942, the brigade stepped up its activities on the Moscow-Minsk and Orsha-Mogilev railways. On the railways to undermine enemy echelons, small sabotage and reconnaissance groups went out on July 17 and 20, 1942, in the Tolochin-Kokhanovo sector, a group from Ivanov's detachment destroyed two enemy echelons. On July 24, scouts from the Denisov detachment derailed an enemy echelon in the Shklov-Mogilev sector. The steam locomotive and 2 carriages were broken, 18 Nazis were destroyed. On July 31, a group from the Suvorov detachment blew up an enemy echelon in the Kokhanovo-Trotskylovo sector. 2 steam locomotives, 18 wagons were broken. Traffic was stopped for a day. On August 20, the scouts of the Kovalev detachment on the Kokhanovo-Tolochin stretch blew up a steam locomotive and 7 wagons, destroyed more than 100 Nazis. Traffic was stopped for 8 hours.

Nikolai Ivanovich Kovalev was born in the town of Staroselye, Shklovsky District. He graduated from the command faculty of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, and before the start of the war, with the rank of major, was sent for an internship to the Belarusian Military District as an academy teacher. From the first day of the war he took part in the fighting on the Western Front. He was wounded in the leg and, having escaped captivity, reached Staroselye, where he was treated and hid with his mother.

In the spring of 1942, there was a German garrison in Staroselye, and intelligence officer Petya Strazdin and I went there for reconnaissance. At night they knocked on one of the huts, the door was opened by an elderly woman. Having illuminated the hut with a flashlight, we noticed a man hiding under a blanket. They picked him up, and I immediately recognized the same major to whom I handed over the captured German on July 23, 1941. However, he did not respond to my greeting. Then I reminded him under what circumstances we met at the front east of Bransk. At first he denied everything, but then, having calmed down, admitted: "Yes, I am Major Kovalev, and if you are partisans, I am ready to go with you, but my leg still hurts badly." With these words, he took from the shelf a bag from under the gas mask, in which were placed a bowler hat, a metal mug, a spoon, and some other little things. We reassured Kovalev's mother, took Nikolai Ivanovich away, and leaving Staroselye, we went to our horses. On one of them, Kovalev was taken to the Ratsevsky forest. I reported to Kirpich and Sevostyanov about the results of reconnaissance of the German garrison in Staroselye and about Kovalev. Soon, Nikolai Ivanovich was appointed commander of the detachment being formed. In the autumn of 1942, together with Bulanov, Kovalev flew to Moscow and did not return to us. Upon admission to the intelligence department of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1947 I met Nikolai

Ivanovich again. He was already a colonel, a senior lecturer at the academy. Along with the growing combat capabilities of the partisan detachments, our intelligence was also improved. The cavalry reconnaissance patrols of the brigade operated far apart from the main forces. Our scouts were constantly near

Orsha, Shklov, Mogilev, Krugly, Tolochintsm. At the end of June 1942, information was received from Orsha from Polina Voitova and from Shklov from Nadezhda Khovrenkova that the Germans were preparing a punitive expedition against our brigade. Mounted scouts reported on the advance of the enemy from Shklov and Chernoruchye in the direction of the Ratsevsky forest. The unloading of the Germans in Kokhanovo and their advance towards Ratsevo was noted. The Nikitchenko detachment, covering the main base area from Shklov, without engaging in a protracted battle, began to withdraw to Ratsevo.

The intention of the Germans, who had concentrated up to 600 people near the Rats

destroy. Our detachments took up defense on the northeastern, eastern and southeastern edges of the Ratsev forest. Having turned into a chain, the Germans went across the field towards the forest. Having let them in at a distance of 45–50 meters, we opened fire from all types of weapons. The Germans lay down, but their position on the field was more vulnerable than ours, and they began to withdraw towards Dymovo. The partisans attacked Dymovo, the Nazis could not stand it and threw out the white flag. This was an unprecedented case in guerrilla warfare. The Germans, through parliamentarians, asked for permission to remove the dead and wounded from the field. Picking up the dead and wounded, they went to their garrisons. The partisans collected weapons left by the enemy on the battlefield and captured those who fought off the main forces of the Germans. The news of our victory in the battle near Dymov quickly spread among the local population, the partisans were welcomed and congratulated. This victory raised the morale of the partisans even higher. We scouts were taught a lesson about the need to combine different methods of reconnaissance: observation, informing local residents and scouts of the underground living in garrisons, sending mounted reconnaissance patrols to long distances.

From Klavdia Miloradova, a scout from the reconnaissance group of the Western Front, which operated in the Krupka area, we learned that a group led by "Uncle Sasha" was thrown into the forests south of Krupka from the mainland to assist the partisans.

Sevostyaiov set me the task of finding this group, establishing its composition and mission, and most importantly, whether it has a connection with the mainland (the headquarters of the partisan movement). Grigory Nikolaevich gave me the right to select scouts for this task. It was inexpedient to act as a large armed group. I opted for Zina Platonova, a young partisan scout who arrived from Shklov in Bulanov's detachment in the spring of 1942. Zina, Sevostyanov and I developed a route, having previously outlined the likely areas of operation of the Uncle Sasha group and the order of its search. They developed a simple legend, took food, weapons and set off. It was necessary to walk 100 kilometers, and taking into account the search, even more, through areas in which we did not yet know the situation. We walked by country roads, bypassing settlements as much as possible. True, this was not always possible. Furtively

through local residents, the locations of garrisons and police stations were identified. They bypassed the garrisons located in Volkonosovo, Drutsk, Teterin, Shepelevichi. The short June nights obliged us to be careful. In the area of the villages of Zaozerye and Somra, we began to meet partisans. We realized that we were in a zone controlled by partisans. Having stopped two partisans, we asked them to indicate the location of the partisan headquarters. The young guys, of course, took us for spies and took us to the commander. "Uncle Sasha" - senior lieutenant of the Red Army Alexander Morshchinin - was in the remote forest village of Devenitsa, 30 km south of Krupka. He and a group of servicemen were thrown behind enemy lines to intensify the partisan struggle and give it an organized start. Communication with the headquarters of the partisan movement "Uncle Sasha" maintained by radio station. In a short time, he and his assistants managed to unite several detachments into a partisan brigade, which he commanded until the end of 1942. The first commissar of this brigade was Sushkov N.K. At the end of 1942, Morshchinin flew to Moscow, and Zhunin, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, commanded the brigade before joining the units of the Soviet Army. Zina and I were pleased to have a conversation

with this man. We briefly spoke about our brigade, commanders, area of operations and some results of our combat activities. He sent a telegram to Moscow, which was the first report to headquarters about the Chekist partisan brigade.

After returning, Zina and I reported in detail to Kirpich and Sevostyanov about the results of our campaign, intelligence information obtained by us along the way and received from Morshchinin.

The activities of the partisans in the summer of 1942 were active throughout Belarus, including in the areas of operation of our brigade. The flow of the local population replenished the ranks of partisan detachments, weapons and ammunition were sought for replenishment. As a result of the combat operations of sabotage and reconnaissance groups on the railways, enemy echelons flew downhill, the planned transfer of enemy troops and equipment was disrupted.

On June 7, 1942, a group led by Commissar of the 5th Detachment Fyodor Ivanovich Bukshtynov, which included Anatoly

Machakhovsky, Antos Khainatsky, Pyotr Strazdin and Dmitry Shakhmartov blew up an enemy echelon on the Orsha-Tolochin stretch. And on July 11, 1942, on the same stretch, a group under the command of Simdyanknn derailed an echelon of the Nazis. Our groups also blew up enemy trains on other sections of the railway lines between Orsha and Krupki and between Orsha and Mogilev. Anatoly Romanovich Machakhovsky, a scout of the 5th partisan

detachment, a native of the village of Bagrinovo, Tolochinsky district, who knew the area well, constantly assisted the detachment commander in obtaining intelligence data. He took part in sabotage on the railway, was used as a guide when sabotage and reconnaissance groups went on missions, and kept in touch with Tolochin's underground workers who worked on the instructions of the partisans. For his merits, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, the Order of Glory of the 3rd degree, and three medals "For Military Merit".

After the war, Anatoly Romanovich was engaged in public work on the patriotic education of young people using the examples of the partisan struggle of the Chekist brigade. By the

middle of the summer of 1942, the Chekist partisan brigade had become a formidable force capable of inflicting significant damage on the invaders. The population actively helped the partisans, replenished their ranks. But there were not enough weapons, ammunition, sufficient information about the plans and intentions of the enemy.

This was the main problem that the brigade command could not fully solve on its own. We needed a connection with the leadership of the partisan movement, his help in the further deployment of the partisan struggle. The command of the brigade decided to send messengers - authorized representatives across the front line. The choice fell on me and Lyuba Krivelskaya, a 17-year-old Komsomol member from the village of Ryzhkovichi, Shklovsky District. Lyuba and I accepted this offer of the command unconditionally and were proud that this task was entrusted to us.

A short preparation began, about which few knew. Together with brigade commander Kirpich, chief of staff Bulanov and intelligence chief Sevostyanov discussed the route. shortest distance

from us to the front line there was a direction to the east, through Smolensk to Vyazma. But we understood that this was fraught with great difficulties in crossing the front line and reaching the location of our troops, since it was here that the densest grouping of Nazi troops was. It was decided to go to Senno, Vitebsk, Toropets, assuming that gaps in the front were possible in this direction, and also in our favor - wooded and swampy terrain.

The decision turned out to be correct. According to a well-developed legend, Lyuba and I became brother and sister and went to relatives in Gorodok, Vitebsk region, which was on the route of the movement we had planned. We were issued identity cards filled out on standard forms and permission to visit relatives. We were dressed like peasants, in a bag - a piece of bread and bacon and a small amount of occupation money. Three pieces of white batiste were sewn under the lining of my jacket, Olei Levanovich, on which a report was printed on the combat and numerical strength of the detachments that were part of the brigade, indicating the names of commanders and commissars, an application for the necessary weapons, ammunition, Sevostyanov informed and explosives instructed me additionally. In the second half of the day, the railway openly, substances. and the Minsk-Moscow highway were crossed through guarded crossings, and our documents

passed the first test. Inspired by the first success, we quickened our pace. The German and police garrisons bypassed country roads, marking the following settlements as landmarks along the way. We spent the night wherever we could: in the forest, in abandoned sheds, in piles left over from last year

hay.

One day, unable to bypass the village, we entered it, and suddenly two policemen came out from around the corner towards us, with white armbands on their sleeves. It was too late to turn around. Lyuba said to me quietly: "You shoot at the left, I shoot at the right." Having caught up with us, the police on the move asked where we were going, and without stopping, we also named the next village along the route.

To get to the other side of the Western Dvina, it was necessary to find a crossing, but all the boats from the local residents were confiscated and kept under police protection. In one of the villages to the west

Staroy Selo, we found a ferry near the police station. A carrier from among local residents was on duty at the crossing, but he transported to the other side of the river only with the permission of the police. Lyuba was afraid to swim across at night, because she could not swim well. In the evening we approached the river, I took out a pistol so that the carrier could see. They sat down with Lyuba in a boat and ordered to take us to the opposite shore. Having sailed some distance, we heard a loud cry from the policeman on duty, "Whom did you take?" The carrier replied: "His own." Getting off on the opposite bank thanked the carrier. He advised us how to move forward safely. We crossed the Vitebsk-Polotsk and Vitebsk-Nevel railways at night. At the location of Shmyrev's partisan brigade, which operated in the Surazh area, we were given a guide, who led us to the location of the Soviet troops. In the village of Sheino, near Toropets, the North-Western

Operational Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus was located, which led the partisan movement of the republic, maintained contact with partisan detachments and brigades, providing them with all possible assistance. This group of the Central Committee, located in the front zone, was the forward point of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement.

On the very first day after our arrival, Lyuba and I were received by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus Eidinov G.B. We told him in detail about the situation in the area of operations of the brigade, about its organizational structure, combat activities, about relations with the local population and the activities of the occupying ~~party-political~~ occupied territory, and about the work being carried out. They reported intelligence data on the enemy, which the headquarters of the brigade had, including the deployment of German aviation at the Balbasovo air base, the German garrisons in Orsha, Shklov, Tolochin, Krugloy and other settlements, the nature of the transportation of the Nazis by rail and road. In the presence of Eidinov and a representative of the NKVD, Captain Kosoy, my jacket was torn open and a report printed on white cloth was taken out. Boris Georgievich Eidinov and Captain Kosoy laughed heartily and admired our invention. We served a typed application and verbally transmitted

the request of the command of the brigade for assistance with weapons, ammunition, explosives. The main work with

us was carried out by Captain Kosoy. As Lyuba and I understood, he wanted to make sure that we were no figureheads. At this time, through the German Gestapo and the Abwehr, an intensive training of spies from among the traitors was already underway to send them to the partisans and to the rear of the Soviet Army. But he quickly became convinced that we are the people we say we are. For two days I wrote a report on

the situation and the German grouping in the reconnaissance zone of the brigade. I had to describe in particular detail the Balbasovo airfield, the transportation of Germans to the Eastern Front, and their operational reserves, the order of protection of communications. For me, this was the first large-scale work on the generalization of intelligence about the enemy in a vast area. For this Report, we were provided with large-scale maps. Captain Kosoy asked us to describe the

entire route of our movement with the smallest details and time indicators, plotting it on a large-scale map. Lyuba and I realized that this data was necessary for the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement and the command of the Soviet Army for their use in organizing intelligence work, sending intelligence officers and messengers behind enemy lines.

Having measured the route of our movement on the map, we calculated that it was more than 300 km, and we covered it in 10–12 days. On average, we walked 30–35 km per day. This transition behind enemy lines cost us a lot of stress, moral and physical strength.

We also gave Captain Kosoy several addresses in Orsha, Tolochin, Shklov and other settlements that could be used as safe houses with reliable hosts.

We were placed with Lyuba in a village hut, we were given rations. After a short rest, preparations began for the return to the brigade. We were instructed to lead a large detachment of demolition men to the Mogilev and Minsk regions as guides. This meant the same 300-350 kilometers in the rear of the Nazis. There were about 40 volunteers in the formed detachment. It consisted of separate groups of demolition men who had completed short-term training.

Each group had to go to the location of a certain partisan brigade or detachment.

The front was crossed in the Nevel-Gorodok section in the gap between the battle formations of the Germans. The movement was planned along the route of Shumilino, Senno, Krupki, and then each group independently went to its destination area. We crossed the front line successfully, without losses, despite the fact that the enemy pursued us almost the entire length of the route. Each demolition man had 25-30 kg of roofing material and accessories for demolition, food, weapons and ammunition. The load was very large, and the enemy was literally "sitting on the tail", not giving us time to rest. They marched day and night, at stops they took up all-round defense, they ate only breadcrumbs and concentrates. They hardly entered the settlements. I advised the commander of the detachment to take a cart with horses, put a load on it, lighten the guys and thereby increase the length of the transitions. Thus, we managed to break away from the enemy.

Together with us, a group of demolition men came to the brigade. In addition, along with our partisan Zoya Aladyeva, a group of demolition men also arrived. All this was the concrete help of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement to our brigade. The radio operator Claudia Burakova was also sent to the brigade. To carry out political educational work among the partisans and propaganda work among the local population, Ivan Yakovlevich Konkov arrived in the brigade from behind

the front line. With the arrival of a large group of demolition men, on the initiative of the chief of staff of the brigade, Bulanov I.D. training of partisans in mine-subversive business was organized. Simultaneously with the training, sabotage activities intensified. Groups of arrived demolition workers and local partisans, who knew the area and the situation well, went out to the railways. During the

period from June 5 to September 12, demolition workers from the group of M. Gorbatenkov, together with the brigade's scouts, managed to derail 17 enemy echelons and blow up 5 railway bridges.

Subsequently, the entire composition of this group was awarded orders and medals, and Gorbatenkov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

We constantly felt the lack of explosives. This problem was solved by unexploded bombs and shells. At first, having no experience, a bomb or projectile was carried to the place of detonation, which was used as mines, and then by the forces of the commissar of the 10th detachment Grishanov F.A. set up the production of mines from tol, smelted from bombs and shells. In response to the increased

sabotage, the Germans took a number of measures to protect railways, bridges and warehouses. Forests were cut down on both sides of the railroad, rubble was arranged and mined, additional bunkers were erected on the approaches to the roads, and the counterintelligence regime in the station settlements and villages adjacent to the railroads was strengthened. From periodic punitive expeditions with a limited involvement of forces, the Germans moved on to developing and conducting large-scale operations against the partisans with the involvement of troops, gendarmerie, reconnaissance and bomber aircraft. In September-October 1942, under the leadership of the head of the rear area of Army Group

Center, General Shenkendorf, a punitive operation was developed and carried out in two stages in the Orsha-Mogilev-Borisov region against the partisans. At the first stage, in September, it was planned to surround the Ratsevsky forest and destroy the partisans of the Chekist brigade. At the second stage, in October 1942, encircle and destroy the partisans of the Zhunin brigade in the forests south of Krupka. The 107th Infantry Division, the 286th Security Division, SS battalions, gendarmerie and police formations were used to carry out the operation. In early September, the first data on the actions of the Germans were received from underground scouts from Orsha, Tolochin, and Shklov. In Orsha, infantry,

tanks, artillery were unloaded, and the troops were sent towards the Ratsev forest. In Tolochin, the unloading of infantry, artillery and mortar units and the exit of the column towards Ratsevo was noted. From Shklov, a column of Nazis advanced towards Staroselye. The enemy columns were monitored, and the mounted reconnaissance groups of the brigade accompanied them whenever possible.

By the morning of September 4, the Germans occupied almost all the settlements around the Ratsevsky forest: Staroselye, Ratsevo, Smolyany, Dymovo,

Lagovshchina, Zubovo, Orekhovka, Sloboda. Ratsevsky and Kazenny forests, where the main forces of the brigade were located, were blocked from all sides. There remained a narrow strip running from the northern side of the forest to the railroad and motor roads Minsk-Moscow. The Germans probably believed that the partisans would not leave in this direction.

The detachments took up all-round defense along the edges of the forest. To the west of Staroselye, where German tanks were discovered, our partisan artillery battery, consisting of two guns, took up a firing position. Strong barriers were put up on the probable directions of a possible offensive. The Germans, taught by previous battles against our brigade, moved towards the forest very slowly, successively occupying one line after another. The scouts monitored all the maneuvers of the Germans, penetrating into their rear through gaps in the battle formations. A reconnaissance aircraft periodically appeared over the forest, conducting reconnaissance and scattering leaflets calling for them to drop their weapons and surrender. Analyzing the data coming from intelligence, the brigade headquarters came to the conclusion that a German attack should be

expected on the morning of September 5th. At the meeting of the commanders of the detachments, various opinions were expressed on the actions of the current situation. Some proposed to take up a tough defense and prevent the Germans from entering the forest, others - to break through to the west, cross the Drut River into the forests south of Krupka, and, finally, the brigade command decided to act according to the third option, the essence of which was as follows. Covering the Ratsevsky forest with small barriers, which were supposed to imitate the activity of the main forces of the brigade during the night, take two columns out of the forest to the Minsk-Moscow railway, carefully disguised, the next night, cross the railway and the highway at the Tolochin-Orsha section and leave for forests south of Lepel. Crossing of roads is also to be carried out in two places: with the right column - west of Kokhanovo, with the left column - east of Kokhanovo. The meeting of both columns was planned in the Usvizh-Buk forest.

With the onset of darkness, the detachments moved in two columns in the direction of Galoshevo-Kokhanovo. The left column, consisting of the detachments of Ivanov, Simdyankin, Shamarin, was led by the commander of the Kirpich brigade, the right column was led by Nikitchenko, as part of the detachments of Klyushnikov, Denisov,

Khodornka and Nikitchenko. Between the two columns was a convoy with the wounded. Communication between the columns was maintained by mounted scouts. The columns moved quietly, it was forbidden to smoke, talk loudly. Mounted scouts were at the forefront, closing the columns of the combat guard group. Barriers left in the forest, maneuvering, fired at the concentrations of the Germans. By morning, both columns of the brigade reached the designated areas without a fight. Detachments under the command of Kirpich occupied a small forest near the village of Simonovo, detachments of Nikitchenko - near the village of Olkhovka. Both districts were in close proximity to the Kokhanovsky garrison and railway guard posts. This bold decision made it possible to save the main body of the brigade and ammunition, which

became less and less.

The chief of staff of the brigade was left in the Ratsevisky forest to meet Suvorov's detachment, which was at that time on a mission. Later, Ivan Dmitrievich, who saw with his own eyes the actions of the Germans, told the following. Early in the morning the Nazis began artillery preparation. The shells were exploding in the location of the camps left by the partisans, which means that the Germans had fairly accurate information about our location. Then, lining up in chains, they went on the offensive from three sides, delivering heavy machine-gun fire. Punishers combed the Ratsevisky and Kazenny forests several times with fire. Armored vehicles and light tanks were moving along the clearings, firing indiscriminately. Squad camps have been flipped. The main body of the brigade went north and, hiding, waited at this time for the next night to throw across the railroad and highway. The reconnaissance aircraft searched for partisans over the forests to the west and south of the Ratsevisky Forest, but it failed to find their places of concentration.

With the onset of darkness, the detachments under the command of Kirpich moved along a previously reconnoitered route to the railway. I, with a group of scouts, led the column to the railway crossing 16 km east of Tolochin. Destroying the German guards and placing strong barriers to the right and left of the column, the detachments moved through the railway crossing to the highway. The Germans opened fire on the column, but the bulk of them had already crossed the railroad. By morning we reached the northern edge of the Usvizh forest.

Beech. A reconnaissance aircraft appeared in the sky, but it did not find the partisans, who dispersed in the forest and disguised themselves.

The second column of the brigade, consisting of five detachments, while trying to cross the railway east of Kokhanov, was ambushed by the Germans and, unable to overcome the fire barrier, retreated into the woods. Maneuvering in the forests south of the railway and suffering heavy losses, on September 25, these detachments, under the command of the chief of staff of the brigade, went into the forest in the Ukhvala region, south of Krupka, in the zone of operations of the 8th partisan brigade under the command of Zhunin S. G. On October 5, in the Krupskikh region A plane flew in from the woods, delivering weapons, ammunition and medicines to the partisans. Bulanov I.D. flew to Moscow with this plane. together with Kovalev N.I. The command of the remaining detachments was entrusted to Captain I.N. Suvorov. On October 10, the Germans began to carry out a punitive operation in the area where our five detachments had entered after the Ratsevo blockade. Once surrounded, the detachments stubbornly resisted, suffering heavy losses. The commanders of the detachments Suvorov I.N., Klyushnikov B.N., the commissar of the 20th detachment Massyurov died. Only in December 1942, two detachments under the command of Markov P.I. arrived from Krupki to the brigade, which at that time was in the Lepel forests. and Yakimova

S.N. The detachment of Nikitchenko became part of the Zhunin brigade. The punitive operations of the Germans carried out against the partisans in the area of the Ratsevsky and Ukhvalsky forests had a serious impact on the combat capability of the brigade. If five detachments under the command of Nikitchenko had crossed the railroad and highway and connected with the main forces of the brigade, we would not have suffered such heavy losses. Having failed to cross the roads at the scheduled time, it was

necessary to try to cross them in the following days, then the detachments would not again fall into the blockade. Exhausted in previous battles and transitions, having no food supplies, the detachments were waiting for the arrival of the column under the command of Nikitchenko. It was forbidden to make fires, it was also not allowed to go to settlements for food. The radio station failed, communication with the Center was interrupted. In these difficult conditions, the command decided to send messengers across the front line in order to provide the brigade with ammunition, weapons

Gerasim Alekseevich Kirpich and Grigory Nikolaevich Sevostyanov approached me and without further explanation said: "Pavka, you need to go behind the front line again, report the situation to the leadership and try to deliver the necessary weapons and ammunition to the brigade." I already had some experience, I knew the leadership of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, I was familiar with the route of the Movement and the possible nature of the obstacles during the transition. Valya Vorobyova was offered to me as a companion for this important task. I knew Valya, she came to us in the summer of 1942 and performed reconnaissance missions. For us, temporary certificates were again prepared in the name of Burnatsky Pavel and Valentina, brother and sister, residents of the village of Zaborye. The burgomaster's permission to visit relatives in Vitebsk was prepared. We developed a short legend together with Sevostyanov. The brigade moved from Usvizh-Buk to the Lepel forests, and Valya and I, after warmly saying goodbye to Kirpich, Sevostyanov, Sedletsky, went to the front line.

The breakup was not easy. Valya and I understood what hard trials the partisans of the brigade would face, and the command understood what awaited us when crossing the front. A limited circle of people knew about our task. This time we did not have any written report for the Center, as I knew the situation and our needs for weapons and ammunition well. Kirpich and Sevostyanov warned

me that in a week, as our backups, with a similar task, a second pair would be sent behind the front line - Volodya Ryabinin and Olga Gorbatshevich. Along the route of our movement, many villages were burned, there was almost no movement between settlements. The reason was the punitive expedition of the Germans. It was dangerous to move on the roads during the daytime, and we tried to move along the paths and copses. We rested, as a rule, in the forest, one of us was sleeping, the other was awake. They crossed the Western Dvina in a boat provided by some peasant.

Crossing the Vitebsk-Polotsk railway turned out to be difficult and dangerous. We went out to her at noon. They settled down at the edge of the forest and began to conduct surveillance. To the left of us was a German outpost. We did not go through the crossing, choosing a place for

transition elsewhere. At midnight we missed the patrol and silently ran across to the other side. There was the sound of an approaching train and suddenly there was an explosion. There was an unforeseen coincidence of our crossing the railway and the blowing up of an enemy echelon by some local partisans. Valya and I rushed to the forest, but the spruce forest turned out to be so dense that it was impossible not only to run, but even to walk. From the side of the booth, a barking dog was heard, a burst of machine-gun fire rang out. We crawled along the spruce forest from the railway. A heavy downpour drowned out the crackling of the breaking spruce grove along which we were crawling. Thanks to this, we managed to escape. With the onset of dusk, we entered a house that stood on the outskirts of the village and asked for food. The hosts fed us, brought a piece of bacon, a loaf of bread, a few boiled potatoes. It was evident that they were sympathetic to our

position.

We crossed the Vitebsk-Polotsk railroad south of the Losvido station under the guise of local residents calmly, without running across, without hiding, in full view of the German post. The German who stood at the post saw us, but did not react in any way, probably, such crossings were allowed to the local residents during the day. But when we approached the village, we saw several policemen who were gathering young people for work in the Losvido garrison. I went up to the senior policeman and showed the burgomaster's written permission for our passage. The policeman thought something and waved his hand at us. As soon as we saw that the police had left the village, Valya and I walked across the field to the forest and quickly moved further east. By this time, an old wound on my right leg had become very inflamed. the temperature rose, and I could

hardly walk for two days. On the second or third day after crossing the railroad, we met partisans from Shmyrev's brigade, who fed us. They offered to send me to a partisan hospital. We refused this offer, thanking for the help and crossed the front line with their guide. In the direction of Toropets there was a truck loaded with some kind of army property. The lieutenant gave us a ride. From the pain in my leg and from the high temperature, I fell into oblivion. We went to the road-lezhnevka, which were built on marshy

sectors of the front by sappers. Oncoming cars drove around in such areas with difficulty. Here, on such a section of the road, a cool passenger car "ZIS-101" was walking towards us, on which the high authorities drove. Our truck stopped across the road and an oncoming car stopped. Boris Georgievich Eidinov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), came out of it, driving towards the front line. He recognized me immediately. Valya and I got off the car, and I reported to him with what task we were sent. Eidinov asked in detail about the situation during the blockade by the Germans of our brigade, about the condition of the detachments and the brigade as a whole, about the reasons for the lack of radio communications, the mood of the partisans, and, most importantly, about what the brigade needed first of all. I recounted the request of the brigade command, emphasizing the need for weapons, ammunition and medical supplies. Boris Georgievich and his comrade who accompanied him made notes in

notebooks, asked to repeat some figures. I saw how Eidinov wrote a note on some form and in my presence instructed his driver to take me to the Bologoye station and put me on a train to Moscow. Boris Georgievich himself got into a truck and drove to the front. He took Valya with him to the task force of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement. Arriving in Moscow, I reported to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, located in a separate building on Frunze Street, and reported on the arrival and instructions of Eidinov. I was immediately taken to the army hospital, the same day I had an operation on my leg, and I quickly began to recover. Two weeks later I left the hospital, settled in a hostel on Bolshoi Cherkassky Lane, and went for a few more days to get dressed. After the hospital, I once again reported to Eidinnov about the brigade and its needs, met and talked with other officials of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement.

At the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, I was informed about the new location of the brigade, the areas of hostilities, about the parachute drop of weapons and ammunition, the arrival of a new radio operator, Valentina Antonovna Poleshchuk.

Attentive attitude to the needs of the brigade of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) Boris Georgievich Eidinov, his quick response to requests that were not so easy to fulfill at that time, is an example

responsible attitude to your work. With the same attention, he treated the solution of problems that arose in other partisan formations.

Chapter 5

underground

An invaluable service in obtaining intelligence data about the German troops and the activities of the occupying authorities in the occupied territory, about the operational equipment of the area, the placement of warehouses and bases, and the basing of aviation was provided by underground workers who lived in garrisons, at facilities that were of interest to the brigade command. The underground fighters conducted reconnaissance in Orsha, Shklov, Mogilev, Krugly, Tolochin and other settlements, they monitored the transportation of German troops by rail, the equipment of the defensive line along the Dnieper and transmitted the received data to the partisans.

On the instructions of the Shklov district party committee, Sergei Shugaley, who had worked at the Spartak factory in Shklov, was left to work behind enemy lines. He managed to attract the brothers Nikolai and Valentin Shustikov, the brothers Fyodor, Denis and Ivan Grishankov, Vera Zharina and other comrades who worked on the railway in Shklov and at the Lotva station as machinists, stokers, linemen, repairmen for underground work.

The group maintained constant contact with Anton Antonovich Belobragin, the head of intelligence, and later the commander of the 10th partisan detachment. Through Belobragin, the Shugaley group transmitted to the brigade information about the transportation of Germans by the Orsha Mogilev railway, about the military units located in Shklov, Mogilev, Lotva, the nature of the defensive structures along the Dnieper between Shklov and Mogilev. The group mined the railway between Shklov and Mogilev and undermined enemy trains. She had more than 12 blown up echelons on her account. With the assistance of the partisans of the 10th detachment, the German police garrisons at the brick factory in Lotva were destroyed, the artillery battalion was defeated, several Germans were captured, who gave valuable evidence. Many of the members of this combat group of underground fighters went to the partisans, and many died, including the head of the group Sergei Shugal

a former underground worker, and then a partisan scout, Sofia Yablochkina.

Through Ivan Stepanovich Malashkevich, a partisan of the 10th detachment, contact was maintained with the underground workers of Mogilev, the Novikov spouses, Alexei and Raisa Varlamov, with Rudolf, a Czech storekeeper of a German warehouse. Through these people, the brigade received information about the German garrison in Mogilev, construction work along the Dnieper, and Rudolf, through liaisons Anufry Kononov, Vera Zharina, Maria Bekarevich, Maria and Sergei Shugaley, handed over more than 2 tons of salt to the partisans, which they really needed. The underground workers of Mogilev obtained a typeface for our partisan newspaper, periodically handed over medicines.

An underground group operated in Orsha under the leadership of the former deputy director of the Bialystok textile mill, Semyon Stepanovich Blagochinny. Nina Fomina, a former student of the Pedagogical Institute, conducted reconnaissance of German troops in Orsha, warehouses for various purposes, maintained contact with the Hadorik detachment, where she sent former Soviet military personnel who were captured, delivered mines, leaflets from the partisans, transmitted, on behalf of the Reverend, intelligence information obtained in Orsha. Claudia Medvedskaya, a former student who knew German well, monitored the movement of trains through Orsha, obtained blank forms of various documents that the Germans issued to local residents. Ivan Yankovsky worked as a machinist at the Orsha station, planted mines on trains going to the front line. Fedor Romashov worked in the police, helped the Soviet military to avoid capture, provided them with certificates if possible, connected with Nina Fomina, and she sent them to the partisans. The doctor Evdokia Urastkina, working in the hospital, handed over medicines and dressings to the partisans. When another group of Soviet prisoners of war was sent from Orsha to the partisans,

Blagochinny gave the senior a ticket issued in his name, but the provocateurs exposed the group, the senior was killed, and Blagochinny's ticket was confiscated.

The Blessed One was immediately arrested. Fomina and Medvedskaya were warned of the danger. Fomina managed to go to the partisans,

Medvedskaya was arrested. The Reverend and Medvedskaya were interrogated, tortured, and then executed.

In a German security document about Khodorik, Blagochinny and Fomina say the following:

"Political security service." **GUF Reports**
1941–1943 Message from

the commander of the Abwehr group of the Wehrmacht Wermuth in Kokhanov.

The head of the partisan group, a certain Hadorik Maxim, repeatedly visited the village of Goloshev. A reconnaissance group was sent to the forest in search of partisans, which returned empty-handed. A second group was sent, which established Khodorik's path and met with the partisans. One of our agents shot and killed one partisan, taking away a field bag in which a monthly pass for an employee of an agricultural company at Blagochinny's flax mill was found. The Reverend was closely associated with Fomina Nina. After his arrest, Fomina went to the partisans. During interrogation, he admitted that he burned several hundred kilograms of flax, set fire to a textile factory, and lost his ticket in Galoshev.

The search for Nina Fomina began, as a result of which Khodorik's brother was killed, 16-year-old Zhenya Urbanovich was detained, who lived with his grandmother in Orsha and was recruited by Nina Fomina. He went with her to the partisans. When carrying out the task of Hadorik and Fomina to get the detonator capsules from Savitsky, he was arrested.

During an interrogation after the war, the German agent Yuri Saulich testified that Vermuth from the Abwehr group in Kokhanovo had given him the task of finding out where Hadorik and Nina Fomina were, but this he did not complete the task, because he did not know where to look for them.

For Nina Fomina, a new stage in the fight against the German invaders began in the ranks of the partisans. She was entrusted with responsible reconnaissance and sabotage missions. In July 1943, Nina, together with Olga Demesh, blew up an enemy train near the village of Baran, near Orsha. The next train Nina Fomina with Olga Gorbatshevich was blown up at the Orsha station itself near the checkpoint on August 1, 1943. On September 5, near Cherven station, they derailed another enemy echelon.

At the end of November 1943, Nina Fomina and Olga Gorbatsevich cut the cable connecting Hitler's headquarters with the command of Army Group Center. The cable was laid along the Minsk-Moscow highway at a depth of about a meter. The girls and two men dug into the ground at night for about an hour until they found the cable and cut it his.

All six Khovrenkov sisters from the village of Gantsevichi, living in different places during the occupation, were associated with the partisans of the Chekist brigade and carried out reconnaissance missions. Maria Khovrenkova got a job in the volost government of the village of Ponizovye, entered into the confidence of the burgomaster and the officers of the garrison. She conducted reconnaissance of the German troops near Ponizovye, obtained blank documents, revealed the plans of the Nazis and transmitted this data to the brigade through messengers. The Gestapo hunted down Maria, brutally tortured and shot her. Nadya, Maria's sister, who served as partisan intelligence, died in

1942. Maria Glushankova monitored the Nazi air base in Balbasovo, the Orsha garrison and the railway junction. According to her information about the concentration of aviation at the Balbasovo airfield, transmitted by radio to the Center, our aviation attacked the airfield. At the time of the installation of a magnetic mine on a fuel tank in Orsha, Maria was captured, and only by a lucky chance, after severe interrogations, did she manage to escape.

Mathematics teacher Olga Gurinova, who knew German well, got a job with the Germans in Tolochin, informed the partisans about the transfer of German units through Tolochin, the enemy garrisons located in the city. Olga was helped by her friend Dina Finogenova. Both girls were arrested and, after torture, were shot in April 1944.

In September 1943, Ivan Goncharov placed a magnetic mine on a railway tank car, which exploded while the train was moving, while several other fuel tanks burned down. Alexandra Sergeevna Titova and the young Komsomol

member Volodya Polyakov actively conducted reconnaissance in the town of Krugloye. They, keeping secrecy, for a long time informed the command

brigade on the work of the headquarters of the 286th security division of the Germans, located in

Krugly. Alexandra Sergeevna periodically obtained documents from the Germans and handed them over to the partisans. I clearly remember the large-scale German map handed over to us with the bases of partisan detachments of our brigade marked, the routes of movement of partisan groups from the forests south of Shepelevichi to the combat area to Orsha, Shklov, Tolochin, Krugloy, places of partisan crossings across the Drut River. We studied this map with the commanders of the detachments in order to take appropriate precautions, and then sent it by plane to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement.

Titova gave us copies of the orders of the head of the Kruglyansky garrison, information about the exits of punishers into areas controlled by partisans of our brigade. In short but detailed written reports, Alexandra Sergeevna reported on the planned activities of the garrison troops and the administration in relation to the local population (requisition of property, including warm clothes and felt boots for the German army, collection of grain, flax and other raw materials). According to the agreement, Alexandra Sergeevna addressed her reports to "Grandfather", and signed them "Grandmother". She was a reliable source of intelligence information. We protected her as best we could, only Kirpich, Sevostyanov, Bukshtynov and I knew about her work with us. For reasons of secrecy, we never met her. However, despite the precautions, the Gestapo managed to track down Titova and convict her of having links with the partisans. On June 10, 1944, the Germans arrested Alexandra Sergeevna. Volodya Polyakov was the link between the

underground and the partisans. He reported on all the activities that were carried out in Krugly, paying special attention to the work on the decomposition of the Vlasovites (the Vlasov regiment of Don Cossacks was stationed in Krugly). On our instructions, Volodya joined the police, and with his help, the guards of the German warehouse in the Krugly region were disarmed, and the warehouse was destroyed. After that, Volodya joined the partisans and became a scout of the 1st detachment.

In the book of Sevostyanov G.N. and Zhukovskaya V.N. "Behind the front line" it is noted: "In 1943, there were about 60 underground workers in Krugly, half of them worked for the Germans. In Shklov in 1944 there were 30 of them, and in Orsha - 15 members of the underground. As the former head of intelligence of the 5th detachment Safronov recalls, more than 30 underground workers from among the local population worked on his instructions alone in Tolochin, Kokhanovo, Slavny and Orsha.

The Germans suffered heavy losses in personnel. In Germany, there was a shortage of human resources to staff combat units and formations. To make up for the loss of life, they began to form Vlasov units and formations, various kinds of national legions, companies and battalions, police stations from among the Soviet prisoners of war recruited in the camps. These formations were used by the Nazis to protect communications, fight against partisans and underground workers in the occupied Soviet territory. People joined these formations for various reasons. Some, an absolute minority - out of ideological convictions, others went to serve because of their weakness, some - under the threat of force, and some were looking for an opportunity to escape from the hell of the German camps, get weapons and go to the partisans.

In September 1943, the so-called "Turkestan Legion" arrived in Tolochin, formed by the Germans on a national basis from Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks. The legion served in the protection of German objects of secondary importance, was engaged in construction work. The work on the decomposition of this legion was entrusted to the commander of the 5th detachment Simdyankin, the scout of this detachment Uzbek Topivoldiev and me. Having reconnoitered the location of the legion, we began to look for connections with the legionnaires through local residents. Near the Tolochin station, Topivoldyev and I met twice with one of the legionnaires, Karaliev, who clarified the size of the legion, its weapons, the objects under its protection, and most importantly, the mood of the legionnaires. It became clear that many were ready to go over to the side of the partisans.

On October 17, 1943, 17 people from the Legion with weapons went over to the side of the partisans. And the "Turkestan Legion", as unreliable, the Germans disbanded.

Certain work on the decomposition of personnel was carried out by us in the Volunteer Cossack Don Regiment. The Cossack regiment was stationed in the district center Krugloye at the headquarters of the 286th German security division and at that time was an impressive force. It consisted of two cavalry squadrons, an artillery battery and support units.

Through the underground workers in Krugloye, we tried to establish contacts with the Cossacks. A young underground scout and our contact, Volodya Polyakov, who lived in Krugloye, offered us the candidacy of Lieutenant Krymtsev. Krymtsev near Borisov was surrounded, then he was captured, a half-starved existence in a prisoner of war camp. After consulting with his comrades, Krymtsev and his friends in captivity decided to join Vlasov's army and join the partisans at the first opportunity. We consulted with Sevostyanov and Kirpich and decided to develop Krymtsev. Volodya hinted several times to Krymtsev about the possibility of contacting the partisans, to which he allegedly reacted positively. We wrote a note to Krymtsev with something like this: "You once violated the oath of a warrior - you surrendered to the Germans, the second time you violated it, taking the path of treason, we offer to atone for guilt, for which, with a group of Cossacks, go over to the side of the partisans and embark on the path of struggle with the Nazi occupiers. At the next meeting, we suggested that Volodya pass our note to Krymtsev, he agreed. We discussed the day, the hour, the place of meeting with Krymtsev for negotiations if he was ready to cooperate with the partisans. The meeting place was the house of our contact Rylkova in the village of Pasyrevo.

Sevostyanov and I took a platoon of partisans from the 1st detachment with us, set up posts on the likely approaches to the village, and began to wait. Approximately thirty minutes earlier than the stipulated time, without knocking or warning, the door opened and a group of healthy guys in German uniforms tumbled into it. We were in a state of shock for several seconds, because the posted posts were supposed to warn us about the approach of someone to the village. And suddenly a clear army report: "Lieutenant Krymtsev with a group of fighters has arrived at your disposal." 11 "Cossacks" came with Krymtsev. All of them were assigned to the 1st detachment under the command of G.S. Ivanova.

At first, Krymtsev was an ordinary partisan, then he was appointed senior reconnaissance group of the 1st detachment. It was not easy for the command to make decisions about the rapid promotion of the former traitor, but his military abilities, ability to get along with people and the situation contributed to this. Krymtsev died on July 7, 1943 during an operation to defeat the German artillery division in Lotva.

After a group of Cossacks headed by Krymtsev went over to the partisans, Polyakov, at our request, got a job as a policeman. He was sent to guard a warehouse in the Krugloe area, where he began to work among the police, suggesting that they go over to the partisans. In early July 1943, a company of the 1st detachment under the command of Krymtsev disarmed the guards of the warehouse at the moment when Polyakov was on duty. The partisans silently entered the guard building, took away 12 rifles and ammunition, burned the flax warehouse and returned to the camp. Polyakov never returned to Krugloye, it was dangerous.

Scouts of the 20th detachment, led by Zakrevsky, established contact with the Vlasovites of the Dubrovka garrison through the Ponyzovya underground fighter Polina Voitova. In mid-September 1943, with the assistance of Polina, 5 Vlasovites went over to the side of the partisans. They brought with them 4 machine guns, 2 machine guns, 2 rifles, rifle cartridges

and 22 grenades. Gradually, we gained combat experience, constantly studied the enemy and began to understand that he was afraid of us. The Germans were reluctant to leave the garrisons, the impudence with which they robbed local residents in 1941-42 was lost.

For us, the meaning of the word "environment" has changed. It was the Germans who were surrounded - on the one hand, by the active Soviet troops, on the other - by partisans. After the war in the seventies, General Maksimov and I were on a business trip to Minsk and visited the former brigade commander Kirpich. During the conversation, General Maksimov had the imprudence to ask Kirpich: "Under what circumstances did you find yourself surrounded?" Brick very emotionally answered the general: "I have never been surrounded, it was the Germans who were in our constant environment!" This is how my former commander reacted to the question,

and Maximov, when we left Kirpich's apartment, said: "This is the brigade commander!"

Chapter 6

By the beginning of 1944, the Great Patriotic War entered the final stage of the liberation of our Motherland from the invaders. But the Soviet people, the soldiers of the Armed Forces, still had to endure many trials. For three years, the Belarusian people were under the yoke of the fascist yoke. Tens of thousands of people were driven away by the fascist governors for forced labor in Germany. There was not a single family that did not experience the horrors of war.

But the Belarusian people did not bow their heads before the enemy. During the entire fascist occupation in the republic, the flames of the struggle of partisans and underground fighters did not subside. By the summer of 1944, over 140 thousand

partisans were fighting in the occupied part of Belarus. The Chekist partisan brigade, among other formations and detachments, also actively acted against the German invaders. By this time, there were more than 2 thousand partisans in its ranks. Over time, the reconnaissance of the brigade took on an increasingly organized and planned character, was carried out both in the interests of the operating fronts and for its own needs. A variety of methods were used to conduct reconnaissance: intelligence activities of underground scouts, informing local residents, monitoring enemy activities, testimonies of captured Germans, traitor defectors, information from neighboring brigades and detachments.

The vast flow of intelligence information that came round the clock from various sources to the brigade headquarters was taken into account, analyzed and generalized. I, as head of intelligence, reported my conclusions on the situation to the command of the brigade. The order of the report was established as follows. At the end of the day, Kirpich, Sevostyanov, Bukshtynov, sometimes members of the Shklovsky underground district committee of the party gathered near the headquarters, and I briefed them with intelligence for 20-30 minutes. They clarified certain provisions and immediately, usually Kirpich or Sevostyanov, gave additional instructions on reconnaissance. Sometimes it got ridiculous. Sometimes at night shooting started somewhere. I was

they asked: "Where and who shoots?" Knowing the enemy well, his habits and the situation in general, I gave answers right off the bat, and for the most part they were correct. At the direction of the commander or chief of staff of the brigade, intelligence information was transmitted by radio to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, the headquarters of the Western Front, and by messengers to the Mogilev military task force under the Mogilev underground regional party committee.

Beginning in 1942, we almost completely gave the Center a timetable for the movement of German trains along the Minsk-Moscow and Orsha-Mogilev railways, and reported on the nature of the goods transported. The passage of military echelons was controlled at several points on the same road. We monitored enemy transports, mined railways, staged sabotage: in Orsha - Blagochinny, Fomina, Demesh, Medvedskaya, Yankovsky; in Tolochin - Goncharov Gurinova, Panchenko, Alovetsky; in Shklov and Lotva - Shugaley, Zharina, Shustikovs, Grishankovs, Ermachenkos; in Mogilev, the Varlamovs and many others. In the spring of 1943, the

reconnaissance of the brigade informed the High Command about the transfer of German troops near Kursk and Belgorod, about the transportation there by rail of new tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", self-propelled assault guns "Ferdinand". In the summer, after the defeat of the Germans on the Kursk Bulge, the reconnaissance of the brigade reported on the flow of German trains going west with the wounded, on the evacuation of warehouses and bases from the frontline zone, the removal of looted property, on the appearance on the railway between Orsha and Borisov of sleeper destroyers that were used by the Germans to disable the railway track during the withdrawal of troops.

On the eve of the strategic operation "Bagration" by the Soviet troops to liberate Belarus, the reconnaissance of the brigade revealed the grouping of troops of the 4th German army, which opposed our Western Front. Intelligence reported on the deployment and movement of troops of the 286th security and 78th assault divisions, on the location of units of the 230th infantry division in the Gorki area, on the arrival of the operational group of the headquarters of the 27th German army corps in the Mukhanov area north of Orsha, on other military formations and rear organs of the Nazis.

A month and a half before the start of the Belarusian operation, a detailed diagram of engineering structures on the German defensive line along the western bank of the Dnieper was delivered by plane from the brigade to the headquarters of the Western Front. The scheme was executed with an indication of defensive positions interconnected by communications, places of built bunkers, artillery positions, machine-gun sites, prepared and equipped command and observation posts, cut-off positions between defense lines. The diagram also showed the engineering structures of the Nazis on the bridgeheads in front of Orsha and Mogilev. Reconnaissance of the defensive line along the Dnieper

has been carried out since 1943, i.e., from the beginning of its equipment, by groups specially formed for this: in the Orsha area under the leadership of Zakrevsky, near Shklov - Malashkevicha, near Mogilev - Varlamov. In addition, information came from captured Germans and policemen who took part in the construction of facilities, local residents who lived in the construction zone. The data coming from various sources were pre-plotted on a large-scale map, which was divided into several parts: from Orsha to Shklov, from Shklov to Mogilev along the Dnieper. Separately, maps were kept, on which engineering structures were plotted on the bridgeheads in front of Orsha and Mogilev. On the eve of the Belarusian operation, we transferred to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement

and the headquarters of the Western Front generalized intelligence information on the air base of the Nazis Balbasovo (the number of aircraft based, the location of fuel depots, aviation bombs and ammunition, the quartering of the flight crew, anti-aircraft cover of the airfield). Data on the Balbasovo airfield was provided by scouts from the 20th detachment, primarily the group led by Zakrevsky, and the 60th detachment led by Bublikov. The reconnaissance data of the brigade on the eve of the offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus were highly appreciated by the command of the

Western Front, an officer of the intelligence department of the front headquarters flew to the brigade to clarify them. To the commander, chief of staff, and to me, the chief of reconnaissance of the brigade, the commander of the front troops expressed gratitude and awarded valuable gifts, and on his behalf

an intelligence officer handed us a TT pistol, binoculars, and an officer's tablet each. An intelligence

officer taught me a lesson in interrogating prisoners of war. I and our other comrades, who interrogated the prisoner, usually sat him next to him, treated him to a cigarette and began to interrogate him in a benevolent open manner. The officer categorically rejected our method. At this time we had two fresh

"language" and he showed us how to do it.

Firstly, he put the German at attention and did not allow him to relax, secondly, he conducted the entire conversation in an imperative mood, and thirdly, he demanded only clear answers, not allowing lengthy reasoning. In principle, it was possible to disagree with such a method of interrogation. But we thanked the intelligence officer for the lesson. With the formation of a military task force under the

Mogilev underground regional party committee, we were obliged, along with other combat documents, to work out and submit there with messengers an intelligence report for a certain period of time. The summary usually indicated: the general nature of the enemy's actions in the brigade's zone of responsibility; locations of German garrisons; the nature of the transportation of the Nazis by rail; German police stations in the zone, their strength and combat composition, the nature of the actions; activities of the German administration carried out in the area of responsibility; conclusions about the situation. As information, the reconnaissance report was sent to neighboring partisan formations: to the 8th partisan brigade of S.G. Zhunin, to the

partisan regiment "Thirteen" under the command of S.G. Grishin, who arrived in our zone in 1943, and in the presence of an aircraft - to the headquarters of the Western Front. We, in turn, also received intelligence reports in the form of information from these partisan formations. Four days before the start of the transition of the troops of the Belarusian fronts to the offensive, by decision of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, an operation was

again carried out throughout the occupied territory of Belarus to disable the railways by means of a massive explosion under the code name "Spring

concert". The troops went on the offensive on June 23, and the partisans began their operation on the night of June 19-20,

1944. Our partisan brigade was involved in this operation in full strength. 25th detachment under the command of I.Ya. Yakushko operated on the railroad between Orsha and Mogilev, and all other detachments - between Glorious and Trotsilovo on the Minsk-Moscow railroad. As in the previous operation "Rail War", the scouts organized reconnaissance in a short time, led the detachments to their original positions for undermining, took a direct part in the undermining and provided an organized withdrawal after the operation. As a result of the explosions,

the railways in the Orsha-Borisov and Orsha-Mogilev sections did not function, and the Germans could not use them during their withdrawal. On June 23, Soviet troops went on the

offensive, an operation began to liberate Belarus. The concept of the operation "Bagration" provided for the simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy's defenses in six sectors, the encirclement and destruction of the flank groupings of fascist troops in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the defeat of the Orsha and Mogilev groups. It was planned to encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center with converging strikes of three Belorussian fronts in the general direction of Minsk and reach the borders of the Soviet Union. The main forces of our brigade were at that time west of Druti in the area of

Shepelevichi, Klev, Somra, in the areas of concentration after the operation on the railway, but reconnaissance groups were already advancing towards the advancing troops.

We heard the rumble of artillery preparation, air strikes on the German defenses on the Dnieper. This was Soviet artillery and aviation hitting targets identified by our intelligence. It was with our help that bomber aircraft attacked the Balbasovo air base and the railway echelons frozen on the destroyed railway. A sense of pride for the victorious march embraced both the soldiers of the advancing fronts and the partisans, the locals greeted the Soviet troops with tears of joy.

Since the main blows of the 2nd Belorussian Front were delivered from Orsha through Borisov to Minsk, and the 1st Belorussian Front through

Bobruisk to Minsk, in the zone of responsibility of our brigade, the greatest density of Nazi troops was formed, retreating to Minsk. We captured hundreds of prisoners, reported to the Center that units of the 14th, 78th, 93rd infantry divisions were retreating towards Minsk through our strip, and the 12th infantry and 67th assault divisions were withdrawing under the command of General Kraft, whom Hitler instructed to be the first to pass in the capitals of the defeated countries of Western Europe. The 31st

detachment under the command of Nazarov and the 51st detachment under the command of Krenev were the first to engage in battle with the retreating German units east and northwest of Shepelevichi.

On the night of June 28-29, on the Shepelevnchi-Somra road, on the retreat route of the 14th German Infantry Division, partisans under the command of the brigade commander Kirpich G.A. frontal and flank ambushes were organized by forces of the 1st, 5th, 20th and 31st detachments. This was the last fierce battle of our brigade with regular Nazi units. Parts of the 14th division, which attacked the positions of our brigade several times, failed to pass along this road, suffered heavy losses and were forced, abandoning equipment, transport, to retreat along forest roads towards Minsk, where they had already prepared a "cauldron". The 61st detachment at that time was fighting with the retreating units of the Germans on the Krugloye-Ukhvala road.

On the morning of June 29, with a group of scouts, I went to the Shepelevichi-Somry road and saw with my own eyes the motorcyclists of the Soviet Army. We jumped off our horses and walked towards them. Imagine my surprise when I immediately recognized my colleague from the school of lieutenants by the name of Nepeyvoda. Nepeyvoda took a flask of vodka from the motorcycle, we kissed each other, took a sip from the flask, and each went his own way. The commander of the advancing tank corps drove into the location of the brigade. The partisans carried him in their arms to the brigade commander. The general jubilation grew.

The brigade commander was instructed by the entire brigade to go to Shklov, to the Dnieper. The detachments lined up in a marching column, and the brigade moved. This time we also conducted reconnaissance, but with the difference that we reported to the command about the meeting with our units of the second echelons of the advancing 2nd Belorussian Front. We spent the night before Shklov, cleaned ourselves up as best we could, cleaned our weapons, and entered Shklov in the morning. Then at the direction

The Mogilev regional committee of the party concentrated in the Buynichi state farm, south of Mogilev, and on July 7, together with other partisan formations operating on the territory of the Mogilev region, they took part in the parade of partisans in Mogilev. The inhabitants of the heroic Mogilev, which lay in ruins, warmly welcomed the partisans, who inscribed their page in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This ended the

intelligence activities of the Chekist partisan brigade. The best scouts and

intelligence leaders who proved themselves in combat missions were Hero of the Soviet Union Mamadali Topivoldyev, Nikolai Koyanov, Nikolai Zolotoy, P.A. Barchukov, Vasily Khromov, Anatoly Machakhovsky, Petr Strazdin, Vasily Zakrevsky, brothers Nikolai and Karl Zakharchenko, Bronislav Zalevsky, Vladimir Ryabinin, Viktor Chistyakov, Nikolai and Ivan Safronov, Lyubov Krivelskaya, Nina Platonova, Olga Demesh, Nina Fomina, Olga Gorbatshevich, Nina Laskevich, Valya Vorobieva, the Khovrenkov sisters (Nadezhda, Maria, Anna, Matrena, Zinaida, Efrosinya), the Sidlyarova sisters (Valentina and Akulina), Alexandra Titova, Vladimir Polyakov, Nikolai Fedorov, Anton Khainatsky, Mikhail to Grigory Ermachenko, Valentin and Nikolai Shustikov, Philip Barin and many others. A book could be written about the exploits of each of them. The close ties of partisan scouts with the local population, their boundless devotion to the Motherland,

faith in victory over the Nazi invaders, the special selection of partisans for reconnaissance operations made it possible to solve complex tasks that were set by the Center and the brigade command.

Chapter

7 Interaction between the reconnaissance of the "Chekist" brigade and the reconnaissance groups of the fronts of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ger

As a result of the perfidious attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union and the seizure of a significant territory of our country, Soviet military intelligence also suffered significant damage. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and the intelligence departments of the fronts essentially had to recreate the intelligence network behind enemy lines. In the Western direction, after a short preparation, about 560 reconnaissance groups were transferred behind enemy lines. Due to the lack of proper means of communication, lack of experience, many of them died or were captured by the Germans. But many worked and passed on valuable intelligence information to the High Command and front headquarters.

Thus, during the preparation of the Belarusian offensive operation, the reconnaissance groups of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts reported to their headquarters in a timely manner that the enemy did not have large reserves. This helped the front commanders to correctly distribute forces when breaking through the enemy defenses and successfully carry out the operation. The reconnaissance groups of the GRU of the General Staff and the fronts, where possible, were based on partisan detachments and brigades, used intelligence obtained by partisan intelligence, and transferred them

to their headquarters. From the base of our partisan brigade in 1943-44, a reconnaissance group headed by Major Vatslavsky Boris Nikolaevich operated, which we constantly assisted in solving reconnaissance tasks, since the reconnaissance capabilities of the brigade were much greater than that of this group. We helped Boris Nikolayevich to select assistants from among the local residents for

reconnaissance tasks in Orsha, Tolochin, Shklov, on the railways. They assisted the Vatslavsky group in solving the food problem, sometimes they gave food to the radio station. The scouts of the group had the opportunity to periodically rest, being under the protection of the partisans. Together with Boris Nikolayevich, we often traveled directly to reconnaissance objects to clarify any data. I remember that as a sign of friendly disposition and assistance to the group, Vatslavsky gave me a trophy leather French saddle. The young Miloradova Claudia, the intelligence girl Alexandrovna from another reconnaissance group of the GRU General Staff, assistance in solving reconnaissance tasks in Orsha and the Balbasovo airfield. Legalization documents were prepared for her in the brigade, secret addresses of our underground workers were given.

also turned out

permanent

Claudia Alexandrovna once wrote a small book called "In Intelligence" about the actions of her group's scouts. She now lives in Moscow, actively participates in public work, speaks with memories to young people and to young intelligence officers, writes articles about intelligence officers in newspapers, including about her friend Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, with whom she underwent intelligence training.

Chapter

8 Party Political Work

Party political work behind enemy lines was organized and carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions. Having seized the strategic initiative, the enemy persistently advanced deep into Soviet territory. The Germans occupied the Baltic republics, Belarus, Moldova, part of Ukraine, and by the end of 1941 came close to Moscow and Leningrad. The communists and Komsomol members who found themselves in the occupied territory, both from local residents and from the troops of the Soviet Army, began to establish contacts among themselves, collect abandoned weapons, and organize themselves into partisan groups and detachments. Where possible, they listened to the Moscow radio, wrote down the reports of the Sovinformburo by hand and brought their contents to the local population, although at the first stage of the war these news were not joyful.

With the unification of the detachments into the "Chekist" brigade, commissars were appointed to each partisan detachment: commissar of the brigade Sedletsky F.M., commissars of the detachments P.I. Scheslavsky, F.I. Bukshtynov, N.M. Yakovenko, F.A. Grishanov, N.G. Danilov, P.Ya. Myakotenko, N.I. Massyurov, V.F. Malchevsky, M.N. Ivanov, I.E.

Kungurtsev. The party organization of the brigade was formed, which included 66 communists. The party bureau included G.A. Brick. F.M. Sedletsky, G.N. Andreev, I.S. Shcherbakov; B.N. Klyushnikov, M.N. Baranovsky, P.A. Krasnyakov, F.T. Sialko, Sh.L. Kesler. The navigator, senior lieutenant Andreev Georgy Nikolaevich was elected secretary of the party committee, I.S. Shcherbakov. Party groups were created in the partisan detachments. All party political

work was aimed at solving the main tasks of that time - organizing partisan struggle, involving broad sections of the population in it, increasing the effectiveness of the struggle of partisans against the German invaders, exposing Hitler's propaganda about building a "new order" in the occupied territory, disrupting events

Hitler's command to rob Belarus, deport young people to work in Germany.

Detachment commissars, communists, Komsomol members held meetings and talks in platoons, companies, detachments, in villages, during which they explained the real situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, distributed among the local population leaflets, reports of the Sovinformburo, appeals, decisions of the party, government, local underground party bodies.

Intelligence was entrusted with the task of obtaining paper, printing ink, distributing newspapers, leaflets, reports, appeals to the local population in cities and towns.

In our difficult conditions, commissars and communists were role models, they were the first to go into battle, they led combat groups in carrying out the most difficult tasks, they went out on sabotage, inspiring the partisans by personal example. Many of them died. In a battle with punishers in Ratsevo, the first commissar of the brigade Sedletsky F.M., the commissar of the 1st detachment Scheslavsky P.I. died. died during the assault on the German garrison in Galoshev, commissars Massyuzov N.I. died in battle during the blockade. and Kungurtsev

I.E. With special warmth, our partisans remember the first commissar of the brigade Fedor Mikhailovich Sedletsky. It was as if he was born to work with people - he found encouraging words for everyone, slept by the fire together with ordinary partisans, ate with them from a partisan cauldron and went into battle with the partisans. He was buried in his native Staroselye, a bust was erected on the grave. When meeting partisans of our brigade, an obligatory tradition is the laying of wreaths on the grave of Sedletsky.

Fedor Mikhailovich repeatedly offered me to become his assistant in the Komsomol (we had such a position), taught me intelligence. Between us, more than once there was about such a conversation. Sedletsky says: "Where are you, Pavka, always climbing, you don't know how a scout should act. No need to jump out on a horse on the field. First you need to stop, observe, and then go further. You will be left without a head. And he laughs with his eyes. I answer him something like this to his moralizing: "Why do you go into battle in the chain of partisans? Is this a commissioner's job! In the spring of 1943, in agreement with the commander of the brigade, Sedletsky F.M. passed his

position to Fedor Ivanovich Bukshtynov, and he himself formed a new partisan detachment and became its commander. After the death of Sedletsky, the 60th detachment was given his name. In July

1943, representatives of the Mogilev underground regional party committee Mark Ivanovich Kudin and Ivan Pavlovich Krispovets arrived in the brigade to create the Shklovsky underground district committee of the party. At the party meeting, the composition of the district committee was chosen, it included: G.A. Kirpich, I.S. Shcherbakov, F.T. Sialko, F.I. Bukshtynov, Sh.L. Kesler. F.I. Bukshtynov.

With the creation of the underground district party committee, party political work intensified. In cities, towns, railway stations, new party organizations were created, which carried out work among the local population, informed them about the situation at the front, and instilled confidence in victory. Through scouts and underground workers, they managed to get fonts, paper, printing ink in Lepel and Mogilev,

they themselves made a primitive typesetting machine. With the help of the former compositor Pyotr Kolchenko, the newspaper of the Shklov underground RK CP (b) "For the Motherland" began to appear. The first issue of the newspaper was published in the amount of 300 copies. Shcherbakov Ivan Samsonovich was chosen as the editor of the newspaper, before the war he worked as an instructor in the Bogushevsky district party committee and was familiar with editorial work. A newspaper went to the partisan detachments and to the population, which told about the combat activities of the partisans, about the

successes of the Soviet Army on the fronts, about the atrocities committed by the invaders against the civilian population, about the party life of the region. The typesetter, printer and publisher all rolled into one, Petr Kalchenko was a master with golden hands, he also made German seals

for us, which we used when working out legalization documents.

At the same time, the Shklovsky underground district committee of the Komsomol was elected, which included: M.A. Ivanov - secretary of the district committee, Sh.L. Kesler (from the party organization), N.F. Zakharchenko, P.A. Golitsyn, V.F. Chebyshev, SP. Obukhov, V.P. Alekhovich.

The main question of the meetings of the Komsomol district committee was the question: "How can we better beat the German invaders, how to protect young people from being deported to Germany." Underground Komsomol cells were also created in settlements.

When planes began to land on our landing sites, we had newspapers to hand over to the detachments and local residents.

The ranks of the party organization grew over time. The best commanders and ordinary partisans who proved themselves in battles were accepted into the party, including G.N. Sevostyanov, I.D. Bulanov, detachment commanders G.S. Ivanov, A.A. Belobragin, S.N. Yakimov, chief of staff of the detachment I.I. Zhomeiko, company commander N.K. Anapashenko, scouts M. Topivoldiev, A.R. Machakhovsky, N.F. Zakharchenko, doctor T.Ya. Krivitskaya and others. At the end of March 1943, at a party meeting in Staisk, G.N. Sevostyanov, I.D. Bulanov,

G.S. Ivanov and I were accepted as candidates for the party. Linking fate with the Bolshevik Party, we swore an oath to intensify the struggle against the German invaders and became in the forefront of those who were devoted to the cause of the complete liberation of the Motherland. I was recommended to the party by the commander of the brigade G.A. Kirpich, the commissar of the brigade F.I. Bukshtynov, a member of the party bureau of the brigade I.S. Shcherbakov. Bukshtynov Fedor Ivanovich was born in 1903 in the village of Sloboda, Tolochinsky district, Vitebsk region. Sloboda adjoined directly to the Ratsevsky Forest, where our partisan brigade was born. Since

1921 Bukshtynov F.I. - in the Komsomol work. Since 1927, he worked in Moscow in the management of the Moscow-Belarusian Railway, and before the start of the war - in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In September 1941 he joined the militia, participated in the defense of Moscow. On June 15, 1942, together with his brother Pavel Ivanovich, he began to partisan. During the creation of the brigade Bukshtynov F.I. was elected secretary of the party organization of the 5th detachment, then appointed commissar of the same detachment, and from the fall of 1942 - commissar of the brigade. In July 1943, Fedor Ivanovich was elected secretary of the Shklovsky underground district committee. He was directly involved in sabotage on the railway, combat operations of the 5th detachment and brigade. On May 1, 1943, near the village of Bovsevichi, he was wounded.

Fedor Ivanovich enjoyed great prestige among the commanders and ordinary partisans of the brigade. His extensive experience in party work allowed him to understand people well, to be sensitive and attentive to them. People came to him with their problems and anxieties. Fedor Ivanovich did a lot to strengthen discipline in the detachments and the brigade as a whole. Irreconcilable was to violators of order, manifestations of looting. In the postwar period Bukshtynov F.I. for a long time he worked as the secretary of the party bureau of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, but still provided assistance and

assistance to the former partisans of the brigade. Fedor Ivanovich died in March 1973. The party organization of the brigade doubled compared to 1942. By the summer of 1944, there were 123 communists in it.

At party meetings, questions were raised mainly about the combat activities of partisans, examples of communists in battle, political work among the population, disruption of the activities of the German administration, and the involvement of new fighters in the ranks of partisans.

For Soviet people, the word "partisan" has become synonymous with a patriot, a courageous fighter for the freedom and independence of his homeland, ready for all hardships, to die for the sake of victory over hated invaders.

Party political work achieved the best results when it was carried out purposefully, taking into account the prevailing situation. If in 1942 the population was called for damage and destruction of industrial equipment, the destruction of crops, then by 1944 the situation had changed. The Soviet Army stood on the threshold of Belarus, and it was important to preserve material resources for the restoration of the national economy. In one of the appeals of the Shklovsky underground district party committee of November 30, 1943, it was said: "Men and women! Those who are able to bear arms, rise to the sacred struggle against brutal fascism, do not miss a single day.

Cook hidden dugouts in the forests for families, harvest products, hide property...

Do not allow fascist executioners to destroy you and your families. Revenge Hitler's cannibals for blood and tears, for

inflicted suffering on our people.

Curse, death to the German brigands.

Shklovsky underground district committee

of the CP(b). When you read

it, pass it on to someone else." A copy of this address lies before me, reminding me
the hard work of our political and party organs.

Chapter

9 Rescue of the Pilots

The scouts operating in the brigade's responsibility zone were instructed to rescue our pilots in cases where our aircraft were shot down by German anti-aircraft artillery fire or crashed for other reasons. The first pilot to join our brigade was the

navigator, foreman Lieutenant Andreev Georgy Nikolaevich, whose bomber plane was shot down in the spring of 1942. Andreev stayed with us for several months, was elected first secretary of the party organization of the brigade. In the fall of 1942, Andreev, with a group of partisans from our brigade, was sent behind the front line to the location of the Soviet troops.

In September 1943, Olga Zhigunova, a brigade liaison officer from the village of Troitsa, witnessed an air battle between a Soviet bomber and a German fighter. Olya saw how both planes, engulfed in flames, began to fall. 4 people jumped out of the bomber and parachuted down to the ground. An immediate search for pilots yielded no results. The next day, in the morning, Olya found a trace of the pilots, met them in the forest and brought them to the brigade. Soon, all four were sent to the mainland by planes that landed on our site.

At the end of June 1944, during the Belarusian offensive operation carried out by our troops, I was with a group of scouts in the area west of Shepelevichi and observed the following. Two Soviet fighters flew from west to east. One of the fighters lost speed, began to fall and, hitting the ground, crashed. From under the wreckage of the aircraft, the scouts pulled the pilot out and took him to the location of the brigade. The pilot turned out to be officer Volkov Anatoly Ananyevich. Volkov received medical assistance from partisan doctors, but his condition remained grave. For several days he was treated in our hospital, and at the beginning of July 1944, after our brigade joined the troops of the Soviet Army, Volkov was sent to the command of the Soviet troops.

And so, during the gathering of partisans of the Chekist brigade in Shklov in 1984, we met with Anatoly Ananyevich, got to know each other, he recalled with gratitude his salvation after the disaster. After this incident, Volkov continued to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army, then retired, lives in Vinnitsa and makes himself felt every year with greeting cards.

In the spring of 1944, the PO-2 plane, flying to our brigade, was fired upon by the Germans over the Dnieper. The pilot was wounded, but made it to our landing site, where, during landing, the plane poked its propeller into the ground and froze. An unconscious, bloodied pilot was pulled out of the plane, transported to a partisan hospital, and the plane was disguised at the edge of the forest. A week later, the pilot was sent by plane to the mainland to recover. The mechanic pilots who arrived installed a new propeller on the plane, and it flew to the location of its unit. Three years later, already in the

postwar period, we accidentally met this man in Moscow, he was already in the rank of captain, continued to serve in the army and fly (unfortunately, I did not remember his last name). There were other cases when our partisans

provided assistance to our downed pilots. But we certainly tried to send them to the mainland to continue their service, since there was always a need for pilots at that time.

Chapter

10 Logistics of the combat activities of the brigade

It would seem, what does intelligence have to do with logistics? In partisan conditions - the most direct. During the period of organizing partisan detachments, i.e., in the initial period of the struggle against the invaders, we experienced a shortage of weapons and ammunition, so one of the reconnaissance tasks was to search for weapons and ammunition abandoned by our retreating troops and deliver them to the forest. I remember that by the autumn of 1942, after the blockade battles with punishers, our brigade had 5 rounds of ammunition left for a rifle and a disk for PPSH and PPD assault rifles. We indicated these figures in our application for help when we went with Valya Vorobyeva to the front line. The scouts looked for weapons and ammunition themselves, and most importantly, through local residents, many of whom hid these weapons or saw them abandoned somewhere. Exactly the same situation was with explosives - everyone was looking for explosives, bombs, shells and delivered them to the detachments.

From the spring of 1943, planes began to arrive at our landing site 3 km west of the village of Zaozerye, the main cargo of which was weapons and ammunition, and they took the wounded from us. But only PO-2 and R-5 planes landed in the forest, the carrying capacity of which was very small. On the same platform, weapons and ammunition, explosives and accessories for detonation were dropped in a cargo parachute landing container. Landing planes and receiving cargo have always been holidays for us. The cargo was collected by duty units around the site, delivered to the brigade headquarters, and there it was distributed among the detachments. Usually, either the brigade commander G.A. Kirpich himself, or G.N. Sevostyanov, or I.D. Bulanov were engaged in the distribution of the received cargo.

Several times on our signals parachute dropping of ammunition in boxes was carried out. But it did not justify itself, since some of the cartridges were deformed, and they became unsuitable for

application. And they checked it out. A team of partisans stood out, who opened all the cartridge boxes and zinc packages, and each cartridge was driven into the chamber with a bolt and thrown away. If the cartridge did not go, then it was deformed. Jackets or tunics were sewn from the fabric of cargo bags, and linen was made from parachutes. The tunics turned out to be heavy, stiff, especially after rain, but linen from parachutes turned out to be excellent, its main advantage was that lice did not start in it. The parachute fabric was also used as a dressing material after its disinfection. I remember in connection with the reception of our aircraft

and comical cases. The commissioner of the 5th detachment, Savchenko, who wore a large beard, was often asked to be on duty at the aircraft reception area. After unloading the plane, he approached the pilot and begged him for a pistol. The conversation went something like this: "Give me, my grandfather, a pistol, and we will kill a fascist from it." Pilot: "A pistol is a personal weapon, it is written in my certificate." Savchenko: "I'll give you a receipt for its receipt, you will report that you gave it to the partisan commissar." In this way, Savchenko collected about 5-6 pistols, which became known to the brigade commander. He summoned him, scolded him and ordered him never to appear on the site, not to dishonor the partisans.

German weapons and ammunition were obtained in battle, trophies were especially large when defeating garrisons.

For the repair of weapons on carts, a mobile repair weapons workshop was equipped, headed by the "golden hands" master Leonid Nikolaev. In the workshop, not only weapons were repaired, but according to the drawings of the commissar of the 1st detachment P.I. Scheslavsky produced new PPSH type assault rifles. In total, gunsmiths repaired 1580 rifles, 170 machine guns, 4 cannons, 6 mortars, 3 anti-tank guns, and manufactured 122 new machine guns. Automatic machine number 2 was sent to the mainland and presented as a gift to the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko. It is exhibited in

the museum of Minsk. An urgent problem was providing the partisans with food. Scouts reported at what points grain was concentrated for shipment to Germany. An armed group was immediately sent, and this grain was requisitioned, and there,

where it was already guarded, they took it with a fight. Food was also seized during the defeat of the garrisons. Of course, one of the main sources of food procurement was the local population. The division of the area of responsibility of the brigade into areas of operation of the detachments made it possible to carry out more or less planned procurement of food. The main food was potatoes, sometimes meat, mostly horse meat. Unlike the Crimean, Karelian partisans, we never received food from the mainland. Beginning

in 1943, the collective farmers were given an official document with the following content: "Citizen such and such, on account of the state supply, handed over to the partisans _kg of grain, _kg of potatoes. Signature of an official of the partisans, sealed. The seal was made by P. Kalchenko with the coat of arms of the USSR and the inscription around the circle "Partisan brigade "Chekist".

The flow of the wounded after the ongoing battles required the organization of medical support. Among the first partisans were doctors Anna Ivanovna Kokina, who lived before joining the partisans in the village of Bosharovo, and Tatyana Yakovlevna Krivitskaya from the village of Vorontsevichi. All care for the wounded fell on the shoulders of these young women. Later, two high-class surgeons came from Orsha: Vikenty Mikhailovich Volchek and Konstantin Petrovich Chekhov, followed by another group of doctors, 6-7 people. These forces treated the wounded in the

brigade hospital and in detachments. Intelligence was entrusted with the task of obtaining medicines, dressings, medical instruments. All this was obtained through liaisons and underground workers in Orsha, Mogilev, Krugly, Tolochin. E.M. provided great assistance in providing medicines. Volkhovskaya, who got them in the pharmacies of Mogilev. With the threat of blockades, the wounded were placed in the villages with the consent of the owners of the house, sometimes they even managed to be placed in hospitals in large settlements, and when the planes arrived,

the wounded were sent to army hospitals. Doctor Tatyana Yakovlevna Krivitskaya, even before joining the partisans, raised the wounded soldier of the Red Army Potapov Ivan Sergeevich to his feet, who immediately went to the brigade, and from the autumn of 1942 led our partisan office work (orders, instructions, minutes of meetings and other necessa

a very capacious trophy satchel, covered with a skin and wool, in which he carried documents and took care of them more than his own eyes. The knapsack was waterproof and ensured the safety of documents during transitions.

If we talk about the way of life and way of life, then briefly we can say - they were marching and combat. Each of us always carried a weapon, ammunition, one or two grenades (usually "F-1"), a duffel bag or satchel with toiletries and linen; some had a cape or a German cape. All this amounted to a fairly decent weight, and when the situation allowed something to be removed from oneself (during sleep, before a bath, etc.), one immediately felt relief. Most of the time was spent in campaigns and hostilities, but for us - scouts - in continuous movement. Rested and based in the forest. The detachments of our brigade had two areas each: the area of combat operations between the Dnepr and Drut rivers, and the base area for the rear of the detachments and the brigade - in the forests west of the Drut. These regions were located at a distance of 50–70 km from each other. When the detachments were in the rear area, the food was cooked in the boilers of each

detachment, and in the combat zone they ate as they had to - each from his own duffel bag and bowler hat or flask. Until 1942, the detachments had only one area - the area of combat operations - and all the detachments were based on the Ratsevsky and Kazenny forests, which were insignificant in terms of the area they occupied. Life sometimes forced me to go to the forests west of Drutp. Forests and swamps complicated the use of equipment by the enemy and at the same time created the possibility of placing partisan rears and a hospital. The brigade hospital was located in the forests southwest of the village of Zaozerye, the rear of the detachments, a landing site for receiving cargo and aircraft were also located there. But this does not mean that there was no enemy there. The enemy was and found us everywhere. The German garrisons were located 7-8 km from the base areas (in Shepelevichy, Belynichi, Ukhval, Korytnitsa).

We dressed in all sorts of things. More than half of the partisans were dressed in German trophy clothes. Everyone tried to adapt it to combat and camp life (a pistol belt and bags for ammunition and grenades on it, a backpack for simple belongings: linen, razors, food). It was harder in winter

time. They got overcoats from the Germans, local residents helped with padded jackets, jackets, casings.

I've been lucky with winter clothes. Being in Moscow in the autumn of 1942, I received a good warm jacket with a collar, a warm, sports-type suit. Volodya Ryabinin, who was in Moscow at that time, received approximately the same equipment. There was some kind of partisan warehouse on Smolenskaya Square, where they gave us these clothes. In the

forest, the brigade was placed in squads. The detachment camp was equipped in the summer with huts, in the winter, if the situation allowed, they dug dugouts and installed home-made stoves-potbelly stoves from barrels, iron, stone and other auxiliary material. Particular attention was paid to camouflage from the air, because the Germans periodically conducted aerial reconnaissance, and according to the results of the check, they bombed and shot partisan camps.

Under the headquarters of the brigade, 2-3 dugouts or huts were usually equipped. One of them housed brigade commander Kirpich G.A., commissioner Bukshtynov F.I., radio operator Valya Poleshchuk, editor of the newspaper Shcherbakov I.S. In another dugout - the chief of staff G.N. Sevostyanov, his deputy I.D. As a rule, we dug out and equipped our own dugout, we had a lot of experience. For lining from the inside, aspen, split in half, was used. With the white side they put it inside the dugout, with the slab to the ground, and it became clean and comfortable in the dugout. In the summer, a frame was made of poles for a hut, the spruce bark was peeled off and the frame was lined with it. The white side is inside the hut, the gray rough side is out. In the hut, white walls were also obtained, and outside the bark was a good disguise from air and ground surveillance. If the situation was relatively calm, then the food for the leadership of the brigade was prepared by the cook. It was her duty to prepare refreshments for the guests, if any appeared at the

headquarters. We all ate at the same table, it somehow brought us together, united us. But all together we rarely gathered, each had his own

affairs and duties outside the headquarters. More often than others, the commander and commissar of the brigade

were at the headquarters. The fate of our cook Czerny was interesting. She lived with her family in Shklov. The Germans transferred her and her family to the Jewish ghetto, and once a large group of Jews, including Chernya, was taken to be shot. Near the forest, several people rushed to escape from the column, the guards opened fire on them.

Cherna managed to escape

and get to us, and all her relatives died. We were all very attentive to Cherna, she gave us her affection, took care of us, always tried to feed us better. After the war, her house in Shklov was returned to her, and once, while in Shklov, I went to visit her. There were a lot of tears and joy that day for this lonely woman with a tragic fate.

Chapter 11

Communication

Communication in the brigade was organized and carried out depending on the situation and capabilities. When the brigade was located in full force in one forest area, communication between the brigade headquarters and the detachments was maintained by foot or horse messengers. Messengers from the detachments were located near the headquarters in readiness to carry out the order of the command. The brigade headquarters was usually located in the center of the detachments. The 1st partisan detachment of Ivanov, who guarded the

headquarters, was most often located near him. When the detachments went on a combat mission in full strength, they allocated mounted messengers who were located near the headquarters and roughly knew the area where the detachments were leaving. The detachment sent written, and more often oral reports on the completion of a combat mission to the headquarters of the

brigade through mounted messengers, or the report was delivered to the headquarters by one of the commanders of companies, platoons. The connection between the headquarters of our brigade and the headquarters of the military task force of the Mogilev underground regional party committee, located in the Klichev forests, 60–80 km away from us, as well as the headquarters of S.G. Zhunin's brigade. and regiment Grishin S.G. was also organized with the help of horse messengers. Our messengers were at their headquarters, and their messengers at ours. Such an organization of communications, primitive at first glance, made it possible to exchange intelligence and operational information, coordinate military operations, exchange experience in political work among the population, although rarely, but conduct joint operations ("Rail war in 1943-44, simultaneous defeat of German garrisons in Klichevsky, Shklovsky, Belnichesky, Kruglyansky districts in 1943 and 1944). To communicate with the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, the brigade headquarters in 1942 sent its representatives across the front six times: Golitsyn, Krivelskaya; Golitsyn, Vorobyov;

The brigade's envoys informed the BSHPD about the situation in the brigade's area of operation, about the condition and combat readiness of the detachments, and about the needs of the brigade. The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement always provided the

brigade with all possible assistance. Radio communications played an exceptionally important role in the reconnaissance and combat activities of the brigade. In June 1942, Zoya Aladyeva brought radio operator Claudia Burakova with a radio station to the brigade from behind the front line, and in December 1942, the BSHPD sent radio operator Valentina Antonovna Polishchuk with a radio station. Having received radio communications, the brigade command was able to maintain constant contact with the leadership of the BSHPD, receive specific instructions on conducting reconnaissance and combat operations, inform the Center, and subsequently the headquarters of the Western Front, about the situation in the brigade's responsibility zone, and primarily about enemy groupings, target Soviet aviation to the Balbasovo airfield, the Orsha railway junction, railway trains stopped by sabotage on the hauls. Radio communications made it possible for the brigade to interact directly with the troops of the front, as was the case in the "rail war" in 1943 and 1944.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the radio operator Valya Poleshchuk, who selflessly, sometimes under extremely difficult conditions, established and maintained communications at the Sever radio station until the summer of 1944, that is, until the brigade joined the advancing troops of the Soviet Army. Such extraordinary cases come to mind. On one of the autumn days of 1943, a message was received that a plane would fly out to us and throw cargo over the site. The Germans undertook a sortie and, according to our calculations, by the evening of the scheduled day of dropping the cargo, they should have approached the site. It is a rare case when I was the only one left in the leadership of the brigade at the headquarters. I prepared a telegram to the Center with a request to cancel the flight due to the danger of the site being captured by the Germans, but there was no communication session. But Valya still managed to get in touch on the frequencies of the reception on duty and transmitted a message. In another case, when the power to the radio station ran out (batteries BAS-60, BAS-80), Valya collects old batteries, connects more than a dozen of them together and transmits radiograms. The Germans are approaching the camp, you need to give a telegram to the Center about this, and Valya, in cold blood, under the whistle of bullets, conducts a communication session.

The Sever radio station played an exceptional role in organizing communication with partisans and reconnaissance groups thrown at that time behind enemy lines. The small dimensions of the radio station, weight about 5 kg, relative moisture protection, convenient battery supply (BAS-60 and BAS-80 dry batteries), relative ease of setup, long range - up to 600 km, allowed thousands of active points behind enemy lines, including and our brigade, keep in touch with the BSHPD and the headquarters of the Western Front. Every day, Valya transmitted 2-3 radiograms to the center, primarily of an intelligence nature.

Later, at the end of the 60s, I managed to get acquainted with the designer of the Sever radio station, Boris Andreevich Mikhalin. Then this modest, somewhat shy man worked in one of the research institutes on a new, more advanced high-speed station. Many, including his work colleagues, did not even know what a huge contribution Boris Andreevich made to our victory over the Nazi invaders. Mikhalin B.A. and his comrades-developers took only a few months in difficult wartime to develop this radio station, which was immediately put into production and went straight from the workshop to equip partisans, reconnaissance groups of the fronts and the GRU thrown behind enemy lines. Now, they say, only 2-3 copies of the Sever radio station have been preserved, which are preserved as museum exhibits. And, finally, the connection of the brigade with the Center and the headquarters of the Western Front from the middle of 1943 was carried out using

aircraft that landed on our partisan site. By plane we sent reports, reconnaissance reports, maps showing the enemy grouping, diagrams, including a diagram of the German defensive line along the Dnieper, captured documents and other information. In addition to weapons and ammunition, newspapers began to be delivered to us by planes, which were read to the holes in the detachments.

The former chief of staff of the aviation regiment, commanded by V.S. Grizodubova, Alexander Mikhailovich Verkhozin, in his book "Airplanes Fly to the Partisans" writes: "In the spring of 1943, almost regular air communication was established between the partisan regions and the mainland. Weapons, ammunition,

medicines, food and clothing - everything that the Motherland could spare for the people's avengers. The partisans fought behind enemy lines, destroyed the communications of the Nazi troops, thwarted his plans, and transmitted valuable information about the enemy to the command of the Soviet Army.

Acceptance of cargo from the air has always been an extraordinary event for us. The partisan detachment at the landing site somehow pulled itself up in a special, military way, everyone acted clearly, at the same time, on command, lit signal fires, and also quickly extinguished them. Each partisan enthusiastically greeted the pilots, tried to exchange at least a couple of words with them, just come up and touch the plane - the envoy of the Motherland, which brought valuable cargo from the mainland and once again demonstrated the greatness of the Soviet Army. We carefully and quickly put the wounded on the planes, asked them and the pilots to say hello to all Soviet people who fought and worked on the other side of the front.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of postal communication, which was carried out by aircraft. With what trepidation the partisans waited for letters from relatives and friends who were on the other side of the fiery border - the front. The guerrillas sent letters with airplanes, in which they reported about themselves, their combat life. Many sought out their relatives, and relatives sought out their relatives in partisan

detachments. Summing up the sabotage and reconnaissance activities partisan brigade "Chekist", we can say the following.

The reconnaissance of the brigade, thanks to purposefulness and perseverance, to some extent managed to systematically inform the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement and the headquarters of the Western Front about enemy groupings in front of the front, reserves, aviation basing, rear facilities in the vast area of Orsha, Mogilev, Belnichi, Krupok, which occupied in strategic plans of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Nazi army important. Our intelligence data was probably taken into account when making decisions by the command. Information

from the reconnaissance brigade on the transportation of Nazi troops along the Minsk-Moscow and Leningrad-Kyiv railways, on the nature of the goods and military equipment transported, contributed to a certain exte

the degree of disclosure of the enemy's plans in this important strategic direction. Perhaps the most

important merit of our intelligence is the detailed opening of German engineering structures on the defensive line along the Dnieper between Orsha and Mogilev and the timely transmission of this data to the headquarters of the Western Front before the start of the Belarusian offensive operation in the summer of 1944.

The main object of combat activity of the sabotage reconnaissance groups of the brigade was rail transport - the main mode of transport of the Nazis. It was on the railway communications in the sections Orsha - Borisov and Orsha - Mogilev that the sabotage and reconnaissance groups achieved the highest results. In total, they derailed 265 enemy echelons.

During the fighting, the brigade destroyed about 11,000 Nazis, mostly as a result of sabotage carried out on the railways. As a result of a massive strike on the railways on

the night of June 20, 1944, the Orsha-Mogilev railway was completely paralyzed. On its hauls, more than nine echelons remained "frozen", inherited by the Soviet troops. The successful implementation of measures to organize and conduct reconnaissance depended to a decisive extent on

the close connection of the partisans with the local population. Thanks to volunteer intelligence assistants in the villages, underground workers in settlements, the brigade command had the opportunity to constantly receive intelligence data of interest to the front and to the brigade itself. Almost every local resident strove, to the best of his ability, to help intelligence.

Brigade command - Kirpich G.A., Sedletsky F.M., Bakshtynov F.I., Sevostyanov G.N., Bulanov I.A. provided constant assistance to intelligence in staffing it with the best people, equipping it with weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive equipment, surveillance devices, etc. The scouts, in turn, sought to meet the requirements for them.

Chapter

12 Disbandment of the brigade

After participating in the parade of partisan forces in Mogilev on July 7, 1944, the brigade in full force returned to the Buinichi state farm on the Dnieper. The guerrillas were

resting. The weather was warm and sunny. People bathed, washed linen and uniforms, sunbathed, sang songs, had fun as best they could. The Belarusian leadership sent us poets, composers, artists, a mobile film installation with a set of films - all this was used in the interests of the partisans, who had been waiting for these days, days without fighting, for so long. But the war continued, requiring human resources to replenish the military formations operating at the front. The

Belarusian land lay in ruins, it was necessary to restore the national economy. We were visited by representatives of the Mogilev Regional Committee and

the regional executive committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) headed by the secretary of the Central Committee Avkhimovich N.E.

The command of the brigade presented to the arriving commission the command and political staff of the brigade and partisan detachments. The commission had a short talk with each and tentatively determined in what position and in what capacity this or that person could be used to restore the national economy.

Then the military commanders arrived and also talked with regular officers who remained after the selection of the commission of the Central Committee and the regional

committee. By order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the command staff of the brigade, commanders, commissars and chiefs of staff of the detachments were sent to Gomel, and then to Minsk to write reports on the combat activities of the

detachments and the brigade as a whole. The partisans selected for the restoration of the national economy went to the disposal of the central and regional personnel bodies, and the rest to the reserve regiment of the Soviet Army.

The moment of parting was both joyful and difficult. The united organism of the partisan brigade, which had been hammered together and soldered in battles, diverged into

different directions. There were strong handshakes, smiles, tears, but everyone did what was prescribed by the leadership, the military command.

Writing the reports required a certain amount of effort and took a long time, from the end of July to August. In addition to describing the fighting, the commanders were asked to write submissions for awards for distinguished partisans. Let's face it, partisans

were not spoiled with awards; when they fought, they didn't think about awards, but it became clear when they joined with units of the Soviet Army. For the entire period of the war, we were asked to write a submission for awards only in the fall of 1943 and after joining the army in the fall of 1944. A surprise

and complete surprise for us was the decision of the country's leadership to pay salaries for the entire period of hostilities in the partisans. Ordinary partisans received money at the rate of 200 rubles per month, and commanders and chiefs in positions according to the staffing table (such staffing tables were developed by the BSHPD). The cash deduction received was at that time a good help in the transition to a new peaceful way of life. After writing the reports, the commanders were given short-term

vacations of 15–20 days, during which the commanders went to their homeland, met with their families, and oriented themselves in the new conditions. Most of the command and political staff was left in Belarus to restore the national

economy. G.A. The brick was sent to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b), G.N. Sevostyanov - to the Council of Ministers of the BSSR, F.I. Bukshtynov, A.F. Simdyankin - in the Mogilev Regional Executive Committee, I.S. Shcherbakov - secretary of the Shklovsky district committee, G.S. Ivanov, G.A. Nazarov, S.N. Yakimov, S.A. Krenev, I.Ya. Yakushko, A.A. Belobragin, A.I. Kokina, T.Ya. Krivitskaya, V.M. Volchek and many others - to various enterprises, to party and Soviet bodies.

After the war, usually on round dates dedicated to the anniversaries of the liberation of Belarus, the partisans of the brigade, at the invitation of the Shklovsky district party committee and the district executive committee, gathered in Shklov, recalled past battles, told each other about

post-war life. Many came with their children and grandchildren. The meeting program necessarily included a trip to the Ratsevsky and Kazenny forests, near which a marble memorial sign and a partisan dugout were erected in memory of the actions of the brigade. Each time, a trip and the laying of wreaths at the grave of the first commissar of the brigade F.M. Sedletsky, laying wreaths at the monument to the liberators of Shklov, which was built in a beautiful place on a steep slope above the Dnieper. To the credit of local authorities, a memorial sign, partisan dugout, grave and bust of Commissioner F.M. Sedletsky are kept in good condition. Local residents also take care of other burial places of our partisans in Shklov, Ulanov, Staroselye, Ratsevo, Tolochin, Vorontsevichi. In 1982, in memory of the 40th anniversary of the

formation of the brigade, the badge "Chekist Partisan Brigade" was minted. The commemorative badge, dugout and badge of the brigade were made at the initiative of the commander of the 5th partisan detachment Alexander Fedorovich Simdyankin and other local partisans. In 1981, the publishing house "Belarus" published the

book "Behind the Front Line" about the combat activities of the Chekist partisan brigade. The authors of the book are the former chief of staff of the brigade G.N. Sevostyanov and the former liaison brigade V.I. Zhukovskaya, and the preface to the book was written by the former intelligence chief of the brigade P.A. Golitsyn.

Materials about the combat activities of the brigade are reflected in the regional editions of the book "Memory" of the Shklovsky, Orsha, Tolochin, Belnichsky and Kruglyansky districts. About the commanders, ordinary partisans of the brigade and underground workers who maintained ties with the intelligence of the brigade, articles often appear in the newspapers of the Belarusian Republic. Expositions are dedicated to our brigade in the Shklovsky, Golovchinsky, Tolochinsky local history museums. Ivan Viktorovich Kulikov from Shklov, Anatoly Romanovich Machakhovsky from Tolochin, Vasily Dmitrievich Guzov from Golovchin, Ivan Maksimovich Prussky from Vorontsevich did a great job of collecting materials about the people of the brigade and their exploits.

Chapter

13 Training of Intelligence Officers

The overwhelming majority of the listeners were reconnaissance officers or combat officers who had arrived from various fronts and were later to be assigned to reconnaissance posts. In our courses, I was the only partisan.

The learning process was intense and took a lot of time, especially for me. The main issues for us were the organization and conduct of intelligence in the regiment, division during the conduct of hostilities, the study of methods for obtaining intelligence data, their analysis, processing, report to the commander; development of intelligence documents: working and reporting cards of the chief of intelligence of the headquarters of the regiment and division, intelligence reports, summaries, certificates, etc. The classes on the study of foreign armies were interesting and lively under the guidance of Captain Medvedev. After a short introductory course on the general principles of the combat use of German units and units, Medvedev daily trained us to memorize the main control figures: the main armament of a squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division of the Germans, their strength and combat composition, standards for the width and depth of defense, the removal of trenches from one another, the creation of strongholds, the deployment of reserves, the formation of battle formations in the offensive, etc. Using drawings and albums, we studied the uniform and insignia of all categories of military personnel of the Nazi troops - from private to general.

In tactical and reconnaissance training, they solved tasks on maps, worked out written intelligence documents.

At the end of the training course, each student developed an abstract on a topic proposed in the course, or taken on an initiative basis. For example, I wrote an essay on the topic "Organization and conduct of intelligence in a partisan unit", which provided a historical background on the actions of partisans in 1812, during the Civil War of 1917-22, and mainly during the Great Patriotic War.

wars of 1941-45. The abstract was written on the basis of the intelligence activities of the partisan brigade "Chekist". The first copy of this abstract, handwritten in pencil, has been preserved and now lies in front of me. Studying at reconnaissance courses gave me a lot, I felt confident in my abilities and

willingness to work in the army in reconnaissance positions. I recall with gratitude the help rendered to me by front-line officers Georgy Nikolaevich Bakaldin and Alexei Ivanovich Ivanov. Later, I always remembered studying at these courses as a good, necessary intelligence school. From the mood of the listening officers, their behavior, the expression on their faces, it was clear that they were resting from the roar of the front. Unusual peaceful silence, no firing of machine guns and machine guns, no

whistling of bullets, no hooting of mines, no exploding shells, only light beeps of Moscow cars and the chime of trams passing by. In their free time, on weekdays and on Sundays, officers could go to the cinema, theater, listen to music, go to a restaurant. Everyone was given limited restaurant books, according to which they could eat and even drink at a discount. Wives, children, relatives came to visit non-residents, and Muscovite officers were sometimes allowed to spend the night at home. How could one not thank fate for the opportunity to take a break from war, blood, suffering. But the war continued, there were bloody battles on the outskirts of Berlin and in Berlin. But everyone knew and felt that the end would come soon. On May 2, 1945, Berlin was taken, and on May 8, an act of unconditional surrender of Germany was signed. May 9 was declared Victory Day - a great holiday for the entire Soviet people. Moscow was in full swing that day, everyone was jubilant, shouting "Hurrah", as soon as a man in military uniform appeared somewhere, he was immediately picked up. And joy, and tears for the dead - everything is mixed up

together.

Preparations began for the Victory Parade, which included, among other things, the passage of a combined battalion (box) of intelligence officers. Compiled lists of participants. The training of our column was carried out on Vosstaniya Square under the leadership of the head of the Higher Intelligence School, Lieutenant General

M.A. Kochetkov. We were all sewn and given trousers and tunics made of light khaki English woolen fabric. I do not know by whose order, but we went to the parade with drawn blades and in spurs. I remember that there were

officers in our consolidated battalion
scouts of the Yugoslav army.

On June 24, 1945, we had a solemn, high spirits. The consolidated battalion of intelligence officers, among others, marched solemnly along Red Square. The summer warm downpour that happened during the parade did not dampen our good festive mood. On the evening of June 24, fireworks rumbled in honor of the Victory and the winners, festive illumination illuminated Moscow, crowds of people took to the streets and squares of the festive city.

Soon, a commission from the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense arrived at the courses. Short conversations were held with us on the subject of where we would like to serve after the end of the war and in what position. We knew that our desire would not be particularly taken into account, but formally all this was observed. Most of the officers expressed their desire to serve in the western military districts. I wanted to visit the Far East, and I told the commission about this. The colonel who was talking to me smiled slyly and said: "We will try to satisfy your request."

Chapter

14 Reconnaissance in the division as part of the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and the Primorsky Military District

I arrived in the Primorsky Military District, whose headquarters was in Voroshilov-Ussuriysky, in July 1945. After a short conversation at the headquarters, I was appointed assistant chief of intelligence of the 105th rifle division, whose headquarters was stationed in Galenki. The 105th Rifle Division was a real Far Eastern division that did not take part in the battles against the Germans. The division was commanded by Major General Seber, of medium height, strong build, over 40 years old. The division had an old organizational structure that differed from the structures of the front divisions. Intelligence was represented by a divisional reconnaissance company consisting of three platoons and support units, in rifle regiments there were platoons of mounted and foot reconnaissance, in an artillery regiment - a reconnaissance battery, in an engineering battalion - an engineering reconnaissance platoon, in a chemical protection company - a chemical reconnaissance platoon. The reconnaissance subunits ^{fully} were manned by officers, sergeants and ordinary scouts and were in combat readiness. My immediate superior was the head of intelligence of the division, Captain Fyodor Egorovich Nikitin, who had served all the time in the Far East, who knew well the situation and the peculiarities of service in this remote region. Captain Nikitin had no reconnaissance training, but he had good experience in serving in reconnaissance, organizing combat training of reconnaissance units. I read everything that fell into my hands regarding intelligence. He was always smart, executive to scrupulousness. I immediately liked him, and our relations developed the most businesslike and comradely. The commander of the reconnaissance company, Captain Amochkin, is very energetic, smart, athletic, they say about such

"Officer-zhivchik", personally worked a lot to train the company in reconnaissance techniques. Getting acquainted with the reconnaissance company, I made a discovery - the commander of one of the reconnaissance platoons was my relative, the son of my cousin Fedya Kornilov, with the rank of lieutenant, although he was 5 years older than me.

During the introduction to the division commander, General Seber, a rather lengthy conversation took place between us. He was mainly interested in how the military operations of the troops against the Germans were conducted. I apologized to him and reported: "I fought in the partisans and do not know the whole organization of the battle at the front." But he still listened to me about the actions of the partisans, about my assessment of the German troops. Since there

were only a few front-line officers in the division, the political department and the editorial office of the divisional newspaper took over me so that I would speak to the personnel of the divisions through the newspaper. I did this job conscientiously.

Everyone saw that the streams of echelons with troops were moving from west to east, including in Primorye, they understood that the situation was developing before the war and that something was about to happen soon - a war against the Japanese, fighting breaking through the strongest Japanese Kwantung Army deployed in Manchuria along the borders with the Soviet Union. We, reconnaissance officers,

reconnaissance units and units of carried out classes
rifle troops on the organizational structure, weapons and tactics of the Japanese troops. They studied the Japanese troops in the Khun-chun operational direction, and more fully and in detail - the troops and fortifications of the Dongxingren and Hunchun fortified regions. There were enough materials to prepare for classes in the division. Over the long years of confrontation with the Kwantup Army, our intelligence obtained fairly complete intelligence information about the Japanese troops in Manchuria. In 1945, the Main Intelligence Directorate published handbooks with schemes of fortified areas with a detailed description of fire weapons in each UR of the proposed areas for deploying field troops in case of war.

By the time the Manchurian operation was carried out, our troops were opposed by a strong grouping of Japanese troops. Along the border with

In the USSR and the MPR, the Japanese had 17 fortified areas with a total length of 1,000 km, in which there were about 8,000 long-term firing structures. The Kwantung Army consisted of thirty-one infantry divisions, nine infantry brigades, one special forces (suicide) brigade, and two tank brigades. The total number of the enemy was 1320 thousand people, he had 6260 guns and mortars, 1155 tanks, 1900 aircraft and 25 ships. The plan of the main command of the Soviet troops provided for the

defeat of the Kwantung Army by simultaneously delivering two main (from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Primorye) and a number of auxiliary strikes in directions converging to the center of Manchuria, dismembering and destroying enemy forces in parts.

Our 105th rifle division, as part of the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, was introduced into the breakthrough in the direction of Dunin Vantsin, that is, in the left-flank grouping of the front's troops. But we learned about this only on the eve of the start of the war, when the division was alerted and reached the breakthrough site east of the Manchurian

city of Duning. The division command probably knew about the timing of the start of hostilities, since upon arrival at the division headquarters in Galenki, the chief of staff ordered the commander of the reconnaissance company to set up a tent for housing for me on a hill near the division headquarters: there was no reason for me to settle somewhere in the apartment, and the division did not have a hostel. The officers lived in private apartments, where anyone could get a job. In my camp tent I had a bed, a soldier's bedside table, a home-made table from empty boxes, a stool with a bucket of water, there was no light. The simplest washstand hung on a post in the street. All my personal property was placed in a wooden suitcase made by fellow craftsman Stepan Belkov during my visit to my native Chernostochinsk. The Spartan atmosphere suited me perfectly, the mood was good, the desire to work was more than enough. A relative, reconnaissance platoon commander Fedya Kornilov, invited me to visit. He rented a corner with a bed in a village hut, so other officers of the division settled down. He arranged a festive dinner for me, during which we remembered our homeland, relatives, shared our views on the upcoming war. Fedya told about

situation in the reconnaissance company, shared his opinion about the officers of the company, about his plans for the future. He, like me, completed short-term officer courses, received a lieutenant rank and was assigned to a reconnaissance company. The meeting with Fedya was pleasant for me, after all, after all, a relative, additional support, and most importantly, he informed me in detail about the features of service in the Far East, and there were enough features.

Approximately on August 8, by the end of the day, the division concentrated 15-18 km from the state border east of Dunin. On August 9, hostilities began with powerful artillery fire and air strikes against the firing points of fortified areas and Japanese troops in the depths of Manchuria. We heard the thunder from the explosions of the shells. Short rallies were held in all parts of the division on the occasion of the beginning of the war, at one of them, at the headquarters of the division, I also spoke. In the second half of August 9, our division was introduced into the breakthrough made by artillery, aviation, forward detachments directly opposite Dunin. The day was sunny and visibility was perfect. The ridge of high hills that dominated our territory, with pillboxes, bunkers, and casemates equipped on it, was on fire. Barely audible somewhere in the distance machine-gun bursts were heard. Everything else was suppressed by our artillery and aircraft. The columns of the division's troops went straight through the border town of Dupin. The population hid, the Chinese were rarely seen running across the yards of their buildings. I was

ordered to lead the reconnaissance detachment of the division, consisting of a reconnaissance, machine-gun company and a battery of SAU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts with the task of conducting reconnaissance in the division's movement lane in the direction of Dunin-Vantsin, establishing the strength, composition and belonging of the retreating Japanese troops, the lines of resistance and what forces they are busy with, the directions of the Japanese withdrawal. It was necessary to move ahead of the division at a distance of 10-15 km from its main forces. The companies were put on trucks. The SAU-76 battery has 4 self-propelled 76-mm guns. Communication with the chief of intelligence of the division - by radio and messengers. Reconnaissance platoons of mounted reconnaissance conducted reconnaissance in front of and on the flanks of the

Head of intelligence captain Nikitin F.E. was constantly at the headquarters of the division, together with the Japanese translator Dzhuma Atabaev.

Along the reconnaissance route, only scattered, uncontrollable small groups of retreating Japanese came across, who immediately surrendered. We ordered them to drop their weapons and go along the road towards the division, which they willingly did, and in the division they were collected and sent to the collection points for prisoners of war. Mostly Japanese from the crews of the defeated fortified areas and combat support units were taken prisoner. It was disquieting. We asked ourselves the question "Where are the regular field troops of the Kwantung Army?" This situation was also disturbing to the command of the division. We were moving in some kind of emptiness, constantly in tension, in anticipation of a flank counterattack or, worse, a counterattack by large forces. During the

breaks, I came to the headquarters of the division and reported the received intelligence data to the head of intelligence and command.

One day I saw my fellow reconnaissance officer Captain Bakaldin overtaking our column in a Dodge, greeted him, and he stopped. Bakaldin served in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 17th Army Corps. He informed me that the main, main forces of the Japanese in our direction should be expected at the Mudanjiang-Wangqing line. Subsequently, these data were confirmed.

We continued to move towards Wangqing, the number of retreating Japanese increased, but the division did not meet organized resistance. In some places, especially at night, individual shots and bursts of machine-gun fire were heard either from our guards or from the Japanese who stumbled upon him.

In the reconnaissance department of the division, it turned out that the interpreter, senior lieutenant Atabaev, was insufficiently trained in Japanese, and with great difficulty we managed to interrogate the Japanese prisoners, of which there were more and more. He had difficulty reading and translating Japanese documents. Atabaev, before being appointed as a translator to the division, completed short-term courses for Japanese translators in Khabarovsk. In a short time, of course, he could not master Japanese well, so

he had difficulties with the translation, but he somehow coped. Atabaev gained experience in practice. And as a person, Juma was a conscientious, very decent comrade. A year and a half later, I met Atabaev already in the role of an interpreter who worked in a Japanese prisoner of war camp and asked him: "What are the progress in the language"? He replied: "Now I would like to interrogate those prisoners." Only now he has become a real, qualified translator.

Another problem that the troops and we experienced in our intelligence activities was the lack of accurate large-scale maps. Our maps were compiled in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War. Before the Manchurian operation, they were simply reprinted with old data without making changes for a long period of time. The data on settlements, their names, and the road network were especially inaccurate. Therefore, in most cases, we were guided by the landscape of the area. This is where my partisan experience in orienteering, in working with a map, came in handy. A strange feeling, familiar only, perhaps, to military people. When at some point you don't know or doubt where you are, you are seized by excitement and it continues until you restore your orientation. In a military person, the feeling of the need to orient oneself persists for life. Being even out of service, on vacation, on a journey, he constantly strives to find out where he is in relation to this or that settlement, that is, he is oriented.

On August 15, our reconnaissance detachment and division entered the city of Wangqing, passing more than 150 km

from the border. From the information of the headquarters of the corps and from some officers, we learned that the Japanese had prepared and carried out a counterattack in the area of the city of Mudanjiang, which hit the troops of 5A, our neighbors on the right. Our troops repulsed this attack by the Japanese, but they had to fight fierce battles.

Our division concentrated in the Wangqing area, its headquarters was located in the city itself, and I, with a reconnaissance detachment, only without the SAU-76 battery, were ordered to advance to the area 15 km south of the city of Wangqing, i.e., turn south towards Korea .

The new task of the reconnaissance detachment included: to conduct reconnaissance south of the city of Wanqing, identify the location of Japanese troops, disarm small groups of Japanese, capture them and send them to Wangqing, and immediately report large groups to the division headquarters. The reconnaissance detachment was located in one of the Chinese villages, in a picturesque valley through which a fast mountain river flowed with crystal clear water. I conducted reconnaissance with the company commanders. We determined the probable directions of a possible attack on our detachment by the Japanese from the mountains and the valley, outlined places for equipping machine-gun sites, positions for the defense of units in case of a Japanese attack, places for secrets and guard posts at night and daytime. From the heights of the surrounding mountains, our village could be seen at a glance - toy Chinese fanzes, vegetable gardens with neatly cultivated beds, cattle pens. A country road ran along the valley, along which a car could pass, and in the south direction from us, not hills, but mountains were visible.

The local population welcomed our parish and began to provide us with all kinds of assistance in the arrangement. From Wangqing, we took with us a guide named Tsoi, he kept in touch with the local Chinese and informed us about everything that was happening in the area (in the mountains, neighboring settlements); the Chinese were afraid, but everyone ran to report to us if they found the Japanese anywhere or learned something about them, that is, we had volunteer scouts from among the local residents. During the

long occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese became hated by the Chinese. They brutally exploited the Chinese, treated them like second class people, behaved like masters in China. I had to observe such a picture in Wanqing. When Japanese prisoners unloaded bags of rice, the Chinese from the People's Revolutionary Army stood in two lines with sticks. Japanese men with sacks on their backs were jogging between them. As soon as one of the Japanese slowed down the pace of running or dropped the bag, blows of sticks immediately rained down on him. We were shocked by this oriental cruelty. But it also spoke of how the Chinese hated the Japanese, how they wanted to rid their land of them.

Every day we sent one or two, and sometimes three reconnaissance patrols from the reconnaissance company consisting of 5-6 people, led by an officer, with weapons and binoculars, for reconnaissance in the mountains. Having met the Japanese, our patrols told them where to go to surrender (in the direction of the village where we were located). The Japanese in most cases complied with this requirement. Our scouts met them in front of the village, indicated a place for storing weapons, and, if necessary, sent them to the school yard. Having gathered a group of 80-100 Japanese prisoners, we sent them to Wanqing under the protection of two or three scouts.

But often there were groups of Japanese who did not want to surrender, tried to hide, and sometimes opened fire. The energetic company commander, Captain Amochkin, could not sit in the village, and I let him go on patrol. Often with patrols I also left. For 3-4 days we studied the surrounding area and oriented ourselves well on it. The nights bothered us. Often the Japanese, not knowing that there were Russians in the village, ran into our guards. Shooting opened on both sides, but usually the Japanese ran away and the incidents ended there. But there was no obvious attack prepared by the Japanese against our small garrison.

One afternoon, scouts discovered the movement of a large group of cavalry in the direction of our village. We prepared for battle, the machine gunners took up their positions, but meeting our guards, the cavalry officer waved a white flag and stopped his horsemen. At our command, the Japanese dismounted, laid down their weapons, and surrendered. It was an incomplete cavalry squadron - 60-70 people led by a major. The squadron was built on the site near the school, and our scouts searched every Japanese. Two Japanese men were found to have one undelivered grenade each in their pockets. We showed these grenades to the major. He approached each of them in turn and hit them in the face several times. Both of them spurted blood, but none of them even dared to raise their hand and wipe it off. We were all amazed by this. Assault in the Japanese army was not forbidden.

Of the squadron horses we got, we kept about 20 with saddles and full harness and kept them in reconnaissance. The mobility of our reconnaissance patrols has increased. We began to send groups to reconnaissance on horseback.

The Japanese Major gave us valuable information. He said that in the mountains, about 10-15 km from us to the southeast, there is a regiment of suicide paratroopers from a special forces group. He accidentally met one of the officers of this regiment, who said that the regiment was in full combat readiness and was not going to surrender. I personally reported to the command of the division and to the head of intelligence, Captain Nikitin, about the Japanese special forces regiment. The interpreter Atabaev interrogated the Japanese major, he again confirmed these data.

I was given the task of finding the Japanese regiment and reporting on its location, as well as everything that could be established about it. A report about the Japanese regiment went to the corps headquarters.

Sending patrols to the two proposed locations of the Japanese regiment ended to no avail. Once, with the commander of

the reconnaissance platoon, Fedya Kornilov, and three scouts, I myself went in search of this mysterious Japanese regiment on horseback. We drove between the mountains along a narrow valley, the path winding one by one, then along the other side of a small mountain stream. The day turned out to be sunny, warm, the mood was good, they knew that soon here, in the East, we would win. Suddenly, on the opposite side of the river, we noticed Japanese soldiers in the bushes. I stopped my horse, waved my handkerchief, and we all waded together towards the Japanese, they saw our signals. We reached the middle of the ford, when an explosion was heard on the other side of the river. We jumped off our horses and rushed to the Japanese. Two of them raised their hands, and the third lay wounded, covered in blood. He was hit by a grenade and died a minute later. Whether he wanted to throw this grenade at us from hiding, or whether he wanted to blow himself up, not wanting to give up, or whether everything just happened by chance, it was difficult to determine. The fragments whistled over our heads, but fortunately none of us were hit, since we were well below the explosion site. They tried to interrogate the Japanese prisoners with the help of gestures and a set of a few words known to us, but they did not get anything from them. They took away their rifles, gave them a note and sent them towards our village. We went further, but what happened alerted us, we realized that we need to be more careful. The valley narrowed, turned to the east and began to pass almost into a gorge. Suddenly, from a small height,

covered with bushes, there was a shout and the sound of a clanging shutter, two Japanese rifles with attached bayonets looked in our direction at head level. We stopped, I took out a handkerchief, waved it, after a while the Japanese shouted something, we continued to stand. Then a third Japanese jumped out from behind the bushes, he gave us to understand that we should stand still. We stand, I still hold a handkerchief in my hand. About 5 minutes later another officer came running and ordered us to dismount with gestures. We obeyed, and the Japanese gave a command to the soldiers to remove their rifles aimed at us, and invited us to sit down on the grass. Fedya and I quietly exchanged a few words about the fact that we probably found what we were looking for. About 10 minutes later an officer with the rank of major came and asked us in broken Russian: "What do you want?" We answered him that we were representatives of the command of the Soviet Army and came to them to clarify when the unit would be disarmed and surrendered. Probably, the major did not like the tone of our conversation, he became very gloomy and invited us to the commander. Fedya and I followed him, leaving about three scouts on guard, led by a sergeant. We walked for about 10 minutes and came to a place where the gorge widened and formed something like a foundation pit in the mountains. Along the edges of the pit, on well-camouflaged natural terraces, tents were stretched out, around which soldiers were stationed. Seeing us, the soldiers jumped up from their seats, staring at us in some confusion. They saluted the major, who didn't say another word the whole way. Well, I think to myself, Fedya and I ended up like chickens in a pluck, in the very inferno of the samurai. We exchanged silent glances with him and understood each other's condition. We went out onto a small lawn, on which a large cone-shaped army tent was stretched. In front of the tent sentry with a rifle. The Japanese Major entered the tent, and we stopped outside. A little later, the same major invited us to enter. In the part of the tent, farthest from the door, there was a couch on which a Japanese lieutenant colonel, the commander of the unit, was sitting in military uniform. This samurai looked in our direction only once, when we entered, he never deigned to look at us again.

The same question that the major asked us: "Who are you and what do you want", we have the same non-diplomatic answer: "We are representatives of the Soviet

command, came to you to find out when the unit will be disarmed and when it will surrender to the Soviet troops.

The lieutenant colonel answered us that he did not have an order from his command in this regard. The conversation ended there. We, accompanied by the major, left the tent, he behaved more calmly, more simply, introduced himself to us as the chief of staff of this unit, invited us to have lunch. Fedya and I were hungry and agreed, went into his tent, and while some lunch was being brought to us, he told us that he knew about the surrender of Japanese units, and added that as soon as the unit received an order, it would also disarm and surrender in captivity. The food did not go down our throats, we had a little snack and went to our scouts, who were on the spot. Saying goodbye to the major, we went to our "capital" - our base village. The Japanese cavalry officer approximately correctly told us both the distance to the regiment and its location. I immediately went

to the headquarters of the division in Wanqing, where I reported to the command about the accomplishment of the task. The commander thanked us and was pleased with our intelligence.

The next day, it was about August 20 or 22, a lieutenant colonel from the headquarters of the Japanese army, accompanied by another Japanese officer, came to visit us, and we again went to the regiment we had found. I no longer met with the regiment commander, with the chief of staff - a major and an army representative - a lieutenant colonel, they agreed on the terms for the surrender of this regiment

and its disarmament. The regiment surrendered battalion-by-battalion for two days. The Japanese battalion approached the agreed place with full armament and equipment, we showed it a place for storing weapons and property and sent it to the site to the school, and from there to Wanqing to the assembly point for prisoners of war.

The next day, by the appointed time, the next battalion did not appear. We got excited. We see: two Japanese riders are galloping. They informed us that 5 km from this place, the regiment commander made himself a "hara-kiri" (cut his stomach open), so the units would arrive 1 hour later than the set time. And so it was. The remnants of the regiment were disarmed, the prisoners were sent to Vanqing. Captured Japanese officers were left edged weapons - checkers, which, as they said, they abandoned in the camps.

The flow of prisoners to our village increased, we acted still very correct, carefully ferrying them to Wangqing.

The need for a guide, the Chinese Tsoi, disappeared, and at his request we allowed him to go home to Wangqing. Before the road they chose Tsoi a good trophy horse and wagon. They loaded her with rice, kaoliang and chumiza, loaded him with a bag of paper money and with gratitude, after a warm goodbye, let her go. He helped us a lot, with his help, intelligence issues related to the involvement of local residents were successfully resolved. Later, when I was in Wangsing, at the headquarters of the division, I once stopped at Tsoi's house. What was there! He raised the whole family, neighbors, prepared a treat, the main one in which were dumplings, tasty, specific, different from ours. Tsoi said that what we had earned would be enough for his family for 2-3 years, that he was ready to continue to assist our army in defeating the Japanese.

The village where our reconnaissance detachment was stationed was typical of China at that time. Astounding poverty. Fanzas (dwellings) were built cramped, dark, without electricity. In very large families, all family members slept on shared plank beds under some kind of rags. A chimney passed under the bunks in the floor, which heated them in cold weather. The latrines were right next to the house. The Chinese families, in full force, worked from dawn to dusk. The fields and gardens were well-groomed. They were processed manually, without means of mechanization. Water for irrigation high in the mountains was raised by women and children on yokes. Revenues from the sale of agricultural products were miserable. The peasants dressed very modestly. Terrible unsanitary conditions reigned in the village, thousands of flies were not allowed to eat in peace, fell into a plate, fleas were everywhere, which attacked us with a frenzy. Our preventive measures against flies and fleas (washing the walls and floors with gasoline, carbolic acid, pulling gauze over the windows) did not give

the desired results. Marshal A.M., Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East On August 17, 1945, Vasilevsky transmitted the following radiogram to the commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army:

"The headquarters of the Japanese Kwantung Army turned over the radio to the headquarters of the Soviet troops in the Far East with a proposal to stop hostilities, and nothing was said about the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria. At the same time, Japanese troops went on the offensive in a number of sectors of the Soviet-Japanese front.

I propose to the commander of the troops of the Kwantung Army from 1200 on August 20 that all military operations against the Soviet troops on the entire front be stopped, lay down their arms and surrender.

As soon as the Japanese troops begin to hand over their weapons, the Soviet troops will cease hostilities.

August 17, 1945 at 6:00 am (Far Eastern time)."

Having accepted this offer of the command of the Soviet troops, the Japanese, on the instructions of their command, on August 19-20 ceased armed resistance. The flow of Japanese to surrender increased to the location of our reconnaissance detachment. The officers of the reconnaissance and machine-gun companies hurriedly accepted weapons, fluently, no longer searching, but externally examining the Japanese who had surrendered, gathered them in columns and, guarded by two or three soldiers, sent them to Wangqing. Among the prisoners of war sometimes came across Japanese women (doctors, sisters, wives of officers). Around our village, mountains of weapons and various military equipment grew,

about which we reported to the division command. Then these weapons and equipment were transferred to the People's Liberation Army of China. During the 15-day battles, the enemy was completely defeated, losing 83 thousand people killed and about 600

thousand soldiers and officers captured. Imperialist Japan was defeated, and on September 2, 1945, an act of its unconditional surrender was signed.

Our 105th Rifle Division, including its reconnaissance, also made a small contribution to the victory over the Japanese in Manchuria.

A general assessment of the Manchurian operation, its results and significance is given by our military experts. Its significance is enormous, but from the position of a tactical intelligence officer I would like to share some of my observations about the Japanese and German armies. Compared with the

German (Hitler) army, the Japanese troops, their best part - the Kwantung Army - were much weaker armed and equipped with military equipment. And yet, having an army of many thousands with aircraft, tanks, artillery, fortified areas stuffed with a large number of weapons, the Japanese were not able to stop our troops and organize resistance in any sector of the front. The morale of the Japanese army in connection with the defeats at the fronts quickly fell. The Japanese soldier of that time was also inferior to the German in his appearance, training and stamina in battle. The daily food ration of the Japanese soldier was so meager both in quantity and quality that it was clearly not enough to maintain the normal physical condition of the body. Japanese soldiers and officers, being taken prisoner, in violation of the oath, gave full data on interrogations about their army, its weapons, equipment, deployment or disposition of military units and subunits. The brutal Japanese treatment of the local population, cultivated for decades in the occupation, immediately deprived them of his support. Practically all the Chinese sought to assist our Soviet Army in defeating the Japanese and thereby get rid of the hated yoke.

After the signing of the act of surrender of Japan in September 1945, the withdrawal of our troops from the territory of Manchuria began. The areas occupied by our troops began to be filled with units of the People's Liberation Army of China, but in a number of places they were occupied by units of the Kuomintang.

Once, on the instructions of the command of the division, I had to visit the headquarters of the regiment of the People's Liberation Army. Staff members were dressed in various ways, some in military uniforms, and most in mixed or full civilian attire. Above the tables of workers hung signs written in Chinese indicating their position, for example: regiment commander, early.

regimental headquarters, etc. They met our officers in a rather dry way, without emotions and loud greetings.

Our division crossed the border west of Barabash, which housed the Headquarters of one of the fortified regions. When approaching the border, some mixed teams of border guards, NKVD troops and other incomprehensible units confiscated trophy property from troops crossing the border (camp tents, cars, wagons, rolls of various fabrics, bales with bedding, furniture, food, etc.). There were mountains of this property near the border crossing point. Later, while continuing our service in Primorye, we scolded our rear servicemen among ourselves for feeding us trophy chumiza and kaoliang for a long time.

Our division stood for several days in Barabash, Posiet, right on the seashore, and then settled in the Lyanchikha valley, with the station of the same name, 25 km north of Vladivostok, where preparations for the parade began. At

this time, many officers of the division were awarded government awards for successful military operations in Manchuria. I was also awarded the Order of the Red Star. A pleasant event for the end of the war after the second victory.

In October, along with other troops, our 105th Rifle Division took part in the parade held in Vladivostok to commemorate the victory over Japan. For us - young officers - this event was of interest, inspired us, emphasizing that we serve the Motherland, whose Armed Forces defeated the troops of imperialist Japan, which for many years threatened the tranquility of our Far East. For the division, they determined the location of the city of Suchan (now

Partizansk), a mining town in Primorye. In terms of everyday life, at that time it was a good place. Officers rented private apartments and brought their families; there was no state housing stock for officers in the city. An operational group was formed from the division, which was transferred to the eastern slopes of the

Sikhote-Alin mountain range, to the village of Wangou, located in the mountains 40 km west of Valentine Bay. Team Member: Assistant Chief

of the operational department of the division, Captain Petrov, a divisional engineer with the rank of captain (I don't remember his last name), a cryptographer, junior lieutenant Kolya Brusninov, and I from the intelligence department of the division. To ensure the activities of the group, we were assigned 5 soldiers, including two drivers: a ZIL-5 truck and an American Dodge 3/4. There was no road across the ridge to Wangou. We moved along country paths, mountain paths, along ravines, along stream beds. Several times we were rescued on mountain climbs by a winch with a cable installed on the Dodge. For the first time in this autumn time, the most favorable for Primorye, we were personally convinced of the beauty of the Ussuri taiga. Its multicolored nature, clear mountain streams with trout, cries of red deer, abundance of pine nuts and berries struck our imagination. With difficulty we reached Wangou, set up a radio station and established contact with the division.

Our task included reconnaissance of a place for a possible deployment of a division to the west of Valentina Bay. I was given the task of maintaining contact with the border guards and reporting on the situation. Something, apparently, worried the command, because Valentine's Bay was separated from the Japanese island of Hokkaido, occupied by the Americans, only by the Sea of Japan. I periodically visited the border guards, they informed me about the situation at sea, and there was complete calm. We settled in village huts. I settled with a lonely 50-year-old woman, Maria Ivanovna, who lived with her 14-year-old daughter Tasya. They placed me in the upper room, where I slept on a wooden bed covered with homespun linen sheets. The hut was perfectly clean. Tasya washed the floors with river sand weekly, and once a month washed the walls and ceilings in the same way. The writer Rybakov was mistaken, accusing the Siberian peasants of the dirty content of the huts in his "Children of the Arbat". The cities should be kept as clean as in the Siberian villages. I had to visit the Altai villages before, and there was nothing like what Rybakov wrote about - about the dirt and laziness of the Siberians. The local residents of Wangou and other neighboring villages treated our soldiers very well and helped us as much as they could. In December 1945, our division was disbanded, and we, with the head Nikitin F.E. were appointed to the same positions in the 9th Machine Gun Artillery Division (PAD) with

division headquarters in Grodekovo (now Pogranichny). Grodekovo is the last railway point of Primorye on the border with China, crossing Manchuria. The division at that moment was completing its formation on the basis of the former fortified area (UR).

The task of intelligence was to monitor the state, activities and activities of Chinese troops in the border zone. To solve this problem, 8-10 observation posts (6-7 battalion and 2-3 divisional) were deployed along the border in the division's responsibility zone, equipped with observation devices (binoculars, stereotubes, periscopes). In addition, the division headquarters constantly exchanged intelligence information with the border guards and special intelligence agencies of the district headquarters.

After studying the situation on the border, together with the border guards, Captain Nikitin and I alternately went to the border to select places for observation posts in order to ensure the best possible view of the terrain on the Chinese side to the greatest possible depth. After the approval of the observation scheme by the division commander and the approval of the crews for each observation post, the forces of the battalion units and the reconnaissance company of the division carried out their equipment. At each NP there were large-scale topographic maps, landmarks were drawn, journals were kept for recording the results of observations, observation devices were installed, and shelters were arranged for rest and eating by personnel. There was a telephone connection with all NPs. A permanent reconnaissance service began at equipped observation posts. The peculiarity of the situation on the Chinese side at that time was that units

of the People's Liberation Army, then units of the Kuomintang came to our border. Fights sometimes broke out between them directly in the border zone. All this was recorded by our observation posts. At the division headquarters, the results of the observation were processed daily, which were reported to the intelligence department of the corps. We made sure that a well-established surveillance system in the border zone, combined with information from border guards and special intelligence units of the district, gave the division command an objective picture of the situation on the Chinese side. But it required us

daily analytical work. Two horses were assigned to the reconnaissance section of our division. I often traveled to the border to check the service of scouts-observers, along the way I always stopped by to talk to the border guards. Sometimes he took with him the translator of our department, Senior Lieutenant Popov.

Another area of activity of our reconnaissance department was the periodic (according to schedule) check of the serviceability of observation devices at the command and observation posts of the commanders of machine-gun and artillery units. We carried out this work together with the officers of the artillery technical service of the divisional engineer. Sometimes the devices had to be sent for preventive maintenance, and in front of the fortified firing points (bunkers, bunkers), the area was additionally cleared of bushes that interfered with observation and firing. Our reconnaissance section in its entirety was

engaged in planning and monitoring the course of combat training in the reconnaissance subunits of the division. We ourselves conducted reconnaissance training sessions directly in the platoons and reconnaissance company of the division. Particular attention in the course of training with scouts was given to their preparation for service at observation posts on the border.

The post was usually assigned 4-5 people, headed by a sergeant, their change was carried out, as a rule, after 7-10 days. All of them entered the service in full combat gear. We were not worried that someone might desert or steal weapons. Scouts were the most reliable contingent of our troops. Every year, during the spring and autumn recruitment, we, together with the head of intelligence and the commanders of intelligence units, selected each person. And it justified itself. During the formation of the division,

a reconnaissance officer, a front-line soldier, awarded two orders of the Red Banner, senior lieutenant Borovoy Ivan Petrovich was appointed commander of the reconnaissance company during the formation of the division. He trained scouts based on his front-line

experience. A big task, the responsibility for which constantly lay with our small reconnaissance section, was the task of reconnaissance training of troops. We developed lectures, conducted practical

exercises on the ground, group exercises on maps for the organization and conduct of reconnaissance, as well as exercises on foreign armies. The chief of staff of the division,

Lieutenant Colonel Stenko, the head of intelligence of the 5th Army, Colonel Rodionov, always highly appreciated the practical activities of the intelligence department of our division. In our department, headed by Fedor Egorovich Nikitin, a comradely atmosphere reigned with a high degree of interchangeability. We treated the head of intelligence with respect, as the most experienced in the service and senior in rank and age. He also answered us the same. With sincere joy, we received the news of his promotion to the rank of Major. For information, the staff category of the head of intelligence of the division at that time was

"lieutenant colonel".

The year 1946 was remembered by us, the military people, by the fact that for the first time after the war, planned vacations were allowed for officers and re-enlisted men. The family, separated by the war, began to unite. There were many weddings. Despite the difficulties, everyone rejoiced at the ensuing peaceful life. While still serving in Suchan, we "married" the commander of the reconnaissance company, Captain Amochkin, the commander of the reconnaissance platoon, Senior Lieutenant Kornilov. After the wedding, Senior Lieutenant Borovoy came to visit us in Grodekovo with his young wife. Gradually, wives, children and brides began to come to us in the Far East.

In connection with the demobilization, the permission for military leave, the trains going from east to west were overcrowded to the limit. In most cases, there were two passengers for each seat in the carriage. Passenger trains from Vladivostok to Moscow took 12 days. We drove in tight quarters, but the people somehow put up with difficulties, people helped each other, peacetime took on its own rhythm of life. Everyone seemed to want to do something nice for a colleague, roommate, just an acquaintance. This is what we lack today, including officers.

Chapter

15 Studying at the academy. Test of strength at work in the General Staff

After the end of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet people began to solve new tasks - to eliminate the consequences of the war in a short time, to restore the national economy. This required not only material resources, but also people. In accordance with the law adopted at the XII session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on June 23, 1945, the demobilization of the personnel of the army and navy began. But the governments of the United States and Britain, immediately after the end of the war, embarked on the path of frustrating the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and creating aggressive military blocs directed against the USSR. In the difficult post-war international situation, the Soviet Union was forced to take measures to strengthen the Armed Forces, which would be able to repulse any aggressor. In our Primorsky

Military District, formations and units were also being disbanded, and the remaining troops were being reorganized. The 105th rifle division, in which Nikitin and I served, was disbanded in the autumn of 1945, and the 9th machine-gun artillery division, where we came to serve, was formed again on the basis of the former fortified area.

Through the personnel authorities, a

commission was created that dealt with the officer corps. With each officer, regardless of the position held, they talked and determined whether to dismiss him in the reserve or leave him to serve in the army. They even said that there was even a list of specialties, according to which officers were first of all fired for their subsequent use in the national economy, that there were supposedly instructions of a different kind, according to which people like me, who had a secondary education and war experience, but did not have a civilian specialty, should have been left in the Armed Forces, bearing in mind both age and prospects in the service. Probably, the personnel officers were guided by these provisions in determining the future fate of the officers. Us with Captain Nikitin

left to serve in the army. And since they left to serve, it was necessary to have a special military education. When the division received the first order for the selection of candidates for military academies, I got on the list. In the summer of 1947, having passed the preliminary test exams in the scope of the academic program and scoring a passing score, I was recommended by the examination committee to take exams in Moscow for admission to the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. I prepared for the exams conscientiously, it was necessary to restore the knowledge lost during the war for secondary school and prepare in military disciplines: tactics, weapons and the principles of its combat use.

The need for training at the military academy was important because the organizational structure of the troops was changing based on the generalization of the experience of the war. The army began to receive new models of small arms automatic weapons, more advanced tanks, guns, mortars, missiles, including anti-aircraft guided ones. The proportion of armored troops and aviation has more than tripled since 1945. Piston aircraft were replaced by jet aircraft. New helicopter units were formed. New radio and radio equipment was widely introduced into command and control of troops and reconnaissance units. It was necessary to study all this, comprehend and prepare oneself for work in the troops in new conditions, enrich one's combat experience with fundamental theoretical knowledge. Most of the officers aspired to get into the academy of M.V. Frunze, who gave fundamental knowledge in combined arms disciplines. The academy accepted officers no older than 32 years old, who had a completed secondary general and military education, with at least three years of work experience in a position not lower than a company commander.

We all took competitive entrance exams in tactics, military equipment, military topography, Russian language and literature, history of the USSR, geography and a foreign language. In addition, in the district, when selecting candidates, officers took an exam in mathematics and

physics. I passed the exams for the academy with a high passing score and was enrolled as a student in the Intelligence Department.

Most of the students in our recruitment were senior officers, as well as participants in the war. We, the officers participating in the war, who had not yet had time to live and work properly in peacetime, were struck by the academy with order, cleanliness in lecture rooms, classrooms, methodological rooms. Service for students was well established in libraries, laboratories, methodological rooms, a polyclinic, a canteen and buffets.

In the planning and organization of the educational process, clarity, military discipline, tact and respectful attitude of the teaching staff towards the students were traced, although we were all much younger than our teachers and in lower military ranks. After the war and a short post-war service, the academy became a significant turning point in my life. Everything in the academy was aimed at ensuring the educational process. Remarkable intelligence officers studied at our intelligence first course, who already occupied solid positions in the service. The chiefs of intelligence of the division were lieutenant colonels Troshin Yu.V., Kushnarev A.U., Mankov V.I., Heroes of the Soviet Union Bezukladnikov V.N., Olipir A.P., Loza D.F., scout- artilleryman Panenko K.A.; aviators, engineers and officers of other military specialties. The most junior in rank on the course were: pilot Art. Lieutenant Zorin and a tanker, my friend Lieutenant Frolov. Only one officer of our course was not a participant in the war. Sometimes this happened: when building the head of the course, he remarked to him: "Why are you without medal bars?". The officer blushed and quietly answered: "I have not yet earned any reward." But the head of the course, General Diaghilev, was a forgetful person, and this question was repeated more than once. We all sympathized with this officer.

From the very first days, intensive study began. Lectures were given, group exercises were conducted on maps and terrain, new equipment and weapons were studied, and the principles of their combat use were studied.

The main tasks for the preparation of students of the academy were defined in the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR I. Stalin dated July 11, 1946, according to which we were to be trained

as combined-arms officers with a higher military education, who perfectly knew the organization and conduct of combat by a regiment and division, the combat and technical capabilities of special branches of the armed forces. In addition, we were obliged to know the basics of organizing and conducting combat by a rifle corps, to understand the essence of an army operation, to deeply study the main operations of the Great Patriotic War and the stages in the development of military art, tactics, organization and new equipment of the armies of the leading capitalist

states. For additional study, the program of the intelligence faculty included the basics of organizing and conducting intelligence in battle in a link - regiment, division, corps, as well as familiarization with the organization of intelligence in the army.

Lectures were given by highly qualified generals and officers, classes in groups were conducted by assigned teachers of tactics and intelligence training. With great interest

we listened to lectures on tactics by Major General A.A. Yamanov, according to the tactics of the engineering troops, Colonel General K.S. Nazarov, on the history of military art by Professor Colonel D.A. Razin, Lieutenant General N.G. Korsun, for the intelligence training of Lieutenant General Onyanov and other teachers. Intelligibly and interestingly conducted classes on tactics Yu.M. Stahl. The listeners loved his manner of presenting the material, his ability to interest in solving tactical problems. I remember with gratitude the head of our

group in the first year, Colonel M.M. Shmelev. In addition to knowledge of reconnaissance training, he taught us how to properly and rationally arrange everything you need on the desktop - a map, a curvimeter, a compass, a commander's ruler, a pencil, pens, rubber bands, etc. It turns out that even such simple things are important for a military man. Nothing extraneous should not distract from the solution of a specific task. When solving reconnaissance tasks, there has always been a lot of controversy

about the search for the rational use of reconnaissance forces and means and the correct formulation of the task. We carefully listened to those who practically solved such issues at the front - V.V. Troshin, A.U. Kushnarev, V.I. Mankov, S.I. Prokopts. They told us how they performed

the most difficult reconnaissance missions at the front, citing specific situations and examples from combat life as an

argument. I will especially note the practical orientation of the exercises on the ground in military topography. All of us, having broken up into pairs, on the instructions of the teachers, carried out a semi-instrumental survey of the indicated area for several days and compiled a topographic map of the given area. It was painstaking, but very important work. We all had to experience for ourselves how a map is compiled, how terrain data and individual objects are plotted on it, and only after that it became clear how to read it. These classes were remembered throughout the further service, as soon as I had to take a map in my hands. Most of us only at the academy received our first

knowledge on the combat use of artillery, air defense systems, aviation, armored and mechanized troops, on the tactics of the engineering troops, and most importantly, on the principles of using reconnaissance units and equipment in battle. At that time, more advanced, in comparison with the war period, means of radio and electronic intelligence had already begun to appear. Many officers of our intelligence course after graduating from the academy went to serve in units and units of radio and electronic intelligence, air defense (Gonchar, Lashov, Galchikov, Akimov, etc.).

The school day was extremely busy. Most of the material was vulgarized, so we spent the whole day at the academy, returning home late in the evening.

In direct contrast to the clear educational process in all academies, especially in ours, things were going on with the provision of students with housing. From our course, only 3-4 students were provided with a hostel. The rest of the officers rented private corners, rooms from Muscovites. Grisha Frolov and I changed two apartments during our studies. Family officers found themselves in a particularly difficult situation, since Muscovites rented out their living space to family officers with great reluctance. We ate every day, except Sunday, in the academic canteen.

Once in Moscow, we, of course, sought to culturally spend our free Sunday time. Together with the partisan leader

headquarters G.N. Sevostyanov, who at that time studied at a diplomatic school, we listened to all the operas from the repertoire of the Bolshoi Theater, watched all the productions of the operetta theater, repeatedly visited the Maly Theater, museums, and exhibitions. And with fellow academy, I often went to football. At that time, the CSKA team set the tone in football, and we were all its fans. With the presentation of diplomas in a solemn atmosphere,

photographing for memory, study at the academy ended, remembered for a lifetime. The officers received appointments and dispersed to the troops. Five graduates of the academy from our course were subsequently awarded general military ranks: Ivanov, Malentsov, Solovyov, Golitsyn, and Karasev was awarded the title of lieutenant general. The Commission of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff selected several people from our course to continue their studies

during the year at the Higher Academic Courses. In this group

turned out to be me.

The one-year course program provided mainly for special intelligence training and in-depth study of a foreign language. Many practical exercises were carried out on the ground, in the city, on maps. Skills were improved in orientation, drawing the identified objects of the "enemy" on the map, determining their coordinates, compiling brief reconnaissance reports for radio and mail transmissions. They also taught us photography.

At one of the practical exercises on landing cargo behind the "enemy" lines, officers of the GRU General Staff Colonel Banov Ivan Nikolaevich and Major Mylnikov Grigory Sergeevich were present. They had a short talk with me and offered to work after completing the courses at the GRU General Staff in their team. I agreed. In December 1951, I was appointed an officer in the special direction of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. Appointment to the General Staff with the rank of major was unexpected for me, but flattering. At that time, special units were formed in the troops, intended for reconnaissance behind enemy lines in case of war. To manage these units, a special direction was created in the GRU General Staff,

which was staffed by officers with practical experience behind enemy lines. Such officers as the Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Banov Ivan Nikolaevich worked in a special direction, who during the war acted behind German lines under the leadership of the famous intelligence officer Linkov, and then he himself led the reconnaissance detachment, which grew to a brigade. I.N. Banov wrote the book "Data Are Reliable" about the actions of intelligence in the rear of the Nazi invaders. Grigory Sergeevich Mylnikov worked with us, having vast experience in sabotage behind enemy lines, personally derailing several enemy echelons. He acted in the Fedorov unit, and at the end of the war - in Czechoslovakia. Ivan Fedorovich Demsky was thrown behind enemy lines in the Minsk region to conduct reconnaissance and disrupt the transfer of Nazi troops. Pobazheev Fedor Fedorovich and Rumyantsev Evgeny Ivanovich also had some experience in the rear of the German troops. Our direction was headed by Colonel Stepanov, who served during the war as the head of army intelligence. We had other necessary specialist officers in the direction, including officers for engineering, parachute service, radio communications, etc. Georgy Andreyevich Stroilov was in charge of radio communications, who later, with the rank of colonel general, held a high position in the Ministry of Defense.

The officers of our direction were engaged, firstly, in the development and clarification of the staff of special intelligence units. Secondly, the development of combat training programs for these units, where the main emphasis was placed on their training in reconnaissance operations behind enemy lines. Thirdly, the organization of combat training of special forces, the development of training manuals for them. Fourthly, the definition of requirements for the development of new weapons and equipment, control over their implementation.

We often traveled to military districts and groups of troops to check the readiness of special forces units for practical operations behind enemy lines. We checked the theoretical provisions in practice during the exercises and classes. We organized airborne training camps for our special forces in the districts.

Throughout the Main Intelligence Directorate and in our departments, as well, a lot of work was carried out to generalize the experience of the war.

Officers of military, radio and radio engineering, undercover intelligence studied archival materials of active fronts, services of the Main Intelligence Directorate, made generalizations, held meetings to exchange views on improving intelligence, wrote articles, and came out with proposals to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. In those years, the "Collection of materials on military intelligence" was published, which was very popular among the troops. Troop scouts of the Main Directorate, districts, army and division exchanged experience in conducting reconnaissance during the Great Patriotic War in various combat conditions (on the offensive, on defense, in oncoming combat, in pursuit of the enemy, during the day, at night, in the mountains, in the forest, in the Arctic, in the desert, on the coast, etc.). The authors of the articles were generals: Rogov, Onyanov, Ryabev, Surin, Chekmazov, Ankudinov, Aleshin, officers: Gvozd, Patrikeev, Stepanov, Banov, Volkov, Mylnikov, Troshchin, Ryamiantsev, Pobazheev, Chervontsev, Malashchenko, Bondarenko, Shmyrev, Modebadai, Stroilov, Rogatkin, including the future first secretary of the Union of Writers of the USSR Karpov. Deputy Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M.V. Zakharov strongly encouraged the activities of the group of authors of the "Collection of materials on military intelligence" and helped in its publication. Intelligence officers of the older generation, who worked in the army at that time, remember this collection as their assistant in working with reconnaissance units and subunits. The collection was produced in large numbers and brought to the division, and sometimes to shelf; sent him to military academies.

Officers of the GRU General Staff assisted in the formation and development of departments of intelligence and foreign armies in a number of military academies, supplying them with the necessary materials to ensure

the educational process. Since the question of the combat use of special forces units was new, the leadership of the GRU General Staff asked the military districts for the opinion of the command on this matter. I recall the proposal of General of the Army Koshevoy, during the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the corps. General Koshevoy, relying on the experience of the war, reasonably proposed both the organizational structure and the principles of the combat use of these units. Quite interesting proposals were sent with justifications from other military

districts. All of them were summarized and taken into account in the development

of states and recommendations. General Rogov ordered me to develop a task for the combat use of special forces units in an army offensive operation on maps. I completed the task after consulting with my comrades beforehand. Rogov liked my work, and he took me with him to the Academy. M.V. Frunze to our reconnaissance courses, where the tasks were solved by officers and teachers. The officers of our department also solved it.

The employees of the Main Intelligence Directorate in the late 1940s and early 1950s were respectable people. In the leadership - generals, senior officers and officers were mostly colonels, less often lieutenant colonels, participants in the Great Patriotic War, repeatedly awarded government awards, and we, the small majors who flickered between them, seemed to be useless here. The older comrades treated us young people very well, they helped, prompted, took care of. But I felt that I should have served in independent work in the army. At the first opportunity, I turned to my then boss, General Sherstnev, with a request to send me to the troops. He granted my request, and I went to serve in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany as a senior intelligence officer for special work.

Chapter 16

Service in the Intelligence Directorate of the GSVG

In the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, military intelligence, as in other border military districts, was represented by all its types, except for space intelligence. The main grouping of the potential enemy, NATO troops, was deployed in front of the GSVG troops. NATO troops are thousands of armed forces, numbering dozens of mechanized and tank divisions, thousands of modern aircraft and helicopters, powerful delivery vehicles for nuclear and high-precision weapons, electronic warfare weapons, modern reconnaissance and air defense forces. In the North-East Atlantic, the strike forces of the NATO navy were in constant readiness for independent operations at sea and support for the combat operations of the ground forces.

The GSVG intelligence was entrusted with the responsible tasks of tracking the opposing grouping of NATO troops, while each officer in the intelligence department did a strictly defined job.

I was responsible for the state of combat readiness of special forces units for conducting reconnaissance and conducting special operations behind enemy lines in the event of a war, for their combat, mainly reconnaissance, training, and morale. My task was to prepare proposals for the

chief of intelligence on planning the combat use of special forces units (where to concentrate their main efforts, which enemy objects to take control of reconnaissance groups in the event of hostilities). Depending on the changing situation, these proposals were adjusted.

We assisted the army intelligence chiefs in determining the place and role of special forces intelligence units in a special period in the army's line of responsibility.

The intelligence department, and therefore me, was entrusted with the task of monitoring the readiness of each reconnaissance group to be thrown behind enemy lines, the provision of its weapons,

ammunition, special means of reconnaissance and military equipment, the availability of ready-made (packed for the jump) parachutes of the first stage groups, the general condition of the parachute equipment, the correctness of its storage and conservation, the availability of readiness for the use of special means of communication (correspondent and center radio stations, SUV documents), equipment for reconnaissance operations behind enemy lines, the availability of topographic maps, instruments for orienting and taking coordinates of identified objects (targets), the availability of means of transfer (airplanes, helicopters,

vehicles). Control was carried out according to a schedule approved by the chief of staff of the district and signed by the chief of intelligence. Specialist officers were also involved in the check: signalmen, artillerymen, and specialists from the Moscow headquarters of the Airborne Forces were involved to check the storage and operation of parachute equipment.

Much attention was paid by us to the reconnaissance training of special forces units. We annually collected them for training camps in the area of the alternate airfields of Verbig or Altengradow and for 1.5-2 months were engaged in their airborne and tactical-special training. To ensure these activities, we were allocated military transport aviation (usually a flight or squadron, a flight of helicopters, airfield support services, etc.). Scouts and unit officers made single and group parachute jumps from airplanes and helicopters day and night, onto prepared sites and into bushes or forests, with weapons, equipment, correspondent radio stations. In the second half of the training camp, complex tactical and special exercises or exercises were usually held with practical landing, making transitions after landing to reconnaissance areas indicated by models of equipment and weapons of a potential enemy. Various methods of conducting reconnaissance were practiced, primarily for nuclear weapons of attack, command posts and other military installations of the enemy. Scouts and group commanders trained in compiling short reports for radio transmission, and radio operators in establishing communication with the Center and transmitting radiograms. Officers assisted in organizing and conducting training camps

of the intelligence departments of the army, Major Trushkin, Lieutenant Colonel Kolodko, and from the political department of the GSVG - Major Zamorennny.

Hero of the Soviet Union Major Ivanov, Major Pankratov, captains Warriors, Sakharov, Kirsanov, Borisov were excellent methodologists and commanders of special forces units.

Before carrying out maneuvers with the troops, in which, as a rule, special forces participated, training sessions were additionally conducted with them.

With the help of mock-ups of nuclear attack weapons made in full size, posters, diagrams, albums, drawings, special forces units studied the armed forces of a potential enemy, their organizational structure, weapons and equipment, and their intelligence signs. A large place was occupied in the training of

scouts by physical training, the study of sambo wrestling techniques, methods of capturing and disarming prisoners. Survival classes were held under heavy physical exertion, preparation of sites, signaling for receiving cargo thrown from aircraft.

In the intelligence department of the GSVG and our first department, the situation was business-like, we, the officers, helped each other in our work, tried to be interchangeable. With warmth and cordiality I remember the master of his craft, intelligence officer from God, Nikolai Efimovich Klimenko, who later served 10 years as the chief of intelligence of the district and received the rank of general. He was repeatedly sent on foreign business trips, including to Germany, the Republic of Afghanistan. Ivan Lukich Kobets is a military intelligence officer who, at the end of his service, devoted many years of teaching at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Alexander Vladimirovich Knyrkov worked with us in the information department, later he was awarded the rank of general, and he worked as a military attaché in the FRG. Mikhail Panteleymonovich Dedovich was our colleague, who was also awarded the rank of general while working as the head of intelligence of the district. There were many other officers with whom we worked together in the field of intelligence in the GSVG. As time went on, the military-political situation in Europe changed. The

gloomy years of the Cold War were coming, requiring strengthening

intelligence. There was a need to create a special forces unit directly in the hands of the intelligence chief of the GSVG. A lot of work has been devoted to the creation of such bodies. They selected places of deployment, created a modern training base, and were engaged in the selection from among the young replenishment of intelligence officers in these units. Along with intelligence training and other disciplines, foreign languages of European NATO countries were studied with intelligence officers during the three years of service. Translators appeared in the divisions - teachers of foreign languages. One of these teachers, who had a good command of a foreign language and the methods of teaching it, was Dmitry Kondratievich Oleinik, who later worked in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. In more detail, with intelligence officers and officers of special forces, they studied probable objects of intelligence in the event of a war. The weapons and equipment that were put into service with these units were studied, and the requirements for the state of combat readiness were increased. The so-called groups of the first stage were constantly kept staffed, for them weapons, military equipment, equipment, communications were stored in warehouses, that is, the groups were ready at any time to perform tasks behind enemy lines. Special Forces units are located in the picturesque area of the GDR, on the shore of the lake. Unlike other troops, they were quartered freely, in spacious barracks, there were equipped training fields and classrooms, a good dining room, officers with their families had good apartments, that is, relatively good conditions were created for mastering the curriculum. These units were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kalmykov Nikolai Nikolaevich. Previously, under his command was the reconnaissance battalion of the tank division. Kalmykov knew little about the specifics of combat use and training of special-purpose intelligence officers, so he personally had to work a lot so that he would learn his new position and direction in the service. He understood something, but he never became a real commando. The backbone of these new units was the officers who served in the former special forces units. They were promoted in positions and ranks and made the new units, frankly, exemplary. Commissions that came from the headquarters of the GSVG and the General Staff,

the training of special forces was assessed, as a rule, as "excellent". The best officers were Ustyuzhanin, Borisov, Sakharov, Morozov, Dokarev, Zhuravel, Warriors, Fadeev and others. Most of these officers rose to high military ranks and positions in special intelligence, they later worked in the headquarters of military districts and groups of troops. The commander

of the training unit for the training of sergeants was Senior Lieutenant Malinovsky. After a special selection of soldiers for this Training Unit and intensive training, all cadets successfully completed standard exercises.

Chapter

17 Intelligence in the army. Berlin Crisis

By decision of the command in October 1960, I was appointed to an independent section of work - the head of intelligence of the 20th Guards Army of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

An army is an operational formation that includes several divisions and various units of military branches and services, capable of operating as part of a front or independently in a separate operational direction.

Intelligence in the army, both in peacetime and in wartime, solves tasks that ensure the command makes certain decisions. The army has various types of reconnaissance: military, artillery, radio-electronic, radar, engineering, radiation and chemical. All of them require attention from the intelligence department and the head of intelligence. Divisions of the 20th Guards. armies were stationed around Berlin. The main object of reconnaissance of our army was the West Berlin garrison, which included American, British, French

troops, as well as numerous West Berlin paramilitary police. On May 8, 1945, representatives of the Nazi command signed in Berlin an act of unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the territory of Berlin was divided into zones of occupation by the

USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France. Contrary to the decisions of the Berlin Conference in 1945, the Western powers held separate elections to the city parliament in 1948 and thus predetermined the split of Berlin. The western part was separated from the eastern. Thus, West Berlin became a special political entity. West Berlin has long been a hotbed of tension in the center of Europe. In violation of the legal status of West Berlin, Germany under

With the connivance of the Western powers, it allowed gatherings of revanchist compatriots and associations of the FRG to be held here, allowed the existence of a branch of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of the FRG, penetration into the politics of the city of politicians and functionaries, various companies

of the FRG. On June 17, 1953, an attempt was made to organize a counter-revolutionary putsch in the capital of the GDR, Berlin, from the territory of West

Berlin. During the existence of an open border between the capital of the GDR and West Berlin (until August 1961), as a result of speculation, organized luring of labor from the GDR and other illegal actions, the annual damage caused by the GDR reached 3.5 billion marks. In

connection with the aggressive activities of the FRG and its NATO allies against the GDR, carried out from West Berlin, the government of the GDR in August 1961 was forced to establish order on the borders with West Berlin, blocking the way for subversive activities against the GDR. A 106 km long concrete wall was built between West and East Berlin, and checkpoints for vehicles and pedestrians were identified for communication between both parts of the city. The checkpoints were controlled by the GDR - by the GDR police, from West Berlin - by the US, British, and French military personnel.

The construction of the wall separating West Berlin from East Berlin and the measures directed against the abuse of transit traffic between West Berlin and the FRG have aggravated the situation in Europe, and mainly in Berlin, to the extreme. The intensity of passions around the problem of West Berlin created a critical situation, similar to the pre-war period. To strengthen the command of the GSVG troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev arrived in Wünsdorf, although officially no one removed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Yakubovsky I.I. from command. During this period, the GSVG had two Commanders-in-Chief. The troops of the

20th Guards Army were brought to a high degree of combat readiness. An operational group of the army headquarters headed by the first deputy commander of the army, Major General Chursin N.A., was advanced to Berlin.

American tanks with full ammunition reached the border with East Berlin. In response to this exit of American tanks, the tank regiment of the 20th Guards Army under the command of Colonel Sergeev also went to the border with West Berlin. At the checkpoint on Friedrichstrasse, American and Soviet tanks stood in a wall against each other, almost buried in cannon barrels.

What was the West Berlin garrison? The American troops were represented by an infantry brigade consisting of three battalions, a tank company, a battery of 155-mm howitzers, an army aviation detachment, a security battalion, a communications company, and anti-tank units. In addition, the Americans in West Berlin had numerous warehouses with weapons, ammunition, uniforms, food, and spare parts. The Tempelhof airfield was constantly functioning, which daily received many aircraft of the allies and the FRG. To service all this, there were military units with engineers, technicians, and various kinds of specialists. The British in West Berlin had three army battalions, a tank company, a communications regiment, a military

police regiment, support and maintenance units. The French have regiments (motorized infantry and tank), as well as support and maintenance units. The total number of personnel of the troops of the USA, England, France totaled about 12 thousand people. The West Berlin police consisted of 22,000 men, well-armed and organized into army-type units. Stocks of weapons

and ammunition made it possible to increase the strength of the police up to 70 thousand people. Military units changed periodically, using the highways passing through the territory of the GDR, and transport aviation, which used the three air

corridors allocated to the Allied armies under the Potsdam Agreement. It was in such a difficult military-political situation in Europe and the acute situation in West Berlin that intelligence was organized and conducted in the army. Arriving in

Eberswalde, where the headquarters of the army was located, introducing himself to the command - the commander of the army, General

Lieutenant Kotov Viktor Filippovich, First Deputy. Commander Major General Chursin Nikolai Alekseevich, Chief of Staff Major General Lev Nikolaevich Abrosimov and Member of the Military Council Major General Semenov Ivan Petrovich, I took up my duties. I replaced the gray-haired Colonel Sakharov, who was already of considerable age and had held this post for a long time, as head of army intelligence. There was a moment when I was taken aback, the thought was spinning in my head: isn't it too early for me to take on such a responsible position? Having got acquainted with the officers of the intelligence

department of the army and the intelligence divisions of the divisions, I went to study West Berlin and the NATO troops stationed in Berlin. The situation around West Berlin was heating up, and additional measures were required to organize intelligence. A few days before the construction of the wall, I traveled to West Berlin several times in a row with an interpreter to study the position of the West Berlin troops on the spot. In the evening, in Karhorst, where our Soviet commandant's office for Berlin was located, I processed the data received, went to Eberswalde late in the evening to report to the command and returned to Berlin again. The commandant of Berlin (the Soviet zone) was my classmate at the academy, Major General Andrey Alexandrovich Solovyov. He gave me a room with a safe in the commandant's office, where I summed up the work of the day. Then, with the help of the intelligence department (A.S.

Semikozov, V.A. Bondarenko, P.T. Serkov, I.M. Kobzev, Yu.A. objects of interest (three airfields, the deployment of the West Berlin police, weapons and ammunition depots, points for the formation of police units in the event of a complication of the situation, the main industrial enterprises, through street passages through the city, places of possible blockages and obstacles). On the same map, the main reference materials on West Berlin were placed (characteristics of the population, industrial enterprises, the quantity and quality of products manufactured at these enterprises, etc.). Our detailed map of West Berlin was widely used during this period. It was used by the GSVG command,

army and divisions, reconnaissance units for the training of officers of the army troops. We also sent such a map to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.

At the direction of the army command, the intelligence department developed a detailed reconnaissance plan for the West Berlin garrison. The plan was approved by the army commander, I reported it to the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, Army General Yakubovsky, and the Chief

of Staff, Colonel General Ariko. According to this plan, a network of observation posts equipped with optical instruments was deployed around West Berlin. With each post, either telephone or radio contact was maintained. One of the observation posts was deployed at the Brandenburg Gate. During the period of aggravation of the situation, posts conducted round-the-clock surveillance

and reported its results. The reconnaissance by the units of the army radio intelligence, whose posts were deployed around West Berlin, turned out to be effective. Places for the deployment of electronic intelligence posts were chosen both within the city itself and at heights around the outer contour of West Berlin.

The forces of the officers of the intelligence department of the army and the intelligence departments of the divisions organized patrols in radio-equipped cars in West Berlin. The officers carried out visual observation of the activities of the troops of the West Berlin garrison, police formations, the mode of operation of airfields, mainly the Tempelchow airfield, which operated around the clock. The flow of transport aviation from the territory of Germany and from West Berlin went along all three air corridors, using navigation systems, including their elements deployed in West Berlin. Depending on the evolving situation, the number of our patrol and reconnaissance vehicles sent to West Berlin increased or decreased. Periodically, trips were organized for officers - commanders of units and subunits of the troops of the 20th Guards. army on buses to West Berlin in order to familiarize themselves with the situation on the spot.

The officers of the army reconnaissance detachment maintained close contact with the officers of the Nova Ves and

Marpenborn, through which NATO troops passed to West Berlin and returned from West Berlin to Germany. Often the officers of the reconnaissance department were themselves present at the checkpoint when the troops

passed through these points. The translators of the intelligence department of the army and divisions were involved in translating and studying the West Berlin press, including the newspapers Berliner Morgen, Berliner Stimme, Tagesspiegel, Telegraph and listening to radio broadcasts from the West Berlin radio stations IAS and Free Berlin.

The flow of intelligence data from the sources mentioned above came around the clock to the intelligence department of the army, where it was taken into account, analyzed, studied, summarized and reported in the form of intelligence reports and reports to the headquarters of the GSVG, and sometimes directly to the General Staff. At the end of August, a group of officers from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, headed by General A.V., arrived in Berlin. Romanovsky in order to study the developing situation in Berlin on the spot and report it directly to Moscow, to provide, if necessary, assistance to the intelligence department of our army and the intelligence agencies of the group of forces in organizing intelligence. The main source that supplied information to the GRU GSh group was our intelligence department.

To the command of the army - the commander, the chief of staff, a member of the Military Council - I usually reported the situation in Berlin daily orally in person, if they were in Berlin, or by telephone in Eberswalde. Almost daily, in the morning, at 6-7 o'clock, the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, General of the Army I.I. Yakubovsky, was interested in the situation in Berlin, by this time I was preparing a short oral report for him. This went on for over a year. I could not leave Berlin anywhere and was deprived of my vacation. Every day, by phone after the report to Yakubovsky, I

repeated my report to the head of intelligence of the GSVG, Major General K.N. Tkachenko, received additional instructions from him on the organization of intelligence and the presentation of intelligence information. Tkachenko sometimes expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that earlier than him, I reported the situation to the Commander-in-Chief and the commander, but what could I do if they called me in Berlin earlier than Tkachenko.

Much later, when I served as intelligence chief of the Baltic Military District, and Tkachenko worked in the GRU General Staff, he also sometimes made suggestions to me by phone about my earlier reports to higher commanders. Great assistance in

recording and processing incoming intelligence data was provided to me by the senior officer of the intelligence department for information, Lieutenant Colonel Semikozov Andrey Stepanovich.

For a more rapid response to the situation that had developed by August 1961, an operational group of the headquarters of the 20th Guards was created in Berlin. army. It included almost all the officers of our small reconnaissance department, officers of the operations department, the communications department, the artillery headquarters, representatives of the engineering and chemical services. The group was headed by the First Deputy Commander of the Army, Major General N.A. Chursin. The group was located in Karlshorst, in a three-story building. Telephone lines were brought to us for communication with the headquarters of the army, the headquarters of all divisions and some individual army units. In essence, it was a duplicating body for command and control of the army. The entire composition of the operational group was in the barracks. In this house we worked, ate and slept. This group lasted two years.

We made up for the shortage of officers in the intelligence department by seconding officers from the intelligence departments of the divisions. For them, it was a good internship in practical intelligence work.

The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the GSVG sometimes called me to Wünsdorf for a personal report on the situation in Berlin. The presentations were held in a relaxed atmosphere. Yakubovsky and Ariko always responded positively to our requests and immediately gave orders to satisfy them (on the allocation of additional radio-equipped cars for trips to West Berlin, on additional means of communication with intelligence agencies, surveillance devices, etc.). Throughout the autumn of

1961, the winter and spring of 1962, the situation in Berlin remained tense. In the spring of 1962, the tanks of the Sergeyev regiment were withdrawn from the border into the depths of the city, the Americans also withdrew their tanks from the border. The period of confrontation has begun

in Berlin with the presence of barriers in the form of a wall and wire fences along the outer contour of West Berlin. Some officers of our army and other units that took part in the Berlin conflict were awarded government awards. I was awarded the Order of the Red Star, our intelligence officers were also awarded. Another important area of work for our army

reconnaissance department was the organization of combat, reconnaissance training of reconnaissance companies of regiments, reconnaissance battalions of motorized rifle and tank divisions. In the winter period of training, combat training with them was organized in permanent places of deployment, and in the summer they were taken to the camp at the Liberose training center for 1.5–2 months. The Liberose Training Center was equipped with appropriate training fields and tracks for carrying out special firing from armored personnel carriers, tanks, motorcycles, including for firing and driving floating tanks and armored personnel carriers afloat. Reconnaissance units and subunits went to the training

center in full force with training and combat training tanks, armored personnel carriers, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, radio stations, training models, targets and other equipment necessary for combat training. The units were camped in tents. All elements were equipped in the camp in accordance with the charter (rulers, mushrooms, a food unit, warehouses, parks for military equipment, etc.) and guard and internal service were organized. The training center was located in a picturesque area with forests, fields, lakes, which contributed to the development of

tactical reconnaissance tasks. Training places for shooting on land and afloat were equipped with electrified towers with control panels, which made it possible to create various options for the target environment. A general curriculum and a strict schedule for the use of training fields, shooting ranges and training places at training grounds and shooting ranges

were drawn up. Particular attention was paid to the observance of safety measures at the shooting ranges and when performing exercises afloat on floating tanks and armored personnel carriers.

The reconnaissance units practiced practical special exercises in driving and shooting on land and afloat, tactical exercises on reconnaissance topics: the actions of the unit as a separate patrol, reconnaissance detachment, reconnaissance group behind enemy lines and, of course, reconnaissance actions with forcing water barriers. The reconnaissance armament intelligence reconnaissance units, units of that time, was not bad, it made it possible to solve reconnaissance tasks in maneuverable forms of combat, had good weapons - cannons, machine guns, grenade launchers, was equipped with optical observation devices. Under the direction of division intelligence chiefs and with our help, comprehensive reconnaissance exercises were conducted to organize and conduct reconnaissance in a division, usually during an offensive. Defensive topics in those days, as a rule, did not appear in the training of troops, including in intelligence

preparation.

At the end of the camp training camp, a comprehensive army reconnaissance exercise was conducted to organize and conduct reconnaissance in the army in an offensive operation. Such a large-scale exercise required careful preparation. It was difficult in the conditions of densely populated Germany to choose a piece of terrain in terms of the width and depth of the army operation, so conventions were allowed, the scouts operated in a narrower strip and reduced depth. Usually, a section of 20 by 30–40 km was selected. With the permission of the army commander, motorized rifle units were attracted to mark the enemy and his objects. They put up on the ground mockups of NATO nuclear attack weapons (Honest John, Corporal, Hawk, radar and radio stations, etc.). Each division had such models, made in full size, and they were used in exercises, maneuvers, and for the training of officers. The chief of the communications troops provided us with the creation of networks for the control of intelligence and units that designated the enemy. The complex reconnaissance exercise involved all the forces and means of reconnaissance of the army, including artillery, engineering, radiation and

chemical, for which an appropriate simulation environment was also created and various inputs were prepared.

At that time, Colonel Alexander Ivanovich Golovanov was the head of intelligence of the GSVG air army. He, usually by prior arrangement, allocated to us for a comprehensive exercise a squadron of reconnaissance aircraft from the tactical air reconnaissance regiment. The complex

reconnaissance exercise lasted 3-4 days and made it possible, under conditions close to combat reality, to check the capabilities of military, radio and electronic, special, artillery, engineering, radiation and chemical reconnaissance, the possibility of receiving intelligence from a reconnaissance aircraft, and also to find out accuracy of determining coordinates by various types of reconnaissance. During the exercise, intelligence control was tested using various means of communication.

Great assistance in the organization and conduct of classes and exercises and the material support of these events was provided to us by the deputy. Army Commander for Combat Training, Major General Inoshvili Panteleimon Shoich. And my right hand at these events has always been the senior officer of the intelligence department for military intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Bondarenko Vasily Alexandrovich. The chiefs of reconnaissance of the divisions Klimenko, Makhov, Gasanov and others helped in

conducting classes and exercises. Sometimes the commander of the army, Lieutenant General Kotov Viktor Filippovich, came to our camp. By nature, Kotov was calm, balanced, to the point of pedantry a fair and honest person, so we perceived his arrival calmly, without nervousness, he trusted us in all matters, we paid him with zealous service, solving the problems that he set before intelligence. It has been a long

time since the so-called Berlin crisis of 1961-62 became the center of attention of the world community, heads of state and government, the press, radio and television. We are grateful to those people who managed to prevent its expansion and come to a peaceful solution to the impending conflict between the two coalitions of states. Intelligence of the 20th Guards. army did not occupy any important place in its resolution, but due to

of her call of duty, she did everything necessary to present data to the command of different levels, which, probably, were taken into account when making decisions. In my opinion, our

reconnaissance bodies of motorized rifle and tank divisions, intelligence bodies directly subordinate to the army, were able to solve the tasks we faced in reconnaissance of the NATO troops of the West Berlin garrison and political events held in West Berlin. Reconnaissance was organized and conducted in non-standard conditions of a large city connected with the FRG by road and air communications. Clear planning, rational use of the available reconnaissance forces and means at the disposal of the army command, organization of interaction between

various reconnaissance forces, scrupulous accounting and analysis of incoming intelligence, organized communications made it possible to inform the command in a timely manner about the events that took place in West Berlin and the intentions of the NATO command to use the Berlin situation in your own interests. However, the practical conduct of reconnaissance in the specific conditions of a large city revealed a number of weaknesses in army intelligence: insufficient equipment of electronic intelligence units with electronic equipment, their unsuitability

for deployment in urban environments with high electronic interference. The lack of small-sized VHF radio stations made it difficult to maintain stable communication with the crews of cars sent to West Berlin for reconnaissance. Bulky military radio stations were installed on the machines, with the use of which communication with officers was maintained through repeaters. The repeater was installed on the last high-rise

building of the Unter der Linden street near the Brandenburg Gate.

In everyday combat training, including before the start of the Berlin events, in reconnaissance units and subunits of divisions and the army, very little attention was paid to working out the issues of reconnaissance in a large city, this was our great omission.

The number of officers of the intelligence department (5 people) was clearly not enough to carry out multifaceted work on the organization and conduct of intelligence in an acute situation, which was the situation in Berlin. With the

permission of the army command, we strengthened the intelligence department at the expense of officers (mainly translators) of the intelligence departments of the divisions. The department at that time consisted of 8-10 officers instead of five in the state.

The intelligence department of our army was at that time one of the most reliable sources of intelligence information on West Berlin. The GRU General Staff, the intelligence department of the GSVG headquarters constantly demanded reports on the changing situation. Neighboring armies, border guards, intelligence of the GDR sent their representatives to us to get the situation, the officers of the intelligence department were forced to work for a long time with large overloads, which sometimes affected the quality of the intelligence documents being worked out.

Our applications and requests for equipping with radio and electronic intelligence equipment that could be used in the conditions of various electronic interference in a large city were not fully satisfied.

Chapter

18 Meeting with Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov

I cannot fail to mention the meeting and conversation with Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who bore the great burden of the Great Patriotic War on his shoulders and glorified the Soviet Armed Forces throughout the world.

Having received a long-awaited vacation at the beginning of the summer of 1962, my wife Galina Fedorovna and my three-year-old daughter Katya, without permits, went to Gagra as savages. Every day, swimming and sunbathing on the beach until 11 o'clock, before the onset of heat, we went to the chosen bench in the shade. One day we go to the bench, and it is occupied by a man and a woman and the same girl as our Katya. I decided to survive from the bench seated. He came up and sat ugly next to the man, touched him, and my wife sat next to me. The man turned to me, a clear displeasure written on his face with my neighborhood. I turned to him and recognized Zhukov. We heard that he is also resting in Gagra. My wife, recognizing him, gently nudged me with her elbow. I moved away from my neighbor and asked him: "Are you Marshal Zhukov?" He frowned and said: "I am Marshal Zhukov, and who are you?" I got up from the bench, apologized to him and introduced myself: "I am the head of intelligence of the 20th Guards Army of the GSVG, I know you only from portraits, so it turned out so awkward." His eyebrows straightened, his face became calm, and the conversation began. Zhukov asked about army affairs, about the Berlin conflict, about the command of the GSVG and the army, about the mood in the army environment. I honestly answered all his questions. I also told him about how at the seminars on Marxist-Leninist training we scolded him for separating the army from the people, for striving to seize power. Zhukov laughed openly. I realized that after he was removed from the post of Minister of Defense and removed from the Politburo, he did not often have such conversations. Zhukov, in turn, spoke briefly about the signing of the Act of Surrender of Germany, about the situation at that time. Directly, without

characteristics of generals in high positions. He spoke especially unflatteringly about Grechko, and about Yakubovsky he spoke something like this: "If this Ivan had as much intelligence as his height, then there would be some sense from him." My wife and wife Zhukova moved aside with the children, and we continued our heartfelt conversation. He asked what was new in intelligence, what were the prospects for its development, who heads intelligence in the GSVG, etc. I willingly answered all his questions.

G.K. Zhukov was 66 years old at that time, he looked tired, perhaps he was ill, he was pale, but he spoke vividly, without difficulty. He was dressed in a white sleeveless shirt, light trousers, open sandals on his feet. His wife looked like a very youthful woman, dressed beautifully, in a summery way. The girl Masha looked very pretty and active.

At the end of the conversation, I thanked him for the conversation, once again apologized for my ugly act. In conclusion, on a piece of paper, I wrote for him our address in Gagra, where we rented a room, and asked that if he deems it convenient and necessary, he would come to visit us. By this I touched him, he blinked his eyes, put his hand on mine and said: "Well, Colonel, you respected me, I wish you good service."

This was such an interesting meeting with our great commander Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, which was remembered for a lifetime. The simplicity of his communication, directness of conversation, freedom of expression of opinion on this or that issue served as a good life lesson for me.

Chapter

19 Working at the General Staff Again

Berlin in 1961-1962 was in the center of everyone's attention. Various government and military delegations came to Berlin, including through our intelligence service. Due to the current situation, the intelligence of our 20th Guards Army was at the forefront of events. I, as the head of intelligence, who successfully coped with the tasks, had many proposals for further service: in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Ground Forces, in the intelligence department at the Academy. M.V. Frunze, to the post of deputy chief of intelligence of the border military district. At that time, the head of the GRU General Staff, who was in charge of special forces, Colonel Patrakhaltsev Nikolai Kirillovich, arrived in Berlin, offering to go to him as a deputy. I agreed and was appointed to this position. The head of the department, which included us, turned out to be the same Lieutenant General M.A. Kochetkov, who received me in Moscow in 1944 after my exit from the rear of the enemy. Then I introduced myself to him as a senior lieutenant, and now as a colonel. I think he recognized me, but neither he nor I gave the appearance that they had ever met.

Parts of the special forces were reorganized and acquired a new qualitative state, therefore, as a specialist with practical experience in fighting behind enemy lines and experience in post-war service, Patrakhaltsev invited me.

The reorganization of our special forces units was a response to the creation of powerful special forces in the American, British, French and other armies of the NATO bloc. We are lagging behind potential opponents in this matter. The

beginning of the creation of sabotage and reconnaissance troops in the US Army was the formed six Ranger battalions to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance operations behind enemy lines. In 1950, the Ranger sabotage and reconnaissance companies were included in the states of the infantry divisions. Six of these companies were used by the Americans during the Korean War. In 1952 on

troops began to be created on the basis of these companies in the American army special purpose.

The NATO command believes that the conduct of special operations (that is, the integrated use of reconnaissance, reconnaissance and sabotage formations in the theater of operations, in individual countries and regions) can cause significant damage to a potential or active enemy, in a short time to undermine his political, economic, military and moral potentials, to fight against the national liberation and democratic movement.

The main features of special forces units are their constant combat readiness for combat use to carry out sudden and swift actions already in peacetime (when the use of conventional armed forces is considered politically inappropriate or premature), as well as specific methods and tactics of their actions. Special-purpose units are already oriented in peacetime and are specially prepared for operations in specific theaters of military operations and even at some specific objects. The special purpose units of the NATO armies are assigned

the following main tasks. In

peacetime: organization of anti-government protests, rebel movements with the aim of destabilizing the situation in a given country and overthrowing its government, capturing or destroying prominent political, state and military figures; carrying out sabotage and acts of sabotage; collection of political, economic and military intelligence; accumulation and placement in certain areas (future partisan bases) of weapons and materiel to support operations in wartime; the taking of hostages or the release of its citizens; suppression of progressive or national liberation movements, etc. In wartime: collection of intelligence information; disabling or capturing important military and industrial facilities behind enemy lines using both conventional and nuclear, chemical weapons; violation of communications,

control and logistics systems; targeting enemy targets with their own aircraft,

correcting strikes against them with rockets and artillery fire; demoralization of enemy troops and population; theft of nuclear weapons, samples of equipment and weapons, secret documents; organizing the escape from captivity of their military and civilian personnel. These general tasks, depending

on the applied forces and conditions are specified.

The US special operations forces (ground forces, air force and navy) number 30,800 people, of which: regular forces - 17,600 people, organized reserve - 13,200 people. The US

Ground Forces include: 8 special forces groups of 1500 people each. in each (of which 4 are regular), in the group - 54 detachments of 12-14 people, led by a captain; 4 groups of psychological warfare (of which one is regular); 3 Ranger battalions; squad "Delta"; army aviation battalion.

In total, there are 22,400 people in the special forces of the US ground forces; 9100 of them were in the regular units, 13300 in the organized reserve.

For operations in the European theater, the 10th special forces group is intended, which until 1968 was deployed in full strength in Bad Toelz (Germany). At present, its headquarters, headquarters detachment, special forces battalions, service company, as well as weapons and equipment for the entire group are located in Bad Tölz. The special forces group

is armed with automatic rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, explosives, incendiary ammunition, various types of mines, including small-sized nuclear mines of the M 129 and M 159 types with a capacity of 0.02 and 0.051 kt, weight up to 27 kg), chemical ammunition, electronic warfare equipment, radio and electronic intelligence, small-sized radio stations for groups thrown behind enemy lines. The British army has three special purpose regiments (21,22, 23) of 700 people

each. in everyone. Of the three regiments, 72-144 sabotage and reconnaissance groups of 8-16 people can be formed. each. In the German army, three army corps each have a deep reconnaissance company (100,

200, 300). Of the three mouths may be

formed 60 sabotage and reconnaissance groups of 5 people each. There are

special forces units in other armies that are part of bloc NATO.

The total number of formations that only NATO countries actually had by 1992 for operations in continental, oceanic (marine) theater of operations was 2567–2877; reconnaissance and sabotage detachments numbering 12-14 people. - 940-1080; separate reconnaissance groups of 5-10 people. - up to 544, sabotage and assault detachments numbering over 50 people. - 150-170, sabotage and reconnaissance detachments of combat swimmers numbering 4-10 people. — 743.

Enormous funds are spent on the maintenance of personnel, equipment, weapons, and equipment for special forces, and special equipment and weapons are constantly being developed and improved for them. The NATO command has always placed and still places great hopes on them, in a number of cases in practice they have already justified the expenses spent.

In the article of Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev "Grey advisers of Landsbergis", published in the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" dated 5.03.91, it is said; The "Strategy for protecting the building of the Lithuanian Parliament in the event of an assault by Soviet troops" was led by an American of Lithuanian origin, Andrew Eive... Euwe belongs to the top-class specialists of the US intelligence... increased lethality ... Euwe urgently arrived from the USA in Vilnius on the eve of the January events, having with him ... "a detailed plan for the deployment of partisan operations in urban conditions against Soviet troops ... He intends, together with other" instructors ", to open courses for nationalist militants in Lithuania to teach methods of warfare partisan warfare and sabotage and terrorist acts... Euwe intends to make a military-political career in "independent Lithuania", outdoing his own grandfather, who, with the rank of general, headed the general staff of the Lithuanian bourgeois army in 1926-1927. Euwe makes no secret of his plans to return real estate and large plots

land that once belonged to his parents." This is a fresh example of the use of special forces specialists in practice today. The Americans, much earlier than we began to generalize the experience of Soviet, German and our own intelligence, connected with the actions of sabotage and reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines; documents appeared on the results of the generalization. As in the arms race in general, the

Americans dragged us into the race to create special units. We prepared information for the leadership on special forces units of foreign armies, their weapons, equipment, recruitment principles, and training methods. We developed options for the states of our special forces units for the army and front (district) level. They made calculations for the required number of officers, sergeants, soldiers, weapons, equipment, parachute equipment, communications equipment and special equipment, including mine-blasting equipment and reconnaissance equipment.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense decided to form special forces units for the front-line; for the army level, the former units were approved special purpose.

The main purpose of special forces units and subunits was to conduct reconnaissance and carry out sabotage activities behind enemy lines during the war.

The organizational structure of the front-line units of special forces was created quite flexible, allowing their use in operations in a variety of ways; in small groups of 3-10 people, detachments of 25 to 50 people, entire units of 50 to 200 people, and larger formations. Depending on the theater of operations, individual units of the unit could operate in separate operational areas. Special

forces units and subunits adopted light small arms for service; assault rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, mine-explosive devices and accessories for blasting, VHF and HF radio stations (correspondent and center), parachute equipment and accessories for

him.

But this conventional armament and equipment could not fully ensure the fulfillment of the tasks that were supposed to be carried out behind enemy lines by special forces groups and detachments. Therefore, it was decided to develop new equipment and weapons: reconnaissance, mine-explosive, new small-sized VHF and HF radio stations for communicating groups with the Center and operating groups among themselves, silent and flameless weapons, parachutes for jumping from high altitudes, special means for receiving cargo dropped from aircraft and for directing own aircraft to identified enemy targets, new comfortable uniforms for landing and operations behind enemy lines, small-sized means of radio and electronic intelligence. To develop tactical and technical specifications for new equipment and weapons, to communicate with research institutes and institutions, a group of engineers was created in our direction, headed by Colonel Alexander Dmitrievich Strizhakov.

The team of our direction was friendly, close-knit, the officers had either practical combat experience in conducting reconnaissance behind enemy lines, or experience in serving in special forces. A tireless worker, the head of the direction, Colonel (then General) Patrakhaltsev N.K. fought back in Spain, among our Soviet intelligence officers. During the Great Patriotic War, Nikolai Kirillovich trained scouts to send behind enemy lines, including Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, for a long time he was part of the Soviet mission under Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia during the period of active hostilities.

At various times, Heroes of the Soviet Union, Colonels Banov Ivan Nikolaevich, Pokidko Vasily Markovich, Loginov Anatoly Fedorovich, Karmatsky Dmitry served in our direction. Our direction was supervised by a scout with great experience, deputy. Head of the GRU General Staff Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Mamsurov Khadzhi Dzhiorovich. He had many worries, but he found time either to come to us, or to talk with us, calling us to him.

During the formation of district special forces units, we traveled to military districts to assist in the recruitment of units with personnel, vehicles, equipment, monitored the implementation of applications for parachute equipment for units,

sending it to its destination. As part of the direction, we had a paratrooper officer who was closely involved in parachute landing service. As a matter of urgency,

we developed new combat training programs for special forces units, taking into account their purpose, the appearance of new specialists in their composition. This was usually done by lieutenant colonels Pobazheev Fedor Fedorovich and Mylnikov Grigory Sergeevich. In the

autumn of 1962, for the first time, an experimental exercise was conducted on the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts with the newly formed part of the special forces of the Leningrad military district to use it in a front-line offensive operation. The head of the exercise was appointed deputy. Chief of the GRU General Staff Colonel General Mamsurov Kh.D. The development of the exercise was instructed to be done by me and the head of the special intelligence department of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel Likhanov V.S. Likhanov and I developed this exercise, unusual for that time, for almost a month. They went out for reconnaissance to select landing sites for reconnaissance groups, set up imitation means indicating the enemy in the front line of 80x200 km, worked out documents, the forms of which were not yet available. The chiefs of intelligence,

heads of departments of special intelligence of military districts were called to the exercise. Approximately the following issues were worked out during the exercise: the decision by the chief of intelligence of the front on the combat use of special forces, the issuance of combat orders, the preparation of sabotage and reconnaissance groups, the setting of tasks, the withdrawal of groups to take-off airfields, landing, the performance of reconnaissance and special tasks, radio reports on performing tasks, redirecting groups during the operation to new reconnaissance facilities, moving the headquarters of a special forces unit during a front-line operation. After the end of the exercise, Colonel

General Mamsurov Kh.D. made a detailed analysis. Documents on the exercise were published as a separate volume and sent to military districts and military academies. Prior to the development of guidance documents on the combat use of special forces, this volume was guided.

Soon Patrakhaltsev left to command a separate unit, I was appointed in his place as head of department.

The command was tasked to develop documents on the combat use of special forces units in a short time in order to more purposefully prepare them for operations behind enemy lines. This task was completed. We have developed two fundamental documents: "Manual on the Combat Use of Special Forces Units" and "Organization and Tactics of Partisan Fighting", which outlined the basic concept of the combat use of special forces units, their main tasks, and a set of questions on preparing for intelligence operations behind enemy lines. With the receipt in the troops of the "Manual on the Combat Use of Special Forces", more purposeful training of reconnaissance officers, reconnaissance groups and subunits as a whole began in the units. According to the provisions set out in the manual, field exercises and exercises with practical landing began to be carried out, special attention was paid to reconnaissance of weapons of mass destruction. In addition to self-made models of nuclear missiles, a centrally determined number of inflatable models were made, which were convenient to transport, and during the exercises it was possible to quickly change the area of their deployment.

The methodology for conducting parachute training classes was improved, new parachutes and cargo containers for dropping cargo were mastered. New exercises were developed and introduced for firing from a machine gun and a pistol, adapted to the situation that may arise in front of scouts behind enemy lines.

The officers of the direction, together with the officers of the units, developed temporary standards, including the main elements of the actions of the reconnaissance officer behind enemy lines in the complex (landing, collecting and masking the parachute and landing traces, reaching the assembly point, marching to the reconnaissance area, reconnaissance of the object, determining its coordinates, compiling reports for transmission by radio, setting up a radio station and transmitting a report to the Center, receiving a notification (receipt) about the receipt of a report). This kind of regulation

exercises and exercises disciplined reconnaissance groups, introduced a spirit of competition.

In the units, the educational and material base was created and improved, which contributed to the development of special exercises for physical, special reconnaissance training (simulators and towers for airborne training, the "reconnaissance trail" - overcoming obstacles on the ground and in the air, firing camps - for special shooting, including from silent weapons, mine blasting camps for training in the setting of special mines and incendiaries, radio ranges, etc.).

With our participation, testing and adoption of new reconnaissance and special equipment, radio equipment were carried out.

I happened to participate in the commission for testing a new small-sized short-wave station for reconnaissance groups, one of the developers of which was Boris Andreevich Mikhalin, the same designer who in 1942 developed the Sever radio station for reconnaissance and partisans. Acquaintance with Mikhalin was pleasant, I told him a lot about the defects and positive qualities of the Sever radio station, which we took into account when developing a new station. The new radio station turned out to be quite good, it was made in accordance with new requirements, on a new basis, the main thing in it was the speed method. The station was put into service and for a long time it was equipped with special forces units. In the mid-1960s, other types of special equipment were tested and adopted for service: mine-explosive

and incendiary weapons, silent weapons, devices for electronic intelligence, for taking the coordinates of identified targets, and much more.

For the entire composition of the special units, summer and winter uniforms were designed and manufactured, convenient for operations in reconnaissance and landing. The color of the uniform was ordered and made taking into account the purpose of special forces units in various theaters of war. I remember how the head of the GRU General Staff and I went to the Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sokolov S.L. to demonstrate this outfit. General Sokolov gave

he is highly appreciated, and it still consists of supplying special units. For stocks for

wartime, as well as to provide reconnaissance officers at exercises and maneuvers in peacetime, a small-sized high-calorie food ration was developed and accepted for supply. The scouts liked him very much, in every ration there was, among other things, a bar of chocolate. For a large-scale test of the combat capabilities

of special forces units, newly developed equipment and weapons, new means of communication, instructions and instructions for their combat use, in the fall of 1970, an experimental exercise was developed and conducted. The teachings of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General Sidorov Yakov Ilyich. The topic of the exercise was supervised by the topic approximately defined as follows: "Combat use of special forces for reconnaissance behind enemy lines in the interests of the High Command."

The exercise area covered a significant territory - from the Baltic to the Carpathians (along the front - up to 1000 km).

Troops from the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian military districts were used to designate various enemy targets. The exercise was preceded

by a lot of preparatory work: reconnaissance of landing sites for reconnaissance groups, placement of enemy targets and, above all, nuclear attack weapons, creation of an appropriate counterintelligence regime for active groups, ensuring security measures during flights and landing of paratroopers. The exercise made it possible to work out the issues of the location of special forces

units in the face of the threat of a nuclear attack, the preparation and landing of reconnaissance groups to a depth close to real, the actions of reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines to conduct reconnaissance of important objects, retargeting groups to new objects during the operation. One of the main issues worked out during the exercise was control at all levels using means of communication.

The experience of the exercise was brought to the headquarters of the military districts. Great help in the preparation and conduct of this exercise

we were given a deputy Major General Tereshchenko Mikhail Nikitovich, Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the command of military districts, groups of troops, officers of intelligence departments for the high and high-quality staffing of special forces with officers, sergeants and soldiers. The selection was ^{parts} personal. The guys were selected tall, physically strong, with an average, and officers with a higher education. As in the American army, in our special forces, full-time military ranks were one step higher compared to other troops. The official military rank of the group commander was captain, the company commander was major, etc. This made it possible to keep trained specialist officers in units for a long time.

The principle of studying foreign languages by soldiers, sergeants and officers has been preserved and, perhaps, toughened. Officers who graduated from special higher schools came to units already with knowledge of foreign languages, with diplomas of translators, and in units either maintained knowledge at the level achieved at the school, or improved the language further. Language laboratories with a full set of equipment were sent to all units from the Center for the study of foreign languages. The load on officers in special forces units was enormous, requiring daily preparation for the upcoming classes and great physical endurance, especially

during the exercises. In military districts, groups of troops, and armies, special forces units stood out in all respects. The command and other officers respectfully looked at the healthy, fit, handsome soldiers of the special forces,

who were preparing to perform responsible tasks behind enemy lines. Several training films were shot to show to the young recruits, who arrive annually in the unit, about the actions of scouts behind enemy lines. The films were made by a patriot of our special service, always cheerful and perky Colonel Shchelokov Ivan Nikolaevich.

Many officers who served in special forces units or in our direction of the GRU General Staff for a long time were subsequently appointed with promotion, some of them received the high ranks of colonels and generals. General ranks were awarded

former special forces: Gelfer, Sredny, Kartashov, Gredasov, Shevtsov, Fadeev, Lutsev. Was

everything and always safe in the special forces units? No. There were facts of violation of military discipline, incidents with fatal outcomes, especially during periods of airborne training and major exercises with practical landing. It was not always possible to completely avoid these unpleasant incidents.

Chapter

20 Business trip to Cuba

In 1964, a delegation of the Main Intelligence Directorate consisting of three people - Colonels Meshcheryakova V.I., Modebadze V.K., Golitsyn P.A. - was sent to Cuba to assist the leadership of the Cuban armed forces in organizing intelligence and creating reconnaissance units and subunits. The delegation was headed by Colonel Valentin Ivanovich Meshcheryakov (later Colonel General, Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff), Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Modebadze, specialist in radio and electronic intelligence (later became a Major General and served as Deputy Head of the Operational Technical Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff), and I was heading as a specialist in operational intelligence and, above all, as well-versed in special intelligence. A

revolutionary upsurge continued in Cuba, an agrarian reform was carried out that eliminated the system of latifundia, the property of American companies and the local bourgeoisie was nationalized, all means of production became the property of the people, the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community provided Cuba with comprehensive assistance. The United States organized an economic blockade around Cuba. The so-called "Cuban crisis" began to decline, which led to a dangerous confrontation between the armed forces of the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact countries. The Cubans defeated a counter-revolutionary armed group that landed on the coast in the Playa Giron area. The Cuban armed forces were in their infancy, including military intelligence.

From the plane, when approaching Cuba, an unforgettable picture of beauty opens up. Many islands in the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the island of Cuba. The striking blueness of the Caribbean. And the island itself! This is a land with a red tint, on which palm families are scattered here and there, clearly visible from the plane, green

forests and shrubs of the coast are bordered by the turquoise of the sea. Like white candles, the high-rise blocks of Havana rise up.

Already on the ladder of the plane you feel how hot humid air covers the whole body. It becomes stuffy, hard to breathe.

We were met at the airfield by the head of intelligence of the Cuban army, Major (commandant) Pedro Luis, a young man of about 35, small in stature, with a friendly smile. After a short hello and a cup of coffee, we rushed at high speed in open-top cars to Havana. We were placed in a separate mansion on a hillside, from which the Cuban capital was clearly visible.

The next day we introduced ourselves to the Chief of the General Staff, and in the presence of the Chief of Intelligence, a substantive conversation began. The Chief of the General Staff spoke in general terms about the constant threat to Cuba from the United States, about the difficulties in the economy due to the American blockade, about the problems of intelligence, about the desirability of supplying intelligence equipment and weapons to the armed

forces. Then, in the Intelligence Directorate, the head of intelligence, Pedro Lune, told us in more detail about the actual Cuban intelligence, about the great difficulties due to the lack of experience in its conduct, intelligence means, especially means of radio and electronic, air, special intelligence and the unpreparedness of intelligence officers. This conversation was attended by our senior adviser for intelligence in Cuba, Fyodor Afanasevich Dremov. The Cubans had enough enthusiasm and desire to organize

reconnaissance, but there was almost no experience in conducting it, equipment and trained personnel. We asked Pedro Luis and our adviser Dremov to reconsider what kind of help they would like to receive from the Soviet Union in the area of intelligence and in a few days to return to the conversation on all the exciting problems.

Then, for two days, we gave lectures to officers of the General Staff on the organization and conduct of intelligence in relation to the conditions of Cuban reality. We did not have written texts, we simply presented the material with the help of translators.

IN AND. Meshcheryakov talked about the general principles of organizing intelligence, focusing on the features of covert methods of conducting intelligence. VC. Modebadze devoted his speeches to the organization and conduct of radio and electronic intelligence, emphasizing the favorable conditions for its conduct from the territory of Cuba, located in close proximity to a potential enemy. I mainly touched on the organization and conduct of special intelligence, the need to create special forces in the face of a constant threat to Cuba to act if necessary on land and at sea. Briefly spoke about the principles of sea and air reconnaissance. Raul Castro attended all our lectures, and V.I.

Meshcheryakova - Minister of State Security. He personally asked me to speak to the state security workers with my report on special intelligence. Later we specified the terms, and I spoke at the Ministry of State Security. Our main work in Cuba was devoted to resolving issues with direct executors from the intelligence department and units. Meshcheryakov

worked with his Cuban colleagues, Modebadze with his colleagues, and I with mine.

With an intelligence officer, we went to the suburbs of Havana, where a special forces unit was supposed to be deployed. In the empty military camp there were about five officers and the same number of soldiers. Rifles, grenades with inserted fuses were lying in disorder in the corner, soldiers' beds were right there. I talked with the officers in a relaxed atmosphere and we started the practical work. We have developed two options for staffing: special forces companies and battalions, determined the strength and combat composition of reconnaissance groups, their weapons and equipment, and determined approximately places for storing weapons and property. The Cuban comrades took part in the work with such enthusiasm that one could envy their enthusiasm. I immediately drew up for them an approximate training program for officers and soldiers of special forces units, and we parted already as good friends. Throughout our joint activity, the rifles stood in a pyramid

cleaned, the beds neatly made, and everything was in order.

With a naval intelligence officer and Colonel F.A. Dremov, we went to the resort town of Varadero on the seashore, 40–45 km from Havana. There it was supposed to deploy a naval detachment of scouts - combat swimmers. The atmosphere in Varadero was similar to what we saw in Havana. Digressing from the topic of practical matters, I would like to say in general terms about the resort of Varadero.

Before the revolution, it was a comfortable place filled with American tourists. Now it is almost empty. Wonderful and warm sea. At 700–800 meters from the shore, the water reached only to the waist (similar to our Riga seaside), the water temperature in July reached 35–40 °. At the request of Dremov and Pedro Luis, I worked for several days to refine the real intelligence plan of the Cuban armed forces. He proposed to make some adjustments to the developed plan. To sharply distinguish between intelligence in peacetime and

wartime. On the one hand, with a constantly existing threat, strong intelligence was needed, and on the other hand, it was necessary to save the available resources of equipment, technology, fuel, and take into account the human factor. Our proposals were accepted, thanks to them a significant amount of intelligence resources was saved. Our proposals were also accepted, specifying the procedure for conducting reconnaissance at sea. Fedor Afanasyevich Dremov, my neighbor in Moscow, recalled our work in Cuba during our meetings and thanked us for the assistance rendered.

In the evenings we met at our residence, V.I. Meshcheryakov about the work done, consulted on emerging problems. From the reports it was assumed that radio and electronic intelligence at that time looked better than other types. At the end of our work, we again met with the Chief of the General Staff, reported to him on what had

been done, and together drew up a draft application for reconnaissance equipment, which we sent through the usual channels of communication to Moscow to the General Staff. In order to get acquainted with the country, Pedro Luis organized a trip for us to Playa Giron, where the Cubans defeated the counter-revolutionaries that had landed.

There we were shown a crocodile nursery and an Indian village. Pedro Luis accompanied us on this trip.

I remember this episode. On our way back to Havana, we were caught on the highway by a tropical downpour. It was impossible to go - no visibility, the rain stopped, the fog began to rise - again there was no visibility, and only after some time the fog dissipated, the sun shone, we moved on. It turns out that at this time there is a rainy season and this phenomenon is common. Vladimir Konstantinovich Modebadze endured the Cuban heat very hard: sometimes we were worried about his condition, and he stayed at home. Arriving in

Moscow, we reported to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff on the results of the trip and the work done, then we wrote a written report, and the relevant authorities began to implement the requests of the Cuban comrades.

By decision of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, officers of our direction assisted in the creation of special forces units in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries and some friendly developing countries. I remember that at the request of King Zahir Shah, at the end of the 60s, our officers from special forces units were sent to Afghanistan to assist in the formation of special forces, to develop training and education programs for these units. Major Kudryavtsev, who had experience in serving in special forces units, was sent there as a senior specialist adviser.

The special forces units of our Armed Forces were directly involved in the fighting in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They were used mainly for reconnaissance and searching for the whereabouts of anti-government military formations, determining their numbers and weapons. The effectiveness of reconnaissance by the forces of special forces units was higher compared to other types of ground reconnaissance.

Chapter

21 Intelligence in the military district

A military district is a territorial combined-arms association of units, formations, military schools and various local military establishments. The Baltic Military District, where I was

appointed head of intelligence in October 1970, territorially united the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and the Kaliningrad region. The troops of the district covered our country from the north-western direction.

The armed forces of NATO and neutral Sweden were deployed in the North European theater of operations (according to NATO classification). NATO troops included formations and units of Norway, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany (stationed in the land of Schleswig Holstein). They included: three divisions, four separate brigades, two separate regiments, more than 2000 field artillery guns and mortars, including about 100 nuclear artillery guns, more than 100 anti-aircraft guided missile launchers (Nike Hercules and Hawk) , more than 100 tanks, 600-650 launchers of anti-tank guided missiles, more than 300 aircraft (Air Force, Navy, Air Defense), more than 300 warships and boats.

At the North European theater of operations, 40 military and civil airfields were equipped and operated with a possible capacity of more than 700 aircraft. The highest density of the airfield network was on the territory of Schleswig-Holstein and the Jutland Peninsula, where 15 airfields were equipped with 350 shelters for aircraft, i.e. they provided shelter for 100% of the aircraft based here in peacetime. The theater of operations was also equipped with 10

military
naval bases, more than 10 fleet bases, 32 ports.

To manage the joint armed forces, the NATO High Command of the Joint Armed Forces in the North European Theater of Operations was created with headquarters in Kolsos, in the Oslo region. Allied Commands of NATO were located: in Northern

Norway with headquarters in Buda, in Southern Norway with headquarters in the Stavanger region and in the area of the Baltic Straits with headquarters in Karup (Denmark).

To ensure the control of the armed forces at the theater, modern communication systems of that time were deployed and functioned, including Ai-Shai, radio relay, and satellite.

The armed forces of the NATO countries in the theater of operations had stocks of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food, military equipment for 25-30 days of combat operations. The

mentioned grouping of NATO troops consisted of about 100 thousand people, and in the event of a complication of the situation, it could be doubled due to reserve formations.

The armed forces of the North European Theater of Operations closely cooperated with the combat-ready and combat-ready operational formation of the bloc's armed forces in the Atlantic - the NATO strike fleet (more than 100 warships and auxiliary vessels, up to 600 aircraft and helicopters of aircraft carrier aviation and aviation of the US Marine Corps and other allies) .

The operational and combat training of NATO troops was organized and carried out annually in accordance with the main provisions of the US and NATO strategy of "flexible response", aimed at solving the tasks of holding the strait zone and the territories of the northern states that were part of the NATO bloc, to ensure the combat capability to defeat groupings of troops countries of the Warsaw Pact in terms of the use of various means of destruction. The military-political course of Sweden was based on the

so-called "policy of armed neutrality" officially announced in 1834, which provided for the country's non-participation in military alliances in peacetime with the aim of political non-alignment with the warring parties in the event of a conflict in Europe, as well as armed defense of the national territory when a country is involved in a war. Despite the officially adopted neutrality, the general direction of the Swedish military-political course was pro-

Western. Sweden has developed various forms of military-political ties with NATO member states. The main areas of military cooperation with countries

NATO were the arms trade, the joint development of complex systems of weapons and military equipment, the exchange of modern technologies.

Sweden's main military exports were combat aircraft and spare parts for them, portable missile systems, anti-aircraft and field artillery guns, anti-tank grenade launchers, and off-road vehicles.

Sweden purchased electronic equipment, computers, ATGMs, missiles, combat helicopters, aviation and ship power plants from NATO countries.

The armed forces of Sweden numbered about 70 thousand people. (in the ground forces - about 45 thousand, in the Air Force - 13 thousand, in the Navy -

9-10 thousand people). Twenty-four training and mobilization regiments were armed with about 300 tanks, about 600 guns and mortars. From the invasion, Sweden was covered by five fortified areas with modern weapons. In

neutral Sweden, there was a strong air force, in 20 aviation squadrons there were about 400 combat aircraft, of which: attack squadrons - 6, aircraft - 120; air defense fighter squadrons - 11, aircraft - 220; reconnaissance squadrons - 3, aircraft - 60.

The navy had more than 50 warships and about 200 combat boats.

The NATO leadership considered Sweden, with its powerful armed forces, as a barrier that covered a significant part of the North European theater of operations from the east, and actively contributed to the consolidation of Sweden in pro-Western positions.

Against the troops of the Baltic Military District, the Baltic Fleet, reconnaissance was constantly conducted using electronic means deployed along the coast of Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, ship, air and space reconnaissance. A powerful intelligence center for NATO radio and electronic intelligence is deployed on about. Bornholm. The troops of the Baltic Military District and the naval personnel of the Baltic Fleet were under constant control of NATO intelligence.

Between Sweden and the NATO countries, intelligence information was exchanged about the Armed Forces of the USSR, and above all about the troops of the PribVO and the Baltic Fleet, and consultations were held periodically on military-political issues. The constant strengthening of the combat

power of the NATO armed forces, the adoption of new nuclear weapons, including on the southern flank of the North European theater of operations, forced the leadership of the Soviet armed forces to involve the intelligence agencies of the border military districts for reconnaissance. The intelligence of the border military districts, including our Baltic, by the beginning of the seventies acquired a certain organizational structure and had forces at its disposal to ensure the solution of intelligence

tasks.

The organization and conduct of intelligence in the Baltic Military District had its own specific features. Firstly, the district did not have land borders with neighboring countries that were part of the NATO bloc. The territory of the district and neighboring countries were separated by the Baltic Sea. Secondly, the operational mission of the troops of the district

was also unusual: the troops of the district, transformed into a front, could, after completing the march, be brought into battle in the Primorsky operational direction, and in the event of a sudden outbreak of war and an attempt by NATO troops to land on the Baltic coast, they could carry out anti-amphibious defense. Therefore, reconnaissance had to be organized taking into account several options. Like other border districts, the Baltic Military District had a certain set of reconnaissance forces and equipment. All types of military intelligence were represented

in the district, except for space intelligence, which required their non-standard use, taking into account the characteristics of the coastal direction.

The starting documents for the organization of reconnaissance were the directive requirements of the General Staff and the instructions of the leadership of the district troops (commander and chief of staff). The main task of

reconnaissance was to prevent a sudden enemy attack on the USSR, including the troops of the district, to determine the beginning of his preparation for aggression, to determine the intention and

the intention to use primarily weapons of mass destruction. The main attention was paid to the grouping of NATO troops stationed in Schleswig-Holstein, on the Jutland Peninsula, the naval grouping in the Baltic Sea and the strait zone.

The intelligence of the district was entrusted with the tasks of tracking the means of nuclear attack in Schleswig-Holstein, basing aviation in the south of Norway, in Denmark, the northern part of the Federal Republic of Germany, and deploying air defense systems on the southern flank of the North European

theater of operations. Reconnaissance of means of command and control of troops and weapons was carried out. We were forced to allocate part of the forces and means to monitor the actions of the NATO reconnaissance forces, which monitored the activities of the district troops from land, sea and air. Seven NATO electronic intelligence posts were deployed along the southern coast of the Scandinavian countries and on the island of Bornholm. Reconnaissance aircraft rose from the Mildenholm air base and, flying along the coast of the Soviet Baltic, monitored the troops of the district. NATO electronic intelligence ships of the Trave type constantly cruised along the sea coast, which, using equipment and visual aids, monitored the activities of our Baltic Fleet and the work of ports. Such ships stood for days in front of Baltiysk, Liepaja, Palanga, Tallinn and other places.

The intelligence of the district, if possible, was interested in the progress of the exercises and maneuvers conducted by the NATO command and the national commands in the strait zone, in Denmark and the northern part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Of course, we have always been interested in work on additional operational equipment of the theater area. Particular attention was paid to information on the construction of shelters for military aviation, the creation of barriers on the sea coast, and the equipment of command posts. The

key to successful reconnaissance lay in its thoughtful organization, the development of a plan and the most appropriate distribution of forces and means for tasks and specific objects. In the district, we developed a reconnaissance plan for the year, which, as the situation changed, was either changed, and most often refined.

All the heads of departments and services of the intelligence department participated in the development of the plan; if necessary, intelligence officers were involved from the headquarters of the missile forces and artillery, the air army, the chemical service, etc.

Having received the order, the reconnaissance units conducted reconnaissance based on their capabilities and assigned

tasks. When planning intelligence in the district, given its coastal position, great importance was attached to the organization of interaction with the intelligence of the Baltic Fleet, the border troops, the intelligence of the air defense forces, the neighboring Leningrad Military District and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Usually, intelligence efforts were coordinated in terms of tasks, objects, time, and the exchange of information documents was envisaged. During the planning period, as well as during the year, when reconnaissance was already underway, we coordinated some issues of interaction over closed telephones with the intelligence chiefs of the Baltic Fleet, Rear Admiral Rumyantsev Alexander Alexandrovich, the Leningrad Military District, Major General Anatoly Nikitovich Piyaltsev, GSVG - General Major Onusaitis Yuri Iosifovich. Such exchanges of views were especially useful during the concentration of NATO troops for exercises and maneuvers, when their command posts and communication centers left their permanent deployment points.

After setting tasks for conducting reconnaissance, we, officers of the intelligence department, at the direction of the chief of staff of the district or on our own initiative, went to intelligence agencies and units to provide assistance in organizing intelligence on the spot. This assistance was of a multifaceted nature: the correct choice of the method of performing a reconnaissance mission, the additional supply of reconnaissance equipment and equipment, sending faulty equipment for repair, the alignment of available forces for a more effective solution of tasks, the adoption of the optimal decision in the formation of combat crews at reconnaissance posts, radio camouflage measures, development of documents (plans, reports, summaries, certificates, accounting of received intelligence information, etc.). I, as the chief of intelligence of the district, with the permission of the chief of staff, went to the units that were solving the most difficult tasks at the moment.

Our units and subunits were scattered throughout the territory of the Baltic republics and the Kaliningrad region, sometimes deployed in company, platoon, and in some cases separate reconnaissance posts (especially in parts of radio and electronic intelligence), so our help was often needed on place (in agreement with the local authorities of the equipment of new positions for the placement of equipment, antenna fields, in solving housing issues for officers, allocating food from local funds, cultural provision and other issues). The organization of uninterrupted communication with the reconnaissance units and subunits that carried out reconnaissance and their

management, the organization of the reception of intelligence information from them was our constant, one might even say, daily concern. Thanks to the help of the chief of the communications troops of the district, Major General Zaitsev, and later Colonel Kot, the work of the head of the communications department of the intelligence department, Colonel Trestsov, we were able to solve this difficult task for that time. To obtain intelligence, wire, radio and radio relay communications were used.

The final part of the organization and conduct of intelligence was the collection, recording, analysis and processing of intelligence information, a report to their commander of the district troops, the chief of staff, a member of the Military Council, to the Main Intelligence Directorate, informing subordinate units, neighboring districts and the Baltic Fleet.

The information department of the intelligence department, headed by a tireless worker, a great erudite who knew the armed forces of the NATO bloc well, Lyutikov Viktor Kuzmich, seemed to work around the clock. In this small department, everything was clearly distributed: one of the officers kept records of the weapons of mass destruction of NATO troops, kept maps of the deployment of these weapons, compiled certificates, formulated a section in the reconnaissance report on weapons of mass destruction; another officer kept records and was responsible for the preparation of documents on the Air Force and air defense systems; the third was responsible for the ground forces, etc.; the head of the department or senior officer prepared a daily intelligence report daily; someone went to the troops for training. Only the distribution of duties between the officers of the information department made clear it difficult to cope with

processing of incoming intelligence information, their study, analysis, generalization. The work of collecting and processing intelligence information was daily reduced to, having received it from various sources, turning it into material for a report to the command of the district and to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. The senior officer of the department, Colonel Avramenko, worked hard in this direction.

The work of the officers of the information department and the department of radio and radio intelligence in obtaining data for recording and analyzing the electronic situation in the North European Theater was large and laborious. Such data were required for the district headquarters and the General Staff. Colonels Pidlasy, Avramenko, Lieutenant Colonel Tarkinsky worked almost constantly on this. Especially

tense for the officers of the information department and the entire intelligence department were periods when large-scale exercises or maneuvers were carried out in the NATO armed forces, which had to be monitored and reported on their progress to the command of the district, to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, to inform neighboring districts, the Baltic Fleet, border guards.

Based on the results of reconnaissance of NATO exercises, the command posts of radio and radio intelligence units, as well as our intelligence department, prepared final certificates and reports to the district command

and to the GRU General Staff. Every day the officers of the information department prepared an information review of the radio and press of the capitalist states. The information review was reported in the form of a certificate to the district command (commander, his deputies, chief of staff, member of the Military Council, commander of missile forces and

artillery). At the request and inquiries of the chiefs of departments of the district headquarters, heads of military branches and services, the information department prepared for them reference material on a variety of issues related to foreign armies (on tanks, guns, communications, mobilization capabilities, rear service,

etc.). For the needs of the district and, above all, the command, it was constantly required to have extensive reference material in the intelligence department, that is, a certain data bank. This bank was created

in the form of recording information in the journals of officers of the information department on various sections of foreign armies (nuclear weapons, groupings of troops - ground, air force, navy, air defense, operational equipment of the theater, controls, etc.). For memory, the material was accumulated and stored in the counting and perforation laboratory, headed by Major Gromov. In the intelligence department, maps were constantly maintained and updated with the situation on the deployment and possible deployment of NATO troops in case of war, the maps could be reported to the district command at any time.

Reports and reports to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General headquarters were presented according to the timesheet of urgent reports.

In the order of interaction and mutual information, our monthly intelligence reports were sent to the border guards, to the intelligence department of the Leningrad Military District, the GSVG, and the Baltic Fleet. We also received information documents from them.

Chapter

22 Intelligence in the military district

Another major area of work for officers of the intelligence department of the district was the organization of combat training in reconnaissance units, reconnaissance training of troops and staffs, and participation in the operational training of the highest officer level of the military district.

The general directions of the reconnaissance training of troops and staffs and the combat training of reconnaissance units were determined by the directive of the commander of the district troops. And the specific features of the training of specialists of each type of intelligence were reflected in separate documents of the headquarters or intelligence department. The combat training of reconnaissance pilots and the training of reconnaissance units of special forces or specialists in radio and radio engineering, military intelligence were in no way similar to each other. Therefore, officers and heads of intelligence departments developed separate instructions for them, guided by their programs and directives from the Main Intelligence Directorate. The main thing that was taken into account when planning combat training in reconnaissance units was its focus on improving the quality of specialists and on ensuring more effective reconnaissance. For example, in the aviation reconnaissance regiment, emphasis was placed on training pilots to detect nuclear attack weapons on the ground, determining their coordinates with maximum accuracy, and radio intelligence specialists were taught more accurate direction finding of identified enemy radio equipment, etc. All reconnaissance units received new reconnaissance radio systems - and electronic intelligence (from district to division), new reconnaissance vehicles for reconnaissance battalions of divisions, more advanced aircraft, including unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance devices and weapons for special forces. All this had to be studied and used for reconnaissance. In the units, training and mastering of new equipment was organized, we provided all possible assistance to the units. Our help was

in the organization of demonstration classes on the principles of using new means, placing them in the operational formation of troops, battle formations, collecting intelligence, transferring them to command, according to new technical models. With the receipt of equipment, combat crews, unit structures were refined, new specialists appeared, it was necessary to re-equip some positions from which reconnaissance was carried out, additional equipment of command posts, and in some cases some redeployment of units. The educational and material base was also replenished. The unit commanders proved themselves to be good organizers of combat training: special Colonel Mashkovsky forces - Colonel Boryakov N.V., radio intelligence - B.V. and Ostrakh I.B., commander of the reconnaissance battalion of a tank division, lieutenant colonel Dorogov and others. For several years in a row, according to the Moscow and district commissions, they received excellent marks in combat and political

training part of the special forces under the command of Colonel

Boryakova N.V., reconnaissance battalion under the command of an army lieutenant colonel Dorogova, reconnaissance artillery battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kuts.

By order of the Main Intelligence Directorate, the head of the district intelligence had to personally conduct a special tactical exercise with each part of the district subordination, at the end of the year - a comprehensive intelligence exercise with the district intelligence units. The chief of staff or the chief of intelligence of the army is an exercise with reconnaissance units of army subordination, in a division - divisional reconnaissance.

Conducting reconnaissance exercises required time, work on their preparation, and expenditure of materiel. The exercise began, as a rule, with the raising of a unit or several units on alert, then going to the areas of concentration, conducting reconnaissance in accordance with the prepared instruction.

When conducting exercises with units of radio and electronic intelligence, it was necessary to take into account their involvement in conducting real intelligence. It was especially difficult to solve real and training tasks during the exercise when moving units to new positions. When organizing an exercise with a part of the special forces and aviation units of the district and the army, a lot of

forces to mark the enemy, etc., but the exercises were carried out despite the difficulties. The reconnaissance exercises with reconnaissance of the 11th Guards were well and comprehensively prepared. army. Army intelligence chief Colonel Dolgov I.A. and the head of intelligence of the missile forces and artillery of the district, Lieutenant Colonel Holokholenko, have always been the main developers and organizers of these exercises. To work out questions during military intelligence exercises, we used the Volunteer Training Center, where the actions of units in the reconnaissance patrol, reconnaissance detachment, radio intelligence, engineering units were deployed. were worked out, radiation and chemical intelligence The forces of the Baltic Fleet, border

guards, units of the country's air defense forces were involved in complex reconnaissance, carried out against the backdrop of a front-line operation. This made it possible to work out the issues of interaction. In 1974, under the leadership of the Chief

of the General Staff, at that time General of the Army V.G. Kulikov, a command-staff exercise on reconnaissance and electronic warfare was conducted, in which our Baltic Military District also participated (the code name for the exercise was Electron). During the exercise, we were once again convinced of the enormous capabilities of the NATO armed forces in command and control of troops and weapons, the presence of a large number of electronic means for this, without reconnaissance and suppression of which it is difficult to count on victory. The exercise showed us our weaknesses in studying the radio-electronic situation in the theater and insufficiently clear interaction with units and the district EW service.

After this exercise, together with the officers of the department of radio and radio intelligence V.M. Pidlasym and P.I. Tartinsky collected the necessary materials and developed a certificate on the electronic situation on the SET in relation to the needs of the district. A certain interest arose in our certificate - we sent it to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, the EW Service of the General Staff, the Academy of the General Staff, to the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet, and in our district, when conducting reconnaissance exercises, we began to involve EW units and the EW

service in them. In the autumn of 1975, on the instructions of the General Staff, we in the district prepared and conducted a demonstration exercise in co

the use of a special forces unit in a front-line offensive operation. They showed the exercise to the heads of intelligence and the heads of special intelligence departments of the military districts. During the exercise, they demonstrated the preparation of reconnaissance groups for dropping behind enemy lines, the transfer of groups across the front line, dropping by parachute, landing from the sea using the watercraft of the Baltic Fleet, control of groups during a front-line operation, redirecting them to perform new tasks, including moments when they were still in the air or at sea. I was the leader of this exercise, and the commander of the special forces unit, Colonel Boryakov, was the main executor of all the above activities. The officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff also helped us to prepare the exercise, especially in terms of providing radio equipment.

Along with the officers of the operational management, our officers took part in the preparation and conduct of command-staff and military exercises, working out documents related to the enemy and the organization of intelligence. At the training camp with the leadership of the district, we gave lectures and conducted group exercises on the organization, armament, equipment, tactics and operational art of foreign armies, primarily the armies that are part of the NATO bloc, on the operational equipment of the Western and North-Western theaters of military operations, possible options unleashing a war, according to the views of the NATO leadership and the possible deployment of their troops in the pre-war period and with the outbreak of hostilities. Lectures and reports on this topic were always listened to with particular interest, we usually presented them with diagrams, photographs, filmstrips. At the ranges and training centers of the divisions, nuclear attack weapons of foreign armies and other military equipment made in the form of life-size models were demonstrated (Volunteer Training Center, Kaliningrad, Tallinn).

For such gatherings, we also prepared classes and lectures on the principles of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in a division, army, front, on the combat use of existing and incoming reconnaissance equipment. Together with the command and headquarters of the district, we were participants in command and staff exercises conducted by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Such events required maximum tension in the development of the command

decisions and reports to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief of the General Staff. Let's not pretend, we were all worried before such reports, but in different ways. One was worried, thinking about the matter, the other about himself personally, how to please the authorities. Let the officers reading these lines forgive me - there was such a thing. Here is an example. We reported to the Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko in Wünsdorf (GDR), where we were taken by plane. I, as head of intelligence, must report first. My neighbor, also the head of the department, swallows some pills and offers them to me: "It helps a lot, it calms me," I answered him: "I don't need it, I'm ready for the report." He told me: "What are you, the main thing is not a report, but to carry it through." I will not give the name of this officer, he achieved a very high military rank and a high position, I do not want to put him in an uncomfortable position. Reporting to Grechko was not difficult, he did not delve into the details, he wanted to see the main thing. If the main thing was normal, then the report passed quietly. The report of the chief of intelligence at operational and strategic exercises was the final stage in the work of the intelligence agencies and the entire staff of the intelligence

department. Maps were always prepared for the report with the grouping of the opposing enemy and the necessary calculations, a reconnaissance plan on the map and a textual one. The report usually included several points, set out in the following sequence: the general nature of the enemy's actions in front of the front and neighboring fronts (in front of the fleet), his grouping of weapons of mass destruction, air defense, air force, ground forces, fleet forces, the time of the start of the deployment of war (combat operations) and conclusions on the possible nature of enemy actions, the main tasks of reconnaissance and the planned measures for their

implementation.

Every minute, the chief of intelligence during the report must be able to extract the most important and necessary from the prepared material, quickly put his thought into an understandable form, and you must constantly make sure that thoughts go in a certain order necessary for the correct layout of the picture of preparation and the start of hostilities. Definitions should be short, precise and simple. Every minute the intelligence chief must remember that he is strictly limited in time. According to the experience of the exercises,

The front intelligence chief was usually given no more than 20–25 minutes

to report. When reporting to big bosses, there were also curious moments. I reported on the teachings to the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Kulikov. The report went well, but he wanted to clarify something about the interaction of our front with the Baltic Fleet and asked me: "Do you personally know the chief of intelligence of the fleet, give his rank and surname." I gave not only his title and surname, but also his Kaliningrad home address. Kulikov laughed and added: "I think that there is interaction between the front and the fleet," and that was the end of the matter. The head of intelligence of the Baltic Fleet at that time was Rear Admiral Rumyantsev Alexander Alexandrovich, a wonderful officer and comrade, with whom we really maintained good relations.

In the opinion of my comrades in intelligence service, in the 1970s, when General of the Army VG Kulikov was Chief of the General Staff, intelligence was on the rise. New reconnaissance equipment was developed and received in units, the General Staff conducted reconnaissance exercises in a number of border military districts and groups of forces (Baltic, Odessa Military District, GSVG), for the analysis of which the chiefs of staff and intelligence chiefs of military districts were invited. After the end of the exercises, the districts received generalized material on reconnaissance exercises. All this stimulated intelligence activities on the ground; commanders, chiefs of staff, members of military councils paid more attention to intelligence. In the post-war period, I

had to participate in many exercises, listen to reports from intelligence chiefs at various levels (divisions, armies, districts), take part in intelligence meetings, and as time went on, less and less attention was paid to the organization of intelligence, the development of intelligence lagged behind the improvement of weapons. The commanders of armies and districts, listening to intelligence chiefs during exercises, as a rule, limit themselves to listening to conclusions about the enemy and are not interested or have little interest, do not delve into the main issue of intelligence - its organization. While the military leaders who went through the school of war were always interested in

First of all, how intelligence is organized. I had to witness how the famous commander of the Great Patriotic War, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuikov, listened to the report of the intelligence chief of the Leningrad Military District, General V.P. Chuikov was meticulously interested in how intelligence of one kind or another was organized, what forces were involved, how interaction between individual intelligence agencies was organized, etc. Viktor Petrovich Khodakovsky, after an hour's report, left Chuikov wet with sweat. All the marshal's questions and his remarks were correct. Chuikov knew that to get intelligence in a war means to win the upcoming battle or battle.

Another example. Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, General of the Army M.V. Zakharov, at a divisional exercise from the 19th Motor Rifle Division, standing in a trench, listened for an hour and a half to the report of the division's intelligence chief on organizing intelligence in anticipation of an offensive. Zakharov was interested in how the system of observation of military, artillery, engineering NPs is organized, where and how search groups operate and why exactly at these points, where exactly behind enemy lines are reconnaissance groups sent and with what tasks, in what directions it is planned to send reconnaissance patrols and reconnaissance detachments, as well as where the reception of data from the reconnaissance aircraft, etc. is organized. I stood nearby and heard all this.

At the end of the conversation with the head of intelligence of the division, General of the Army M.V. Zakharov said something like this: "You, scouts, organize reconnaissance, get information about the enemy, and we, the commanders, will draw conclusions about the possible nature of his actions ourselves. Of course, you are not forbidden to draw conclusions either. The main thing is the organization of intelligence." Approximately the same about intelligence, he said at the analysis of this military exercise. Listening to the experience of commanders and commanders who went through the crucible of the Great Patriotic War would not hurt both modern commanders and us intelligence officers. The organization of intelligence is not a simple matter. At the end of one of the command and staff exercises, the headquarters of the PribVO, which played for the front, was summoned to Moscow to the General Staff. We were heard by the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V.G. Kulikov. As usual, I hung up two cards: with the grouping a

and an appendix to the exploration plan. Having reported on the enemy, I wanted to briefly report on the organization of intelligence. Kulikov interrupted me and offered to report on the organization of intelligence to the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tereshchenko Mikhail Nikitovich. Tereshchenko, using a well-developed map, reported well the main activities for organizing intelligence. Then Kulikov demanded a written reconnaissance plan. I put it on the table in front of him, he leafed through it for 5-10 minutes and was satisfied. Kulikov already knew that many commanders and chiefs pay little attention to the organization of intelligence, so we were "interrogated" with prejudice. And we passed the "exam" with flying colours. The reports were satisfied by the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V.G. Kulikov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate General of the Army P.I. Ivashutin, commander of the district troops, General of the

Army A.M. Mayorov. The graphic plan of reconnaissance or an annex to the plan on the map was usually developed and personally executed by the head of the 1st department of the intelligence department, Colonel Gulevich Petr Dmitrievich. He mapped the position of the enemy and the reconnaissance organs of the front with conventional symbols, but by the tone of the pencil lines, shading, and the size of the conventional symbols, he was able to convey to some extent the dynamics of the actions of the reconnaissance agencies, their swiftness, indicated by the lines of movement. His plan of reconnaissance on the map seemed to come to life. The flights of reconnaissance aircraft were clearly visible, the areas planned for photographing, like peas scattered on the map and tinted with different colors, reconnaissance groups of special forces, direction finders and radio stations with marked boundaries of their capabilities. All these conventional signs, as it were, acquired a living soul, scouts of various types of intelligence were visible behind them. With such a map, one could confidently

report to both the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. Another area of activity of the head of intelligence and intelligence officers that required daily attention was the maintenance of military discipline. The district command always met us halfway on issues of priority and the possibility of selecting officers, sergeants and soldiers for reconnaissance from among the resources coming into the district. Our units were

more disciplined than other troops. But this was achieved only by the daily work of a team of intelligence officers and units. The district intelligence chief, like any division commander, was responsible for the condition of his units on literally all issues. Yes, there were incidents of violations of discipline in our intelligence, omissions in the conduct of practical intelligence, blunders in the service of the troops, but we, like other commanders, tried to correct the shortcomings. Behind the numerous

current affairs, it was impossible to forget about the promotion of officers in the service, about conferring on them the next military ranks. The next military rank in the army is a good incentive for an officer, strengthening faith in his abilities, increasing responsibility to the command, comrades in the service.

I remember such a case. Before Victory Day 1975, some of our officers were to receive high military ranks of colonels. Previously, before the official extract from the order of the Minister of Defense, usually from Moscow they already inform who the title has been awarded. This "ringing" information did not include one of our fellow commanders. I had to spend a day to clarify the circumstances. Indeed, due to the negligence of some personnel officer, our comrade was omitted from the statement. But everything fell into place, he was also imprinted in this extract.

One of the most important factors contributing to the successful intelligence activity was the attention of the district command to our needs. During almost six years of service in the Baltic Military District, three commanders of the district troops changed during my time: General of the Army G.I. Khetagurov, Colonel General V.L. Govorov, Army General A.M. Mayorov; three chiefs of staff: Lieutenant General Ivanov M.T., Lieutenant General M.N. Tereshchenko, Lieutenant General Stychnsky. All of them not only demanded efficiency from intelligence, but also provided concrete assistance and support to the extent possible. Army General G.I. Khetagurov, for example, liked it when intelligence officers were more in the army and engaged in combat training of intelligence units. Shortly after arriving in the district, I held a group lesson at the training ground with intelligence officers (heads of intelligence of divisions and regiments). To the height where a group of officers stood, I drove up to

UAZike Khetagurov, got out of the car, I reported to him, he stood, listened to how the classes were going, got back into the car and left. In the evening, through the adjutant, he invited me to dinner in Kaliningrad. It turns out, as I was later told, he liked the fact that the chief of intelligence of the district personally conducts classes in the field, and does not direct from

the office. Army General A.M. Mayorov needed as much information as possible: about the events in the world, about the armed forces of the capitalist states, about the activities that are taking place in the NATO troops, etc. With information, he received the head of intelligence at any time.

Before the reports to the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, we were all worried. Mayorov once told me: "Nobody knows the situation and the NATO armed forces in our direction better than you, report more confidently." It was true. I used this recommendation in my future work. We, intelligence

officers, are grateful to the district chief of staff, Lieutenant General documents. ~~Mr. He personally refused intelligence reports~~ to the General Staff, made the necessary adjustments, and only after that we sent them. Mikhail Nikitovich Tereshchenko visited our reconnaissance units, saw their work and provided assistance in solving emerging problems that contributed to the improvement of intelligence. A few words about the problem of reconnaissance automation. A large amount of activities related to the work of organizing and conducting intelligence, processing the received intelligence, preparing them for

reports, the need to accumulate materials on foreign armies and their own intelligence forces and means put intelligence officers in a difficult position.

The end of the Cold War and the changes taking place in the world, including in the countries of Eastern Europe, do not at all mean that we should curtail intelligence activities. The US Congress allocates huge sums of money annually for intelligence. Therefore, the strengthening of military intelligence should become an objective necessity and be implemented without delay. In all cases

the combat readiness of intelligence organs and units must be several times higher than the combat readiness of the troops.

Everything is important: to organize reconnaissance, to obtain information, to analyze it, to draw conclusions on a given situation in the shortest possible time. Therefore, in intelligence, emphasis should now be placed on its technical equipment, automation of all its areas of activity. Automation would make it possible to ensure higher efficiency of command and control and, if necessary, to redirect certain types of intelligence to solve new tasks; automated development and correction of exploration plans with the issuance of formalized administrative documents; automatic input of intelligence information from producing intelligence agencies of all types of intelligence; intelligence processing in real time; a comprehensive assessment of the state and activities of the armed forces of neighboring states or coalitions, groupings of its troops, automatic communication of information to the command; modeling and forecasting the possible nature of the actions of coalition troops or neighboring states in the face of a sharp change in the situation; accumulation and processing of reference material on the capabilities of their own forces and reconnaissance assets, as well as on the armed forces of neighboring states (combat strength, grouping, availability of weapons of mass destruction, prospects for technical re-equipment, etc.).

Without solving the problem of technical equipment for reconnaissance and automation of its activities, it is impossible to successfully solve the tasks facing the armed forces.

Chapter

23 A Mission to Ethiopia

After finishing my service in the Baltic Military District and being appointed head of a department in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff in the fall of 1977, I was sent to Ethiopia as part of a delegation of generals and officers of the Ministry of Defense.

The task of our delegation was to get acquainted on the spot with the situation after the invasion of the Somali armed forces into Ethiopia and to assist the Ethiopian army in expelling the aggressor. Our delegation included generals and officers from various departments of the General Staff, from the types of armed forces and branches of service (operators, intelligence officers, aviators, tankmen, gunners, sailors, political workers, signalmen, air defense specialists, etc.).

On November 18, 1977, our delegation met with the Ethiopian leadership, headed by a member of the WWAC, Major Alisam Tedla. The meeting was attended by Minister of Defense Brigadier General Taye Telahun, Chief of the General Staff Colonel Haile George Mariam, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Captain Haile Wolde, Commander of the Land Forces Colonel Kafelen Ibza, Commander of the Air Force Colonel Fanta Belaite, Commander of the Navy Captain 1st Rank Tesfaye Berhanu. The Minister of Defense told us about the situation at the front and made a request for military assistance to

Ethiopia, including the supply of weapons, military equipment and equipment.

Then the work of the members of our delegation on services began. On November 22, 1977, I met with the head of intelligence of the Ethiopian army, Colonel Tsegaye, and the head of intelligence of the ground forces, Colonel Alemu. The meeting was attended by a Soviet adviser to the head of intelligence of the Ethiopian army, Lieutenant Colonel Yu.M. Novikov. Tsegaye outlined

the state of intelligence in the Ethiopian army, situation at the front and a request for intelligence assistance.

Military operations in Ethiopia can be roughly divided into three periods.

The first covers the period of time from the beginning of the invasion of Somali troops in the Ogaden (July 20, 1977) and their active advance deep into the territory in the Northern, Central and Southern directions. This period ended in September, when formations and units of the Ethiopian army stopped the advancing enemy on the approaches to Harar and Dire Dawa (on the Eastern Front), Ginir and Negelli (on the Southern Front). In the

second period (October 1977 - January 1978), the situation on the fronts stabilized, there was no particular activity in the actions of the warring parties. This period was characterized by the desire of both sides to strengthen their groupings of troops, to create conditions for delivering a decisive blow to the enemy.

However, in the period from 17 to 24 November 1977, the Somalis again attempted to organize an offensive in order to capture the city. Harar and Dire Dawa, but this time they failed to capture these cities.

The third period is the active hostilities of the Ethiopian and Cuban troops to deliver counterattacks south and north of Harar, in the Dire Dawa region, the capture of the city of Jijiga and the general offensive to liberate Ogaden (end of January - beginning of March 1978).

The Somalis, after the invasion of Ethiopia, occupied 90% of the territory of the Ogaden. Only two large administrative centers remained in the hands of the Ethiopians - Harar and Dire Dawa, the capture of which was the main goal of the Somali leadership.

By mid-January 1978, the grouping of Somali troops on the Eastern Front consisted of 24–25 motorized infantry and infantry brigades, about 120–130 tanks, more than 300 guns and mortars; on the Southern Front, the enemy had 5–6 motorized infantry and infantry brigades, up to 150 guns and mortars. The Ethiopian

troops, together with the Cuban units, included 26 brigades (pbr - 6, brigades of the people's militia - 13, proletarian brigades - 6, brigade - 1), of which five were guarding communications, about 230 tanks, 180 guns and mortars, 42 BM-21 launchers.

Thus, by mid-January 1978, the balance of power, especially in tanks, began to take shape in favor of the Ethiopian troops, the Cuban and Ethiopian Air Force consisted of more than 30 combat aircraft, which made it possible to begin the practical implementation of the plan to defeat the Somali troops in Ogaden. On the

morning of February 24, after intensive aviation and artillery preparation, the Ethiopian and Cuban units and subunits south of Harar went on the offensive. Together with the head of our delegation and Major General E.A. Aleshchenko were at the command post west of Harar and watched this battle. Several mines exploded near our command post. On February 2 and 3, an operation was carried out in the Dire Dawa region, as a result of which the Somalis were driven back from Dire Dawa by 40–45 km. From February 8 to 12, an operation was carried out to destroy the enemy north of Harar.

After three successive counterattacks on the Eastern Front, the enemy could no longer offer organized resistance. About 70% of Somali tanks, more than 80% of field artillery guns and mortars were destroyed and captured. On March 4, the general

offensive of the Ethiopian troops on the Eastern Front began, and by March 13, the territory of the Ogaden was completely cleared of the Somalis. By the beginning of the Somali aggression, there was essentially no military intelligence in the Ethiopian armed forces.

At the first stage of hostilities, in view of the absence of full-time reconnaissance subdivisions, reconnaissance was carried out mainly by means of observation by infantry subunits, people's militia and artillery subunits.

After conversations with the chief of intelligence of the Ethiopian army, Colonel Tsegaye and his officers, on December 16, I was received by the Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Taye Telakhun, to whom I reported the draft order "On measures to improve intelligence and strengthen the intelligence agencies of units and subunits", outlined our views on the organization of intelligence of all species in the current situation.

All our proposals were accepted by the minister, and on December 24, 1977, he signed the order, concrete work began on organizing intelligence, primarily on the Eastern Front. The order determined the tasks of intelligence, organizational measures for

artillery, intelligence units: military, the creation of radio, air, naval intelligence and the timing of the tasks.

During the fighting during January - February 1978, reconnaissance companies and platoons were formed in all divisions and 90% of the brigades of the Eastern Front. In Harare, cadres of military intelligence officers were trained (17 people for 1 brigade, 17 people, for 2 brsn, 17 people, for 94 brigade), 20 people were trained in Rore, and 30 people for reconnaissance divisions in Dire-Dawa. In total, 101 people were trained on the Eastern Front. With

the advent of trained scouts in the troops, a surveillance system began to be created, and during the offensive, reconnaissance patrols were sent to a depth of 5–6 km from the troops in front.

The attempts of our advisers to prepare and send reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines were not successful. Ethiopians, including officers, were afraid to go behind enemy lines.

Reconnaissance in force was carried out several times on the Eastern Front. In most cases, the results of reconnaissance in force were positive. It was possible to capture prisoners and obtain intelligence from them, allowing commanders to better know the opposing enemy. Successfully carried out reconnaissance in battle instilled confidence in their strength.

During the operation to liberate Ogaden, strong reconnaissance detachments were sent to conduct reconnaissance and capture important objects. For example, with the exit of the 8th Infantry Division to the Segag area, a detachment consisting of two mechanized battalions was sent from it to reconnoiter the Segag-Birkul-Denan route and capture the city of Denan. The length of the route is 180 km. From the 3 brigade of Cubans - a detachment consisting of a tank and infantry battalions, an artillery division of the BM. The task was set to reconnoiter the Dagabur-Kebri-Dehar route, to capture the city of Kabri-Dehar. The length of the route is 200 km. Detachments ranging from a company to a battalion were also sent from other units of the Eastern and Southern fronts. Given the poor training and insufficient equipment of regular reconnaissance units, the expulsion of these detachments

fully justified itself. At the first stage of hostilities, artillery reconnaissance was carried out passively: there were no trained artillery reconnaissance

there were enough surveillance devices. With the receipt of artillery systems from the Soviet Union, personnel at the front and in training centers received accelerated reconnaissance training under the guidance of Soviet specialists, which contributed to the improvement of artillery reconnaissance. During the operation north and south of Harar, north and northeast of Dire Dawa, from 24 to 30 artillery observation posts and posts were deployed in each of these directions, and during the general offensive to liberate Ogaden, 54 observation posts and

post.

By the beginning of February 1978, a sound reconnaissance battery was formed on the Eastern Front (6 sound reconnaissance posts in the battery). With the commissioning of the battery, the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the enemy's firing batteries increased significantly.

During the fighting on the Eastern Front, there were several attempts to use helicopters and light transport aircraft as reconnaissance spotters. However, the lack of experience in interaction between artillery and aviation, reliable radio communications, the absence of a single coded map and control signals did not allow positive results to be obtained.

Air reconnaissance was one of the main types, allowing to illuminate the depth of the enemy.

The main efforts of aerial reconnaissance were aimed at revealing the areas of location of the main groupings of ground and tank forces, enemy reserves, artillery firing positions in the directions: Harar-Fin; Babile-Dela-Medo-Segag-Danan; Kore Jijiga-Hargeisa; Jijiga-Dagabur-Gabrpdahar; Arabi Jijiga; Dire-Dawa-Aisha, as well as the basing of Somali aviation and air defense systems at the airfields of Hargeisa, Burao, Berbera.

Until December 1977, aerial reconnaissance was carried out by F-5 and Canberra aircraft, and army aircraft and helicopters (up to 12-15 units) were used to reconnoiter the enemy in the nearest tactical depth without overflying the front line, which did not give the desired effect. In December, Soviet reconnaissance

specialists, instructor pilots, trained Cuban reconnaissance pilots and 2 MiG-21 reconnaissance aircraft arrived in Ethiopia, as well as

set equipment by darkrooms with Soviet

maintenance personnel. All this immediately made it possible to organize aerial reconnaissance in a new

way. During the three months of hostilities, 120 sorties were made for aerial reconnaissance, of which 67 sorties were for aerial photography. In especially tense days of the war, reconnaissance pilots made 4-6 sorties. I remember very well how Lieutenant General Grigory Ustinovich Dolnikov and I worked out the first map with a plan for aerial reconnaissance flights, including the planned areas for photographing. According to the oral questioning of the crews and the results of the decoding of aerial reconnaissance materials, a total of 136 main objects were uncovered: BM-3 batteries, PA-15 batteries, ZA-1 batteries, 6 mortar batteries, aviation at airfields - 1, concentrations of troops at railway stations - 3, concentrations of troops and military equipment in the field - 34, areas of defensive structures - 13, ammunition depots - 8, other objects - 14. 12, anti-aircraft installations - 8, special vehicles - 230, command posts - 3. A total of 147 aerial photographs were taken. In critical periods, aerial reconnaissance tasks were set by the head of our military delegation, the Minister of Defense, and the commander of the Ethiopian Air Force. When reconnaissance tasks were set by high officials, they were carried out quickly, and the results of reconnaissance were reported in the shortest possible time. However, in general, the leadership of aerial reconnaissance was carried out poorly. The General Staff, as a rule, did not set tasks for aerial reconnaissance, did not demand the implementation of measures provided for by reconnaissance plans. The Air

Force Headquarters informed the General Staff about the information obtained by aerial reconnaissance irregularly, and the headquarters of the Eastern Front - with great delay. There was no close interaction between the reconnaissance of the Eastern Front and air reconnaissance. There was a tendency to provide intelligence information primarily to their troops: Cuban pilots sought to solve reconnaissance missions in

interests primarily of the Cuban troops, and the Ethiopian pilots - in the interests of the Ethiopian

troops. Reconnaissance pilots, as well as decipherers, experienced difficulties in processing the results of aerial reconnaissance, since the Somalis skillfully carried out camouflage of troops and military equipment, all movements of units and subunits, as a rule, were carried out at night. For example, anti-aircraft guns were disguised under trees, fitting into their crowns, tanks were faked under bushes, trenches were laid out by the surrounding vegetation, command posts, communication centers, individual radio stations and other control facilities were especially carefully masked. By the beginning of hostilities, radio intelligence was

represented only by the radio intelligence center located in Addis Ababa, there were no radio intelligence units in the fronts, divisions.

With the arrival of radio intelligence equipment from the Soviet Union in November 1977, a company of radio interception and direction finding was formed, which was transferred to the Eastern Front and deployed to work in positions in the Harar region.

In January 1978, a non-standard reception center was deployed at the headquarters of the Eastern Front, and at the headquarters of divisions 1-2 reception reconnaissance posts. By the time of the operations to liberate Ogaden, the troops of the Eastern Front had 15-20 radio interception reconnaissance posts and two direction-finding posts working around the clock. Radio reconnaissance was carried out in favorable conditions, since the Somalis violated radio discipline throughout the hostilities. Almost all commands, orders, instructions to the troops were given over the radio in plain text. Applications for ammunition, fuel, food were reported in plain text, routes of possible withdrawal were reported, an assessment of the actions of the opposing enemy, etc.

Radio intelligence was able to reveal the main groupings of enemy ground and armored forces operating against Vostochny.

front, numbering of troops, rearrangements.

Radio reconnaissance determined the time and direction of the withdrawal of enemy troops south of Harar, in the area of the lane. Marda, withdrawal of troops to

the territory of Somalia along the routes: Marda - Jijiga - Hargeisa; Babili - Gakho - Au-Kalaf; Midagolla - Fik - Danan, as well as the planned defense lines in front of the Somali-Ethiopian border.

Radio intelligence was able to intercept a message on the radio about the decision of the Somali leadership to withdraw troops from the Ogaden. However, in view of

the poor training of the direction finder operators, the direction finding of the working radio stations of the enemy was not carried out, but only radio interception was carried out. At the headquarters of

the divisions, the radio intelligence company, the headquarters of the front, no one really led the radio intelligence, no purposeful tasks were assigned to the posts for intelligence, there was no person in the front headquarters for radio intelligence, for processing the received material, its analysis and report to the command. Radio intelligence materials were usually reported to the command in the form of messages received directly from the air. Agency intelligence. Before the start of the armed

conflict, the Ethiopians failed to create an intelligence network on the territory of Somalia, so intelligence was in a difficult position and had to be organized during the war. Undercover reconnaissance in the divisions and the front was carried out by march

agents drawn from among the local residents and trained in a very short time. In many cases, the training of march agents consisted of a short briefing on the upcoming task, the route of movement, and how to complete the reconnaissance mission. March agents are, first of all, peasants who had a low education or completely illiterate people who did not have military training and did not know or knew little about military equipment and weapons.

March agents solved the tasks of reconnaissance of the concentration of troops in the depths of the enemy's defenses and on the roads leading to the front. They determined the locations of headquarters, warehouses, artillery firing positions, studied the morale of the Somali troops, the personnel of the FOZS formation, and the local population. Reconnaissance methods: observation, information through relatives and

acquaintances.

In the absence of radio communications, intelligence information was reported after 1–5 days, i.e., after such a time as the agent needed to overcome the front, reach the object, reconnoiter it and return to its location.

Due to the poor training of the march agents, their intelligence was of poor quality, but the intelligence of the Eastern Front and divisions used their services during the war. The

level of planning and intelligence leadership was low. Intelligence in all military instances was either not planned at all, or it was done formally. The work went by itself. In the intelligence of the General Staff, front, divisions, branches of the armed forces, interaction between its individual types was not organized, each type of intelligence carried out some activities independently. There were no separate communication channels for transmitting orders for reconnaissance and collecting information, so the information passed slowly with long delays, and was reported to the command out of time.

On the urgent recommendation of Soviet advisers, the Ethiopian comrades were asked to plan reconnaissance, manage it, especially during hostilities, set tasks or refine them. To implement these proposals, Soviet advisers developed plans for reconnaissance of the General Staff for December 1977 and January 1978, a reconnaissance plan for the Eastern Front for operations conducted in February and March 1978. Plans were developed in accordance with the prevailing situation at the front.

The tactics of the Somali troops on the eastern front

1. Creation of a no man's land between the opposing sides with a depth of 5 to 15 km along the entire length of the front, which made it possible for the Somalis: to eliminate losses in manpower and military equipment from small arms, mortar and artillery fire; mislead the Ethiopian troops about the true outline of the front line and the location of the main groupings of troops; complicate the conditions for conducting reconnaissance by Ethiopian troops.

2. The use of mountainous terrain to shelter personnel. Somali troops, as a rule, located the main forces behind the reverse slopes of the heights, using the protective and camouflaging properties of the terrain.

3. Equipping temporary artillery and mortar firing positions in no man's land and using them at night to defeat Ethiopian troops, which made it possible to increase the depth of destruction. 4. The use in some sectors of the

front, especially in the Harar region, of nomadic mortar, artillery pieces and batteries. Shooting from nomadic guns and mortars was carried out according to previously reconnoitered objects and made it possible to more accurately hit targets and morally influence the enemy.

5. Using the great depth of the no-man's-land and the concealed disposition of their troops, the Somalis made extensive use of maneuver by forces and means along the front and in depth, creating superiority in forces in the chosen directions. 6. The use of

FOZS formations in the rear of the Ethiopian troops to seize road junctions, commit sabotage on communications, objects of the rear of the Ethiopian troops, and destroy communications. The actions of the FOZS formations forced the Ethiopian command to attract significant forces to protect communications and facilities that could be used at the front. 7. Active reconnaissance of all

types using full-time reconnaissance units of military reconnaissance, sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments from the Danab special forces brigade, FOZS formations and agents, attracted mainly from among local residents - Muslims of the front line.

The experience of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia showed that the invaluable assistance provided to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union was of decisive importance in achieving victory over the Somali aggressors. In a relatively short time, such a quantity of weapons, equipment and equipment was delivered that provided the equipment for the Ethiopian army and created a clear superiority in forces and means over the enemy.

Soviet generals and officers put a lot of work into the development of combat plans for the troops, using the basic principles of our operational art and tactics, constantly assisting the Ethiopian command in carrying out operations to encircle the main enemy groupings and destroy them, organize interaction and control. The following can be said about the work of our

delegation. Strict requirements were imposed on all of us, members of the delegation, generals and officers, we all worked in a front-line manner. Each of us went about his own business, the head of our delegation did not fetter our initiative, but, on the contrary, encouraged it. Periodically, we reported to him on the work done and planned further activities. Lieutenant General V.F. Mazirka and Colonel Solovyov dealt with operational issues, Lieutenant General G.U. Dolnikov - aviation, G.S. Lutovinov - tank troops, N.F. Aleshchenko - artillery, Mikhailov - the supply of equipment and weapons, I - intelligence. We all took part in the preparation and conduct of operations (reconnaissance, development of plans,

assistance to the Ethiopian comrades in organizing the battle, etc.). During combat operations, together with the head of the delegation, they were at the front, often in the battle formations of the units. I would especially like to say about the will, perseverance and titanic work done by the head of our Soviet military delegation. He was constantly in the hottest spots of a battle or operation, often directly in battle formations. For example, near Harar, the Cuban brigade stopped, referring to the minefields, the leader got into an armored personnel carrier and, bypassing the alleged minefield, led the brigade. Another example: during the operation to encircle the Somalis near Dire Dawa, the leader personally led the attack tank and motorized infantry group of the Ethiopian and Cuban troops around the Somali troops. He personally wrote reports on military operations on the Eastern Front to the Minister of Defense of the USSR. I remember that in Harare I laid out maps in front of him with the

situation at the front, and he wrote, sometimes asked me the numbers of the Somali units that were surrounded or destroyed. General N.F. and I Aleshchenko almost

were constantly near him at command posts and saw his leadership of the troops. The leader

sometimes sent each of us to some sector of the front to stop the advance of the Somalis. So it was on January 22, 1978, when the enemy threw all available forces to disrupt the offensive of the Ethiopian troops and capture Harar. He sent me with an Ethiopian scout captain Imam near Kombulchu, G.S. Lutovinov and N.F. Aleshchenko - to some other sectors of the front. Approaching the front with Captain Imam, we see how the

Ethiopian battalion abandons its position in the trenches and retreats in a panic, two tanks retreat with the battalion. Captain Imam, holding a machine gun over his head, shouts: "A Soviet general is with us, reinforcements are coming from behind, forward to the Somalis!" The battalion began to stop, the tanks went forward and the battalion restored the position that it had occupied before the withdrawal. During this battle, the Ethiopians captured 5 Somalis. I asked the Imam: "What did you shout?", He reported the above text through an interpreter.

On February 3, 1978, the leader led a strike force around the Somali positions near Dire Dawa, he left me with the front commander, Colonel Mulatu, at a command post prepared in advance, equipped with trenches, niches, shelters. At this time, the Somalis, who were operating in front of our front, went on the offensive - infantry supported by artillery and tanks. At that moment, Defense Minister Taye Talakhun flew by helicopter to our command post and, rolling his eyes, did not speak, but shouted: "Golitsyn, the Somalis are advancing, what should I do?". I calmly told him: "Shoot them from their positions, do not retreat, fly away as quickly as possible!". As soon as the minister took to the air, the Somalis spotted our command post and opened artillery fire on it, at least to divisions. Everything at the command post and around it was plowed with shells. I saw how our Colonel Solovyov managed to jump into a niche, as a shell exploded right there in this place. A third of the personnel who were at the command post died, and Colonel Solovyov remained unharmed, he was lucky. I recently saw him on the Arbat in a general's uniform. The cause of the deaths was the arrival of a helicopter at the command post, the Somalis conducted good reconnaissance.

Periodically, when I came to Addis Ababa, I wrote reports to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army P.I. Ivashutin, informed him about the situation at the front, in the country.

In March, Major General SP flew to Addis Ababa from the GRU General Staff. Krakhmalov to get acquainted with the situation on the spot. I informed him about the situation and the work done in terms of intelligence. While preparing the operation

near Dire-Dawa, for several days we lived in the same room with Grigory Ustinovich Dolnikov. It was interesting to communicate with a man with a difficult fate. I managed to learn something about his military activities as a pilot at the front, about captivity, about escaping from captivity, about being in partisans, again flying at the front, about post-war service. At this time, we received a message about the assignment of G.U. Dolnikov the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the heroism shown during the Great Patriotic War. We congratulated him cordially, drank a little, in a front-line manner, and Grigory Ustinovich also drank, but only milk, he had a severe exacerbation of his illness. During periods of calm at the front, our delegation was stationed in Addis Ababa, in the

former palace of the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selasie, and then in a large outbuilding next to the palace.

The palace is a beautiful white-stone work of art that was pleasant to look at in bright tropical light from any direction. Huge halls, galleries, living quarters, dining rooms, resting places inside the palace amazed with their luxury. Paintings, tapestries, luxury items installed in stained-glass windows, sculptures, statues, chic furniture, acoustics - all this appeared before our eyes. We could move around the palace freely in any direction, but we always felt behind us secret surveillance or random meetings with servants. During the meal, we took the places of the former imperial family and their guests, and at that time we were served by the same people who served the emperor.

Enclosures and cages with wild animals were equipped near the palace: panthers, bears, monkeys, ostriches, etc. And, of course, a huge rose garden struck with its size and smells. All this luxury was located in the center of Addis Ababa near and

luxurious mansions of the former Ethiopian nobility, and next to the poverty of urban neglected, littered quarters where ordinary people lived. When traveling by car around the city, more often near traffic lights, our cars were surrounded by beggars with outstretched hands. Extraordinary poverty was observed everywhere outside the palaces.

Once, on reconnaissance, we climbed in an UAZ along a mountain serpentine near one of the Ethiopian villages. The day was sunny, the road was winding, and we watched this village for more than two hours at a glance. The huts of the village are more like huts, the entire human population did not have any clothes, neither children nor adults, they were completely naked, they did something there - they dug the ground, herded cattle, the children played and ran - all naked.

I was struck by the unusual nature for our eyes: the cacti that grow in the pots of our apartments here were giant trees, they were chopped and sawn for firewood. The flowers on the trees were huge - like hats, real melons grew on melon trees, in the forest thickets there were many fruits the size of lemons and oranges with unusual smells and tastes. You could pick and chew coffee beans. We saw some animals in nature. For example, predatory hyenas, the size of a pig, but very mobile, at night their eyes burn like lanterns. Several times we saw flocks of monkeys in the forest, which ran away when we appeared. One day, approaching a sheer mountain, we saw a flock of monkeys licking tin cans thrown, apparently, the day before by soldiers, and feasting on other scraps of food. They had nowhere to go, all of them, including those with cubs, climbed the mountain, and we watched them for 5-10 minutes until they disappeared behind the ridge of heights. Some of our comrades saw ostriches in nature, I did not manage to see them. On the flat terrain among the cacti, termites built their huge pyramidal towers. In low places, near puddles and streams, flocks of colorful parrots fluttered, the brethren of which are sold in our pet stores. On the outskirts of settlements fell down peasants

meat waste that was devoured by bare-necked eagles and vultures. The eagles did not react in any way to the presence of people, they continued to devour the prey thrown by them. The locals called them nurses.

In the shallow waters of the lakes there are thousands of wild cranes, geese, ducks, pelicans, flamingos, which probably come here from our northern places for wintering. The locals do not touch these concentrations of birds, so they feel out of danger.

But, to our great regret, we did not manage to really admire the charms of this fertile, warm, sunny land. We were content with what came into our field of vision in between cases. After the end of the fighting in Ogaden, at the direction of the leader, I, one of the members of our delegation, remained for several

days in the Harar, Jijigi region, carried out his instructions to assist the Ethiopians in organizing reconnaissance after the Ethiopian troops reached the state border with Somalia. Then he flew to Addis Ababa, joined the group, washed off the front-line dirt.

Having received permission to return, our delegation in full force returned to Moscow in early May 1978. The next day after returning to Moscow, I arrived

with a report to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, General of the Army P.I. military order. It was the end of the third war in which I had to participate.

All other members of the delegation were also somewhat later awarded government awards.

Chapter

24 Business trip to Germany

According to the decision of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense in December 1979, I was appointed to the post of head of the Soviet military communications mission under the Commander-in-Chief of the

British Army of the Rhine. The appointment was somewhat unexpected, but the order is the order, I left for the place of the new service and took up my duties.

The Soviet Military Liaison Mission under the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine was formed for the first time in 1947 in accordance with an agreement concluded between the commander of the Soviet and British zones of occupation in Germany. The agreement was signed on April 3, 1947 from the Soviet side by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief - Chief of Staff of the GSVG, Colonel General Malinin, from the British side - by the Deputy Military Governor of the Control Commission in Germany, Lieutenant General Robertson. Similar Soviet liaison missions

were set up under the commanders of the American and French forces in Germany. And under the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, military communications missions were formed for the commanders of the British, American, and French troops in Germany. In accordance with this agreement, the main task of the mission was to maintain communication between the headquarters of both Commanders-in-Chief and their military administrations in the zones.

In each zone, the mission had the right to protect the interests of its citizens and their property interests, as well as to provide assistance to compatriots visiting the zone in which the mission is accredited.

Each mission, both Soviet and British, was given the same opportunities of movement with the corresponding members of the movement in mission. Freedom of passes was granted, that is, both zones, with the exception of prohibited areas.

Each mission, according to the agreement, was allowed to have its own radio station to communicate with its Commander-in-Chief, and when members of the mission moved around the zone, they were allowed to use the existing means of communication (post, telephone, telegraph). Couriers, when moving between the mission and the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, enjoyed freedom of movement and immunity, which was granted to diplomatic couriers.

The buildings and territories of the mission had, by agreement, complete inviolability. The head of the mission was accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation zone.

Our mission was located in the small German town of Bünde, on the motorway connecting the cities of Hannover and Osnabrück. The actual territory of the mission was a small area, enclosed by a fence, on the territory of which we were provided with eight two-story buildings where we worked, lived, had a canteen and a small club, a room for receiving guests. On two sides, our section adjoined the residential town of British officers, on two sides - to the German city quarters. From the headquarters of the British Army of the Rhine (the headquarters of the SGA), stationed in Reindalen, we were separated by a distance of approximately 250 km. As part of our Soviet mission, there were 12 officers, 2

ensigns, 5 soldiers-drivers and radio telegraph operators. The total number of our people, depending on the number of children, numbered at different times from 30 to 35 people (officers, warrant officers, soldiers, wives of officers and warrant officers, their children). We lived as a friendly team, tried as best we could to support each other away from our homeland. Everyone ate in the same dining room, except for small children. Twice a week we watched our Soviet films, some of the comrades had televisions. The territory of the British occupation zone in Germany was the largest in terms of area, it

included the lands of Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia and the cities on the rights of the provinces of Hamburg, Bremen and Bremerhaven. The military-political course of Great Britain had a pronounced anti-Soviet, pro-

American and pro-NATO orientation. This was due to the country's membership in NATO,

military cooperation with the United States, the desire of the British government to ensure the country's leading position in Western Europe and strengthen its position in developing countries. A central place was occupied by questions of building up the combat power of the British armed forces, which were the most important component of the NATO Combined Armed Forces.

The main grouping of British troops deployed on West German territory is the British Army of the Rhine (BRA), which includes formations and units of the 1st Army Corps (three divisions) and separate rear units, as well as the command of the British Air Force in Germany (Royal Air Force in Germany). In total, there are more than 70 thousand people in this group. Formations and units occupy several dozen military camps. Part of the financial resources for the maintenance of the troops was allocated from the budget of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The commander of the British Army of the Rhine is also the commander of the troops of the Northern Army Group (SGA) consisting of four army corps (Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) and a US brigade (12 divisions and 4 separate brigades). The headquarters of the SGA was also located in Reindalen.

In the combat strength of the SGA, there were approximately personnel - more than 200 thousand people, detachment divisions - 4 (one in each AK), atomic artillery divisions - 6, tanks - more than 3.5 thousand, field artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers installations - more than 1.5 thousand.

Interacts with the SGA, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, 2 joint tactical aviation command (OTAK), numbering more than 95 thousand people in its composition, more than 40 tactical aviation squadrons (of which 12 squadrons are British - more than 160 aircraft, including more than 100 carriers), more than 700 combat aircraft, of which (240-270 carriers of nuclear weapons. The command headquarters was also located in Reindalen. Operational and combat training of troops was

carried out actively in accordance with the basic provisions of the coalition military strategy of "flexible response" and was aimed at improving combat readiness, ensuring the ability

perform the combat mission of defeating the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in the conditions of warfare using various means of destruction.

At the very center of this powerful NATO grouping of troops was our small Soviet liaison mission. Leaving the territory of the mission in any direction, we would definitely encounter troops - the territory of the FRG was so densely stuffed with them. NATO troops moved in different directions, they were filled with highways, ordinary roads connecting settlements, they conducted classes and exercises at training grounds and just in the field, firing from automatic weapons was heard, the air shuddered from the roar of aircraft engines flying at low altitudes. All West German soil thundered from the wound up military machine of NATO troops. For all of us, Soviet officers, family members, the situation was unusual, alarming, restless. Especially hectic were the days of jet flights for our little children, when literally over the roofs of the mission and in general over the city of Bunde, planes flew at breakneck speeds. Our communication mission was supervised by the military section of the British troops, geographically located on the same street with us. The section was usually led by an officer with the rank of major. During my four years as Chief of Mission, there were three officers: King, Cameron, and Andersen. In addition to the chief, the section included an interpreter - reserve major James, two corporals. The British kept three full-time observers who sat in a booth opposite the exit gate from the mission, kept an observation log, it recorded: the number of the car that left the mission, the names of the officers sitting in the car, the name of the driver, the time the car left and the direction of movement. The same thing was recorded upon the return of cars from trips. The observation booth was equipped with surveillance devices, a telephone and a radio station. Any vehicle leaving the mission was reported to BRA security. In 1983, the booth was equipped with a television camera. Television cameras, except for the entrance gate, were installed in front of our two entrance gates. Any exit from the mission, any arrival to the mission were visible on the screen and recorded by observers in the log, and also

reported to the BRA security service. A local German gardener was kept, who, in addition to his main duties, constantly monitored members of the mission and officer families directly on the territory of the mission. At one time, such a janitor-gardener was a German with the original surname Shpilka. In the morning he would come, indicate the work, then take a flask, lie down in the bushes and sleep. Then he woke up, again marked work and went home. He was usually found sleeping in the bushes by our children, who later informed their mothers where they saw Spilka sleeping, then he was fired from his job, they picked up a more zealous campaigner. We were served in the dining room by five German women (housekeeper, cooks,

waitresses). For many years she headed this service in Frau Lübben's canteen. In addition to cooking, the duties of the housekeeper included three written reports about absent officers and members of their families at breakfasts, lunches, and dinners. Reports to the British were presented on formalized slips of paper. In our opinion, the entire security service was headed by translator James, who spoke Russian very well and

had worked in this position for decades. James was married a second time to a German woman from East Prussia, who hated everything Russian, everything Soviet, with all her soul and body. James bought himself a house in Germany and intended (so he said) to stay forever in Germany. All important documents from Russian into English and vice versa were translated by James, our translators were much weaker than him. When we visited the headquarters of the BRA or received guests from the headquarters of the BRA and the British units in our mission, James was involved in simultaneous translations. He coped with these duties perfectly, although he had never been to the Soviet Union.

This is how hard our mission was framed by the security service of the BRA, which was headed at that time by Colonel Holmes. But that is not all. The rest of the British counterintelligence methods against the officers of our mission will be discussed later. Having become acquainted first hand with the situation in Germany, especially in its northern part, with the work of mission officers, the life and life of officers, the problems that arise in the course of work, I had to

arrive at the headquarters of the BRA for presentation to the commander, chief of staff and other officials. The

date for my submission was mutually agreed to be 18 February 1980. I was accompanied on this trip by the head of the English section, Major King, translator James, the former head of the mission, Colonel N.I. Astapin, Captain V.V. Isupov. It took us about three hours to get from Bunde to Reindalen. The route passed through the most densely populated area in Germany, the Ruhr industrial region, which stretches from east to west for about 150 kilometers. The Ruhr is a continuous conglomerate of coal mines, industrial enterprises,

cities, towns, railways and roads, and warehouse heaps. And above all this is a thick, hopeless veil of dust and burning, and so on to the Rhine itself. But the order of movement on the roads, solid, non-intersecting highways allow you to keep high speeds. Before the Rhine, on the shore, we made a stop to look at the river. Its width in that place is more than a kilometer. But it is not water that flows, but a solid black stream - it is very polluted.

After passing through Mönchengladbach, 10-15 km from the headquarters of the BRA, we were met by two British military police crews on motorcycles at a prearranged parking lot. Accompanied by motorcyclists, we drove into Reindalen and into

the territory of the BRA headquarters. We were met at the entrance by BRA Intelligence Chief Brigadier Jones, BRA Security Chief Colonel Holmes, and Air Force Security Chief Colonel Smart. Several gray German-style buildings housed the headquarters of the BRA and SGA. On the flagpoles in front of the building fluttered the state flags of the armies that are part of the SGA (Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland). In the office of the Chief of Staff of the BRA, we were met by two Chiefs of Staff - the Chief of Staff of the BRA and SGA, Major General Guy, and the Chief of Staff of the RAF in the FRG, Air Vice-Marshal Setton. After a short acquaintance, the usual exchange of phrases about how we feel, a road trip, we headed to the office of the BRA commander. We were also met there by two commanders: the commander of the BRA and SGA, General William Scotter, and the commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Peter Terry. Mutual

greetings, handshakes, I present to General Scotter a letter presented by the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, General of the Army E.F. Ivanovsky, in which he informs Scotter of my appointment as head of the communications mission under the commander of the BRA. My brief introduction to the commanders, then an hour-long conversation. The conversation was of a general nature: about the situation in the world, in Europe, about the joint military operations during the Second World War of the Soviet and British troops as part of the anti-Hitler coalition, about the escort of sea caravans from England to Murmansk, about cultural communication between England and the Soviet Union, about general problems of army service in the armed forces of Great Britain and the USSR, about the desirability of closer contacts between the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG and the Commander of the British Forces (BRA and Air Force), etc. We realized that for both British commanders the conversation was of interest, James informed us about this after the conversation. Finally, they were simply curious to look at a living Soviet general and talk to him. I prepared thoroughly for the conversation. At the end of the conversation, I invited both commanders to visit our Soviet mission at a convenient time for them and invited them to a reception that was held at the mission on February 23 in honor of the anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Army. They thanked for the invitation and said that someone from the British command would be at the reception.

The position of our mission, as well as other Soviet missions in the American and French zones, was somewhat uncertain in terms of obtaining information about the situation in the country, in the armies of the former allies. We, unlike the military attaches, were not invited by the BRA command anywhere, neither to maneuvers, nor to exercises. Our former allies sought, in a sense, to keep us isolated. Therefore, we were forced to take the initiative and work according to our plan. The officers' working day began with listening

to information about the situation in the world, in Europe, and in more detail in the FRG and NATO troops. Daily such information was prepared by translators according to radio and local press reports, sometimes other officers were instructed to prepare such information.

Then some of the officers sat down to study the press - magazines, newspapers, reference literature on political and military topics.

They made some generalizations or information on novelties in operational art, tactics, weapons, equipment, listened to the radio. We subscribed to a lot of English, American, German magazines and newspapers, bought them in bookstores and shops. There was no shortage of literature in foreign languages.

Another part of the officers went out by car to get acquainted with the country, its sights. Along the way, if troops came across on the routes, then they got acquainted on the move with these troops, with their weapons and equipment, with the organization of their movement, the appearance of the military personnel of various armies included in the SGA. Sometimes it was possible to see the organization of classes with military units in the field.

Some of our officers happened to be witnesses to the parachute landing of an American brigade in the fields south of Hanover. The same brigade, about which they wrote a lot, that it was loaded onto planes in the United States, without an intermediate landing was delivered to Germany and thrown out with weapons on its territory.

The BRA Headquarters of our mission issued a map with permanent restricted areas marked on it, the boundaries of which were forbidden for members of the mission to cross. We believed that the areas closed to us were positions and depots of nuclear attack weapons, important control points for weapons and troops, arsenals with weapons and equipment for dual-based troops, airfields for combat aviation, naval bases, positions for air defense and electronic intelligence, training grounds and equipped training fields. A day or

sometimes a few hours before the start of exercises scheduled to be held with NATO troops, we were given a map with temporary exclusion areas, which indicated the duration of the ban (hours and dates). The card was usually signed by the chief of staff of the BRA.

The British zealously watched to ensure that, God forbid, the car of our mission crossed the border of the forbidden area. Simultaneously with the presentation of the map of temporary restricted areas around the mission, round-the-clock duty of British military police crews was established, sometimes two or three such crews were on duty. Police cars had strong engines, were fast,

crews are equipped with surveillance devices. The police cars had an album with photos of all the officers of the mission, pictures of our cars with numbers. All of our cars had large, non-standard yellow license plates with black numbers and red symbols of the Soviet flag. The license plates of our cars were very far visible, they differed sharply in color and size from the numbers of the cars of the

FRG and the military vehicles of the NATO troops.

As soon as our car left the mission area, an English police car followed it and accompanied our car along the entire route until it returned to the mission area. When our car stopped in the parking lots, the police car also stopped, and when traffic resumed, the English car also followed. In the course of the movement, the senior crew of the police car reported to the headquarters of the BRA by radio about the location of the mission vehicle and the actions of our officers. At about 1 pm, wherever we were, another police car would arrive and change them, the surveillance continued. The crew of the car that had changed made farewell gestures to our officers and went to rest. In the parking lots, the crew of the police car, if called upon, made contact with our officers, carried on meaningless conversation, accepted treats of cigarettes, but continued to carry out their police duties.

If a convoy of military vehicles walked towards our car or overtook it, the police did everything possible to prevent our officers from watching the convoy. The policemen parked their car in such a way as to prevent our car from moving, did not allow us to turn around, to the point that they covered the windows of the car with their backs or capes. I remember the case when the car where the senior lieutenant colonel P.A. Berezansky, the police threw a tarpaulin so that the officers could not observe the passage of the English

columns of military vehicles and equipment.

Illegal, unjustified detentions of mission officers in the zone were quite frequent. In English barracks, clubs, in West German police stations in prominent places

photographs and drawings of the mission's vehicles with their characteristic flashy numbers were hung out. Under the drawings, a request was indicated to report the place and time of the appearance of the mission vehicles, and telephone numbers were indicated by which it was necessary to notify about this. Local residents of Germany said that the British even paid the Germans up to 5 marks for reporting the appearance of

Soviet mission officers. Tendentious articles about the "espionage" activities of officers of the Soviet mission were periodically placed in the British and West German press. In these articles, the Germans were indignant at the right of diplomatic immunity of the missions. For example, in the English newspaper "Phosiz Weekly Eco" dated 17.4.83, an article was published with the headline "Caught red-handed." The article reported: "Yesterday, three members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission were held for two hours after they were detained near a civilian nuclear research center near Jülich, West Germany. A spokesman for the German police said it was up to the British military authorities to determine whether the Russians were carrying out espionage missions." In fact, there was such a detention of our officers, only the senior crew of our car, Colonel E.A. Baranov, performed the usual exit to the zone, and our officers could not see the secrets kept there through the walls of the institute.

In the magazine "Vertekhnik" No. L for 1983 there was a German article "Soviet military missions - a hostile factor for the Bundeswehr." The article, in particular, stated: "Soviet military communication missions are a relic of the occupation time and conduct open military intelligence. They are located in Frankfurt am Main (former American occupation zone), Bünde (former British occupation zone), Baden-Baden (former French occupation zone). They will remain a hostile factor for the Bundeswehr as long as the Western Allies have similar missions under the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Potsdam.

The Ruhr Nachrichten newspaper of 8.4.1983 stated in the article "Bonn will not follow the French version of the expulsion of Eastern diplomats": "It is no secret that the Kremlin embassy in Bonn, as well as in Paris, is engaged in espionage activities.

The German secret services know that out of 400 employees of the embassy, 100 are spies. 77 people suspected of this activity belong to the Soviet representative office of Aeroflot, the Trade Mission and military missions ... The German secret services proceed from the fact that in the place of one spy who was expelled from the country, another will soon arrive, to expose him in espionage activities will require a lot of time and effort. Therefore, it is better to observe the already known Soviet agent, study him, and not give him the opportunity to harm the security of the FRG. However, life is life, service is service. Our officers continued, almost daily, to go to the zone in order to somehow feel the

impulse of the activities of NATO troops, to study the situation in the country. Especially a lot of military movements were observed during the periods of exercises and maneuvers such as "Winter", "Autham Forge", troops' outings to the ranges of Bergen Hops, Zenne Lager and others. Constantly deployed from equipped positions, reconnaissance was carried out by the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries by the forces and means of radio engineering units and subunits of NATO armed forces.

forces.

Very rarely, but due to the negligence and inattention of officers, mission vehicles sometimes crossed the boundaries of the forbidden areas. If this became the property of the British security service and the West German police, then on the radio, in the newspapers, a noise arose throughout the country. This happened on

January 29, 1983 in the north of Germany near Flensburg. The mission officers, while returning home, collided with a civilian Mercedes car at the border with the forbidden line. 10 West German vehicles immediately arrived at the scene of the collision, and then officials of the British military police flew in by helicopter. The next day, West German, English local newspapers, radio presented this case as an act of espionage. The newspapers "Ruhr Nachrichten", "Soester Anzeiger" for 1/31/83 gave the following message: "Three Soviet officers of the SVMS in the FRG had an accident in a car during a trip to the military facility of the FRG Navy near Flangburg, which was prohibited for them. They collided with the car of a local resident in the immediate vicinity of the new communications center of the German Navy,

which is designed to provide communication between the headquarters of the German Navy and the ships of the Navy in the Baltic Sea. The same newspaper "Rur Nahrnchtten" dated February 1, 1983 under the catchy headline "The military mission is involved in secret actions. Soviet officers on a slippery slope", "The Soviet Union is using its allied rights for activities that are espionage", presented this accidental encounter near the forbidden area as an illegal act. The British newspaper for the troops, Phosés Weekly Eco, dated 20.2.83, under the heading "Red Spies Sneak", reported the following: "A sinister Soviet intelligence network operates under the noses of the allies in the FRG, but the authorities turn a blind eye because of the 40-year-old treaty on the activities of the red agents. The communist spy network cracked when one of its cars got into a traffic accident ...", etc. The Soldat und Technik magazine and a number of other newspapers wrote about the incident near Flensburg.

After the collision, our car was loaded onto an English trailer for transportation to the mission. The car was accompanied by Art. Lieutenant V.T. Zakharov, our soldier-driver and English translator James. On the way to the mission, a trailer with our car loaded on it drove into an English military camp. Zakharov and the soldier driver were not allowed to accompany the car to the town, he and James waited for the trailer with the car to return from the town for about 3 hours. The next day, in the mission, our ensigns determined that the body, front panel and other components of the car were dismantled, opened by the British, looking for reconnaissance equipment, but they did not find anything, since it was not there. This was a clear violation of the agreement on the diplomatic immunity of the machines of the Soviet communications mission.

In all cases of violation of the agreement, illegal detention of our officers in the zone, I wrote written protests to the chief of staff of the BRA with a request to investigate the incidents and punish those responsible. But in all written, and more often oral answers, early. headquarters justified the actions of the military police.

In relations with the leadership of the British troops, we also had bright moments. On several occasions, the Chiefs of Staff of the BRA and the British Air Force visited the Federal Republic of Germany on unofficial visits.

Previously, through the English section in charge of our mission, the date of the visit of the chief of staff and the number of officers accompanying him were agreed. At the appointed time, the gates of the mission opened wide, I met the chief of staff and the officers accompanying him. Usually he was accompanied by the head of the security service of the BRA, Colonel Holmes, and if the head. Air Force headquarters - then the beginning. Air Force Security Colonel Smart, their adjutants, early. English section in Bunde, constant translator James. On a small platform near the national flag of the USSR,

which was hoisted daily, we lined up the officers of the mission, I introduced them one by one to the chief of staff, he, as a rule, asked the officers questions, they answered. The usual questions were: where did he serve, who was by profession, where did he come from, what kind of family, etc. No one else, except for the chief of staff, asked questions to the officers. Then everyone was photographed for memory. The chief of staff, together with me and the officers accompanying him, walked around the territory of the mission, the club, the canteen, the car park, and the playground. We treated the chief of staff in our spacious living room with

dishes of Russian cuisine prepared by the wives of officers (dumplings, pirozhki, cold appetizers). They drank only Soviet drinks: vodka of different varieties, Georgian and Armenian cognacs and wines. At the table, a casual conversation, photographing for memory, the exchange of inexpensive presents (usually in a good package of vodka or wine - one or two bottles). Then seeing off to the gate. When treating at the table, the deputy was always present. the head of the mission, Colonel Oleg Maksimovich Perepnyako, and one or two officers. After such visits by the chiefs of staff from the headquarters of the BRA, something was

thrown into the mission - sports equipment, soft chairs for the club, furniture for the hotel, etc. We knew very well that the British liked our simple non-protocol meetings. But none of the

commanders (BRA and Air Force) have ever visited us. Colonel Holmes and interpreter James secretly said that every visit to the mission by military officials was necessarily coordinated with London. The mission was attended by the chief of staff of the BRA, General

Major Taylor, Chief Air Force Headquarters - Air Vice-Marshal Setton.

Periodically, the commanders of the BRA and the Air Force invited me to a reception. On January 29, 1981, I was invited by the commander of the BRA and SGA, General Gau, on May 15, 1981, by the commander of the British Air Force in the FRG, Air Marshal Kenedy, on December 22, 1983, by the commander of the BRA and SGA, General Nigel Bagnal, the former commander of the British 1st AC

in the FRG. The conversations at these meetings were of a general nature: about service in the British and Soviet armies, about the situation in Europe, about cultural news in England and the Soviet Union (literature, art, cinema, the interests of the people, etc.). But for each

meeting it was necessary to prepare. I would like to talk about two of them in particular. On May 15, 1981, after an official meeting with Air Marshal Kenedy, Air Force Chief of Staff Air Vice Marshal Setton took us around the headquarters of the SGA and 2 otaks, showed us where the officers of the allied forces in NATO (British, Germans, Dutch, Belgians, Americans) work, briefly spoke about the relationship in the work of allied officers. He showed us the flight canteen, where pilot officers who work at the Air Force headquarters eat. According to him, once a month most of the pilots of all combat squadrons of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain in Germany dine in this dining room together with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. This unites the flight crew, the pilots meet each other, exchange experience in flight training. Based on the number of tables, Oleg Maksimovich Perepiyako and I roughly estimated that 600–700 people were going to such a dinner. Setton showed us a shop for English officers working in Reindalen, where all goods are sold at lower prices than in the shops of the Germans. The meeting ended, as always, with a good lunch in the flight canteen.

On December 27, 1983, after a meeting at BRA headquarters with its commander, General Bagnal, we were invited to dinner at his home by the BRA Chief of Staff, General Taylor. At the dinner, in addition to his wife, who, according to etiquette, sat next to me, there was a new head of intelligence, a young general with his wife, early. BRA Security Colonel Holmes and another general. The table was served on ceramic coasters, on which episodes of the fighting of the Crimean War of 1853-56 were depicted in bright colors, when Great Britain fought against Russia near Sevastopol. Coasters had different sizes (for plates with soup,

under pepper, mustard, sugar, sweets), each of them depicted different episodes. As Taylor's wife explained to me, these coasters are a family table setting of the traditionally military Taylor family. The grandfather of the chief of staff, General Taylor, took part in the battle with the Russians near Sevastopol. The mansion occupied by General Taylor was a small two-story house. We were served at the table by young Englishmen, apparently corporals. Taylor said that the service of British officers in the FRG was considered prestigious and better paid.

Generals, officers who have completed their terms of service, after the FRG, usually retire or retire. He, Taylor, is also due to retire this year, he has a dacha in Cyprus and he intends to go there after the service. The location of the headquarters, the houses of the officers and, in general, the military

camp of Reindalen looks, in terms of grooming and order, somewhat worse than the military camps of the GSVG headquarters in Wünsdorf. British officers and their families constantly complain about the bad, damp, dank microclimate of the Mönchengladbach area.

The officers of the mission maintained good neighborly relations with the British officers of the Bunde garrison. The territory of the mission adjoined the English town on two sides, where the officers of the transport regiment lived. On New Year's Eve, on Easter, in the open air at the mission location, we set several tables with simple drinks and snacks (vodka, wine, sandwiches), opened the gates wider. English neighbors with families, children, came to us with musical home instruments (25-30 people), sang religious psalms, and treated themselves. Our families warmly welcomed them and sang their songs. We never had any incidents with our British neighbors. When we met on the street, we greeted each other.

Our relations with the local authorities and the population of Bunde were also normal. Mission officers, their wives, children felt at ease among the local population. We were in the city, shops, just for walks, on excursions to interesting places - everywhere we met a friendly attitude. Upon arrival in Bunde, I went to the mayor of the city, introduced myself to the local authorities, and warm friendly relations were constantly maintained between us.

I remember that in Bünd, we were also invited to the celebration on the occasion of the opening of the newly built administrative building. At the opening of the solemn meeting, along with the names of guests from other cities and lands, my position, title and surname were named. The solemn meeting was very similar to our similar meetings. The report listed all the good things that had been done for the city, presented letters of commendation to the veterans of the city council, indicated the problems that the city authorities needed to solve. After the solemn meeting, all its participants, including us, were invited to beer with sandwiches. I have never drunk or eaten such delicious beer and sandwiches anywhere else.

The Germans organized for us a visit to the local history museum, the factory for the production of the Coca-Cola drink and other places of interest to us.

One of the correspondence of the local English newspaper dated February 20, 1983 stated: "The German population living near the mission considers Russian servicemen to be good, well-mannered neighbors. Bünd Mayor Herbert Fase said: "We never have a problem with the behavior of members of the mission in public places. They are always correct. Every October they invite us for caviar and vodka to celebrate the anniversary of the Russian revolution."

We maintained close ties with the firm of the Ecker brothers, which traded in cars from the Opel factories. The company was located in the city of Ouenhausen, 30 km from Bünd. On connections with the Ecker firm, one can clearly trace what capitalist dependence is. We had six Opel cars in the mission (three "Record" brands are ordinary, one "Record" with a cargo trunk, one "Record" small-sized bus for 8 people, one "Senator" - representative). The consumption of motor resources for all cars was large. Therefore, at a diplomatic discount, we bought 2-3 Record cars from Ekers annually, sold our old cars to them, repaired cars that were in use from them, we were tied to this company. They were attached to us, as we were their regular reliable customers. Horst Ecker came to us, and a deal was made at the table with a modest meal: we sold him the old and bought the new. Me and

our officers repeatedly visited them at the repair plant and in the car shop in Ouenhausen, they saw the organization of capitalist labor on the assembly line. A worker at his workplace could not leave for a minute without stopping the flow of the conveyor. Eker's other brother sat high up behind a glass partition and saw each work station, and he also gave commands to automatically issue car spare parts from the warehouse and feed them to the work stations. There were 2-3 women in the office who were involved in paperwork - that's all the attendants, and the rest - in the workplace. The firm had an annual multi-million dollar turnover, both brothers were millionaires.

Opposite the mission lived the German Wortman. Through him we maintained contact with local authorities and the public.

Twice near the territory of the mission protest meetings were organized by the local population about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. There were from 200 to 500 people at the rallies. During the rallies, the local police did not allow any outrages against our people. Police officers with dogs usually stood near the mission and did not let anyone near the fence. We believed that the initiative to hold meetings near the mission belonged to the British.

One of the representative functions that our officers and their wives had to perform was receiving missions on the occasions of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and Soviet Army Day. British officers, representatives of the Soviet embassy from Bonn and the Soviet trade mission from Cologne, local city, district and land authorities, heads of firms with whom business relations were maintained, representatives of the political parties of the Herford district and the city of Bünde, including communist, the police authorities of the district and the city of Bunde, representatives of the Soviet consulate in Hamburg, etc. In total, up to 100 people were invited. During the reception, the mission officers, representatives of the Soviet embassy and the trade mission got acquainted with the local German

authorities, the political and economic situation, and the British officers. The guests were multifaceted, multilingual, with different

political views. The conversation was active. English officers in multicolored dress uniforms, ladies in festive attire, men in formal suits looked spectacular. I would like to say quite impartially that our Russian women looked much better than others at receptions. The guests were treated to various varieties of Russian vodka, Georgian dry wines, sandwiches with caviar and various sausages, and Soviet-made sweets. As always, the guests were pleased with the food. At that time, the quality of our Soviet drinks and products was high. The reception lasted 3-4 hours, from 19 to 22-23 hours. After seeing off the foreigners, our guests from the embassy, consulate, trade mission, our officers with their families, remained for some time, congratulated each other on the holiday, sang our Russian songs. Receptions were always organized, but it took a lot of work beforehand to make everything go well. Especially got the wives of our officers. All appetizers, table setting were done by our wives. Our ensigns were used to carry drinks during the reception. We did not use the services of the canteen staff, we knew that our women would do everything better.

Every year in September, our officers took part in the laying of wreaths and flowers on the graves and at the monument to Soviet prisoners of war who died during the Great Patriotic War in the Nazi camp Stukenbrock. This ceremony was attended annually by a delegation of veterans from the Soviet Union - 3-4 people, our comrades from the embassy and the trade mission also took part in it. On the square near the cemetery, the German public organization "Flowers for Stukenbrock" organized a rally, which was attended by more than one thousand local residents from the surrounding settlements. After the official ceremony and the meeting of the members of our delegation with the Germans, they came to visit us at the mission, where a meeting of the delegation with the officers and families of the mission was organized. The composition of the Soviet delegation usually included one of the writers and poets, so the meetings were interesting. In 1982, the delegation included the writer Vasiliev A.S., he presented us with his book "The Song of Przemyśl", in 1983 the writer Ivan Stadnyuk, with whom an interesting conversation of the mission officers about the book "War" took place. He spoke about his future creative plans.

The town of Stuckenbrock and the cemetery were in a permanent no-mission area, and we used to drive there in two cars. Our cars were always accompanied by the British military police and it turned out that a large column approached the cemetery. The British, even in this case, could not leave us unaccompanied, but it was clear that they did not feel very well at that time.

We had to visit the Soviet embassy in Bonn. Upon arrival in Byudnya, I soon visited the embassy and introduced myself to our ambassador, Vladimir Semenov Semyonov. The conversation was short. Semenov V.S. I was interested in how the officers and their families are arranged and how they live, what is the relationship between the mission officers and the British command. From the conversation, I drew the conclusion for myself that our Soviet ambassador knows very well the situation in the FRG, all its aspects, including the military one. In Bonn, I met a young diplomat at that time, Yuliy Alexandrovich Kvitsinsky, who later held a number of responsible diplomatic posts, including Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Mission

officers periodically came to Bonn for fresh Soviet films, which they then exchanged. Living conditions for officers, their families,

ensigns, sergeants and soldiers were satisfactory. All officers had two-room apartments, and the deputy. The head of the mission, Colonel Semenikhin Petr Tikhonovich, and then Perepiyako Oleg Maksimovich lived in three-room apartments, the ensigns had one room each. As mentioned earlier, we all ate in the same dining room, the food was satisfactory, but

the formulaic dishes of German cuisine were sometimes boring. The soldiers ate like all officers and family members. At the request of the parents, it was possible to feed the children at home, in which case they were given rations. Movies were shown three times a week. On holidays, the women prepared treats themselves and we did without a canteen, but we all ate together. During the summer holidays, schoolchildren came to us, our colony grew, became cheerful.

Periodically, I went to Wunsdorf to the GSVG to report to the command. Reported to the chief of staff. Commander-in-Chief and member of the military council, sometimes Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

When I was the head of the mission, two Commanders-in-Chief were replaced - General of the Army Evgeny Filippovich Ivanovsky, General of the Army Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaitsev, two Chiefs of Staff - Colonel General Dmitry Aleksandrovich Grinkevich, Colonel General Ivan Vasilievich Sviridov, two members of the military council - Colonel General Gubin Ivan Arkhipovich and Colonel-General Aleksey Dmitrievich Lizichev. Depending on the situation, the time available to

the chiefs, the reports were of a different nature. Usually, the military-political situation in the FRG was reported, the state of the Armed Forces of the SGA and their activities, what was observed new in weapons and equipment, where and what exercises and maneuvers were held, the attitude of the BRA command to the members of the mission. Depending on the situation, the questions of the superiors were very different, so before leaving for Wunsdorf I carefully prepared. In my previous service in the Baltic Military District, I was well acquainted with General Meshcheryakov V.A., if I had time, I called on his service, he held the position of Chief of Staff of the GSVG Air Force.

The main command of the GSVG has always provided assistance to missions, including ours, helped to solve the problems that we have, and there have been many of them.

After the report to the command and return to the hotel, I changed into a civilian suit, my wife Galina Fedorovna and I went either to the lake, or to the officers' house, or walked around Wunsdorf. These were real, albeit short, hours of rest, when tension was relieved. There was a good bookstore in Wunsdorf where one could buy a good book. There were good concerts in Wunsdorf with the best artists of our country. Finally, it was good to just walk around, have a glass of beer, eat ice cream among your people. Usually we stayed in Wunsdorf for two, rarely three days and returned to the mission again.

Everything comes to an end. My service as head of the Soviet communications mission under the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine also ended.

In late December 1983, I paid a farewell visit to the Commander of the BRA, General Begnal, Chief of Staff, General Taylor. We parted warmly in Bund with the members of the English section, with the officers of the mission and their wives. In Wünsdorf, after a farewell dinner with comrades in the service, my wife Galina Fedorovna and I flew to Moscow by plane, and in May 1984 I was transferred to the reserve after 42 years of service in the intelligence of the Soviet Army.

Conclusion

We now know that Soviet military intelligence as a whole, despite extremely difficult conditions, in the pre-war period, during the Great Patriotic War, withstood all the tests that fell to its lot, was able to provide command at various levels with intelligence information about the enemy for decision-making in peacetime. , for fighting and conducting operations of various scales during the war. It was carried out continuously during the war, in a variety of conditions. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence officers of various ranks showed examples of composure, steadfastness, organization, and heroism. My

comrade partisans-scouts of the period of the most difficult trials of the war possessed all these qualities, they invested their feasible contribution to our common Victory over Nazi Germany. I would like to name all of my comrades who laid down their lives on the battlefields in Belarus. I would like to bow low to the most faithful, reliable, long-suffering Belarusian people, who did not kneel before the Nazi enslavers, who launched a guerrilla war. Every Belarusian was a scout, every third of them died. May the star of happiness and prosperity forever shine above the Soviet Republic of Belarus with a wise, unfussy people with a big perspicacious heart.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new states in the former Soviet republics (near abroad), the conditions for organizing and conducting intelligence have changed dramatically. The system of reconnaissance worked out over the years, especially radio and radio engineering, space, sea, air, radar, intelligence services, has been disrupted. Some reconnaissance of border districts. agencies, units and subdivisions found themselves outside Russia. intelligence The state border has changed, now it passes near St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Kursk, Orenburg, Omsk. Russia with its military-economic potential, armed forces has become the object of intelligence of special services

countries both far and near abroad and, as before, US intelligence agencies. The publication of the arrest

of Aldrich Hazen Ames, a former US CIA officer and his wife Maria Del Rosario, suspected of spying for the USSR and then Russia, caused a lot of noise in the American government and the media around the world. It was not necessary to call the whole world about it. This is an ordinary, ordinary case of intelligence work, of which there have been many, including in recent years. In most countries, exposed agents of enemy intelligence are usually arrested secretly, without noise, tried and determined.

punishment.

Russia's diplomatic success in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1994 apparently overwhelmed the patience of the US administration. That is why the Ames case received publicity neither earlier nor later. Right now, Washington needs to lay siege to Moscow, to remind who is the boss on the planet. At the same time, American intelligence sharply intensified its activities against Russia. "My every day begins with questions about the events that have taken place in the

world," Bill Clinton said on January 4, 1994 at the headquarters of the CIA. "I am forced to look for answers to these questions, turning primarily to the intelligence community, since it is they who warn me and the entire nation about emerging threats, point out the most important trends in the development of the situation." The assessment of the work of the CIA (given by the president) is high. Now in Russia there is such a situation when representatives of the embassy residencies of foreign countries openly come into contact with carriers of state and defense information and receive it first hand. According to counterintelligence, the volume and content of these materials allow the analytical units of foreign intelligence services to recreate a reliable picture of the industrial, scientific, technical and military potential of Russia. The efforts of the special services are aimed at creating a pro-Western orientation both in the center and in the Russian outback in the legislative and executive structures, among the intelligentsia, heads of large industrial, scientific, military facilities, and businessmen.

American intelligence has begun an unprecedentedly wide collection of political information from legal positions. In some regions of Russia, various kinds of "advisers" have the opportunity to monitor the development of the situation from the inside. The number of trips of CIA intelligence officers to Russian cities and towns has increased. The agreements on the conversion of our military-industrial complex are used by special services to gain access to the latest developments and technologies.

Russia's special services are becoming a subject of American interest. For these purposes, the "Freedom Defense Project" has already been developed and adopted for implementation. It involves the participation of US experts in the development of our legislation to control the activities of intelligence and counterintelligence, the restriction of the activities of the SVR and the GRU and the termination of intelligence activities of these services against the Western powers.

foreign policy circumstances, taking into account which organized intelligence of Russia, boil down to the following.

The United States continues to view the situation in Russia as unstable and explosive. Therefore, they intend to maintain sufficient military potential to ensure their success in any clash with Russia, both independently and as part of NATO.

In the Western European states, apparently, there will be a unanimous desire to maintain in NATO such a military power that would enable them to respond to any development of the situation in Russia. In political and economic terms, the states that are members of NATO consider our country as a raw material appendage, a vast market and a source of cheap labor.

strength.

The rapprochement with NATO of some Eastern European states, primarily Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, will undoubtedly create a potential danger for Russia. In the east,

the presence of unresolved border and territorial problems with Japan has a destabilizing effect on the situation in this region. In Japan, the dissatisfaction of public opinion about the unresolved issue of the Kuril Islands is constantly maintained. The unstable situation in the countries of the near abroad, primarily in the Transcaucasus,

Central Asia, Transnistria and the Baltics, conceals

a potential threat to Russia's security and is fraught with the escalation of existing and the emergence of new armed conflicts near Russian borders. In Latvia and Estonia, they

openly talk about territorial claims against Russia, and in the Lithuanian parliament, voices are heard more and more insistently for the separation of the Kaliningrad region from the Russian Federation, the formation of a new "Baltic Republic" on its territory. Thus, the emerging

military-political situation not only does not reduce the number of states that are objects of intelligence activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but also expands their range due to the need to control the construction and activities of their armed forces. Thanks to the experience gained during the Great Patriotic War, the post-war period, its analysis and generalization, the military intelligence of Russia, having adopted new organizational forms, having reconnaissance equipment, continues to solve its tasks at the present time. It is called upon, in cooperation with other intelligence services, to constantly monitor all existing sources of military danger, the forms of their manifestation, to reveal in a timely manner the plans of the intelligence countries for the use of armed forces, concentrating the main efforts on the disclosure of the most important military-political decisions and measures of foreign states that pose a threat to the security of Russia or affecting its vital interests. The solution of the above tasks is possible only with well-planned, reliably organized reconnaissance of all types, with the presence of an extensive, stable, effective system of early detection and prevention of a military attack. Observing the principle of reliable and reasonable sufficiency for the defense of the country, we must constantly take care of improving intelligence of all types, at all levels. We need a strong, well-

equipped with modern technology intelligence in the ground forces, air defense, air force, navy, space, in all military units - regiment, division, army, district, General Staff.

The memory of the days of the Great Patriotic War is inextricably linked for us - intelligence officers - with thoughts about the future, about the fate of our Fatherland, the world. We would like to proceed from the premise that war as a means of achieving political goals has become obsolete under present-day conditions. But the world is seething, there are and, obviously, there will be more small and large conflicts and wars. We cannot turn a blind eye to examples of the concentration of a large grouping of American troops in the Middle East in a relatively short period of time in the fall of 1990 and spring of 1991, its air and missile strikes against Iraq, and the actions of a group of ground forces. These forces were concentrated in close proximity to the borders of our country. The concentration of NATO air and naval forces in southern Europe and the Mediterranean in early 1994, ready to attack Serbia, was also relatively close to our borders. While reducing the armed forces of our state, we must constantly think about

strengthening and improving intelligence. Priority in the development of intelligence should be given to such technical means that would ensure the receipt of intelligence information in real time and provide timely warning to the country's leadership and command of the impending aggression. Many years of experience in intelligence service allows us to say that in the conditions of a dramatically changed situation in the world, it is

necessary to revise, clarify, and in some cases change the methods and methods of organizing and conducting intelligence, obtaining and summarizing intelligence data. Only the introduction of automated systems from mining to information and analytical bodies will allow promptly and thoroughly, at the request of the command, to issue the necessary information of the current and long-term plan for making informed decisions.